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ABSTRACT 
This study finds evidences in support of a thesis of divergence in shaping of new public 
management (NPM). The underpinning of the study is that NPM gains a new hybrid shape as 
it goes through a complex interactive process of transformation. This study delved deeply into 
the shaping process of NPM in Nepal. The scope of this study includes mapping out the 
actors, processes and contents involved in decisions of NPM-inspired reforms and analyzing 
the causal factors involved in the approval decisions. Drawing upon the two cases Strategy 
Paper of Government of Nepal on Financial Sector Reform Program (SPGNFSRP); and 
Governance Reform Program Roadmap (GRPRM), a qualitative field study was conducted 
mainly with senior officials of relevant ministries, agencies, donor agencies and NGOs. The 
inquiry primarily focused on: What forms of the actors, processes and decision-contents were 
appeared? What factors were influential to affect the decisions? In the analysis, this study 
combined model of NPM transformation of Christensen and Lægreid with three perspectives 
of organization theory: 1) instrumental 2) cultural and 3) environmental.  
 
This study found the evidences that the actors are exhibited central and peripheral roles and 
hence are classified accordingly. All central actors involved such as ministers of finance, 
senior bureaucrats and senior technocrats of concerned ministries and donor agencies along 
with other peripheral actors shown supportive roles. While a few peripheral actors shown 
opposition. Similarly, I learned the processes in the SPGNFSRP to be less democratic, more 
closed, more top-down, more consequentiality and more stable whereas the opposite was the 
processes of the GRPRM. The contents of the SPGNFSRP acquired high market and high 
management elements, thus, are referred as ‘market-driven case’. Since the GRPRM obtained 
low market and high management elements, it is referred as ‘mixed case’.  
 
This study also found that a coalition of deliberate planned and hierarchical decision-making 
of superior organizations, fiscal crises and reform doctrines of donors and international 
agencies strongly contributed to the NPM-inspired decisions in both cases. However, 
domestic political opposition and insurgency partly contributed to the decisions but the elite 
orientation in bureaucrats had little or played no roles. Finally, this study revealed that a new 
hybrid emerged in the cases via the complex interactive model of NPM transformation. 
Looking through the theoretical lens, I observed that the instrumental and environmental 
perspectives circumscribed the cultural perspective in producing a new NPM hybrid.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.0  Backgrounds 
A global wave for public sector reform swept the most parts of the world since 1980s. That 
reform movement is later popularly known as New Public Management (NPM). On the issue 
of shape of the movement, we encounter with contesting arguments. Kettl (2005, p.73) views 
the shape of NPM is the same regardless of wherever it travels. Moreover, McCourt (2001, 
p.224) asks ‘why developing countries are not producing new models of their own?’ Making a 
departure from this ‘convergence’ thesis, one can argue that the fundamental shape of the 
NPM may not be necessarily the same everywhere and may vary from country to country. 
Most importantly, developing countries may not be an exception in this regard. With this 
assumption, the study empirically examines the case of Nepal. The study covers theoretical 
perspectives, empirical descriptions and analytical discussions. The first part of the thesis 
carries a mapping on to what extent a range of actors, processes and contents are parts of 
decision making of some public sector reforms. The later part analyzes to what extent some 
factors have affected the transformative process of NPM ideas in the reforms. More 
specifically, approval decisions on two cases by the Cabinet of Government of Nepal (GoN) 
are considered to be the mainstay of the analysis. The cases include Strategy Paper of 
Government of Nepal on Financial Sector Reform Program (SPGNFSRP) 1999-2000; and 
Governance Reform Program Roadmap (GRPRM) 2001-2004. 
 
Following sections of the chapter specify mainly the background for this study, statement of 
the research problem, objective of the study, research questions asked, significance of this 
study and, finally, the methodology employed. 
 
1.2  Theoretical Backgrounds  
Although the proliferation of NPM ideas in the past decades offers a popular reform banner, 
the underpinnings can be seen somewhat differently from country to country. One preliminary 
argument of this study is that divergent form of NPM views the shape of NPM itself is subject 
to alteration or transformation over time. The transformation obviously can exhibit different 
shapes depending upon the given contexts and actors. And the shape of the transformation can 
be referred as contractualism, i.e., having market elements or managerialism, i.e., having 
management elements, divergent or convergent, universal or indigenous, Anglo-Saxon model 
or non Anglo-Saxon model and so forth. In some countries there might be a strong element of 
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diffusion of NPM ideas from outside, whereas in others the reform process might be more a 
result of national or local initiatives that have subsequently acquired an NPM label 
(Christensen and Lægreid, 2002, p.1-2). As Christensen and Lægreid argue, many NPM-led 
reforms have been accumulating a ‘hybrid’ character in course of time. The ‘hybrid’ character 
displays new institutional forms that have resulted from interaction between local and external 
variants of NPM transformation. Each ‘hybrid’ in the NPM body, however, is likely to enrich 
the existing stock of ideas of NPM. Even if NPM espouses economic values and objectives, 
the concept is loose and multifaceted and offers a kind of ‘shopping basket’ of different 
elements for reformers of public administration (Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1995 cited by 
Christensen and Lægreid, 2002, p.19).  
 
In explaining as to how and why a transformation takes place in a given setting, an analytical 
theoretical tool propounded by Christensen and his colleagues provides instrumental help. 
The model combines three explanatory perspectives: 1) structural/ instrumental 2) cultural, 
and 3) environmental. The first two originate from local elements and the third can from both 
external and local. Structural/ instrumental perspectives view ‘organizations as tools in the 
hands of leaders’ that has ‘implicit rationality’ and exerts ‘limitations on an individual’s 
choice’ and ‘creates a capacity to realize particular goals and values’ (Christensen et al, 2007, 
p.5). It is because organizations are formed to realize certain anticipated goals. Keeping into 
account these features, this study views deliberate planned and hierarchical decision-making 
of superior organizations as an agent of this perspective. The second perspective cultural 
perspective is partly a branch of institutional perspectives and assumes ‘political-
administrative system and public organizations develop slowly and gradually’ (Christensen 
and Lægreid, 1999, p. 172). The perspective views ‘cultural norms and values develop 
gradually, through adaptation to internal and external pressures’ (Christensen et al, 2007, 
p.62). Owing to these, the concerned factors can be grappled with path-dependency of 
historical legacies, thus, resistant to a rapid change. Considering these assumptions, this study 
considers two following indicators as agents of this perspective: elite orientation in 
bureaucrats and domestic political opposition and & insurgency. The last is environmental 
perspective which views that organizations respond to surrounding environment as they live 
and survive in the environment given to them. The environment can be of two types: internal 
and external. For example, economy and ideology factors, as prescribed by a ‘model of 
transformation’ (Christensen and Lægreid, 2002, p.35) are well adjusted with this 
environmental argument. Learnt from the arguments, this study assumes two following 
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indicators as agents of this perspective: fiscal crises and reform doctrines of donors/ 
international agencies. By applying these lenses to any case, an understanding may develop 
about the transformative process as to what factors play imperative roles, how and why.  
 
Through a complex mix of external economic and ideological factors, internal polity features 
and national administrative policy and national historical-institutional contexts the NPM 
reforms are transformed through a ‘creolisation’ process (Christensen and Lægreid, 2002, 
p.33-34). National administrative cultures are unique and distinctive, and in various ways 
resistant to the application of ‘one best model’ or blueprint (Minogue, 2001, p.35). After all, a 
shaped reform idea is a result of interaction between a set of internal and external 
determinants. They culminate in a unique result ‘the result in a hybrid, whereby each country 
develops its own variant of NPM’ (Christensen and Lægreid, 2002, p.34).  
 
1.3  Statement of the Research Problem 
Our departure point is that NPM is a set of loosely coupled ideas and the adoption of the ideas 
might vary from country to country. While absorbing guest ideas that come in, most likely 
from outside a country, country-specific cultural institutions like informal values, norms, and 
symbols etc.; and instrumental/structural institutions like goals, structures, and resources, may 
have some causal effect over the adoption of the ideas into the decisions. The transformation 
process functions as an incubation in which breeding of a hybrid NPM ideas and practices 
take place.  
 
This research focuses on some empirical questions: How concerned decisions were made at 
apex level of the executive? How did they get different shapes in different cases? For what 
reasons, some sorts of tension happened in defining problems and solutions? What were the 
variants there so that the behaviour of reform designers and decision makers vary from case to 
case? Unless addressed these issues, ambiguity and ad-hocism are likely to continue. That will 
also keep on the paucity of our understanding the actors, processes and contents.  
 
According to Fisher and his colleagues (1983:3), a problem may be construed as researchable 
if the following ‘three conditions exist: a perceived discrepancy between what is and what 
should be; a question about why the discrepancy exists; and at least two possible and plausible 
answers to the question’ (cited by Sufian, 1998, p.15-16). We also attempt to figure out the 
three aspects of research problem with reference to this study. Regarding the first, the 
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perceived discrepancy is prevalent between the ideas of NPM practiced globally and the ideas 
of NPM practiced locally in the Nepalese public sector reforms. Likewise, the second why the 
discrepancy exists is tantamount to what factors affected the transformation. Finally, the third 
at least two possible and plausible answers to the questions gets answer from the five actors 
and contexts outlined here-in-after. The three questions posed by this study states the research 
problem to this study. 
 
1.4  Objectives of the Study 
The first objective of this study is to map out the actors, processes and contents involved in 
decisions of NPM-inspired reforms. The study aims at unfolding various forms of the actors, 
processes and contents brought along across the design and approval times. The key points 
include how various actors affected the decisions; how they processed through, and what 
contents they concluded with.  
 
The second objective is to analyze the reasons that passed the ideas of NPM through its 
transformation during the approval decisions. The main concerns insist to look into the roles 
of domestic and international environment, local polity and local political-administrative 
culture through out the decisions; and to answer why transformation of the NPM ideas 
cropped up while the ideas shifted from globalization to localization.  
 
1.5  Research Questions 
In view of the objectives, the central research questions employed were as follows: 
1. What were the actors, processes and contents in the decision-making of the NPM-inspired 
reforms? 
1.1 What actors played the major roles in the approval decision-making of the NPM-
inspired reforms? 
1.2 What were the processes followed in the decision-making? 
1.3 What were the contents of the decisions made? 
 
2. Why did some factors affect the approval decisions of the NPM-inspired reforms? 
      2.1   How did the polity related factors affect the decisions?  
              2.1.1   How did the structure factor affect them? 
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     2.2   How did the political-administrative culture related factors affect the decisions?                
             2.2.1   How did the historical institution factor affect them? 
             2.2.2   How did the style of governance factor affect them? 
 
          2.3   How did the environment related factors affect the decisions? 
             2.3.1   How did the economy factor affect them? 
                  2.3.2   How did the ideology factor affect them? 
 
1.6  Overview of the Methodology 
The first method the study used in the data collection was to analyse documents such as 
reports, agreements, decision minutes, articles, interviews, news coverage and so on. The data 
from these sources mainly answered to the first, second and third questions. They were about 
‘what’ actors, processes, and contents were involved while drawing the NPM ideas into the 
design and decision-making of two public reforms.  
 
Similarly, I conducted open-ended interviews with key informants, i.e., central actors, for the 
same questions where the research needed primary data. The aims were to answer ‘why’ and 
‘how’ some local actors and contexts affected the transformation process of the NPM ideas. 
Apart from the interviews, I mobilized supplementary data help from several sources. They 
include media archives in internet and personal observation. The study also benefited from 
email correspondence, to fill up data gap, with selected key informants.  
 
With regard to analysis of the data, the thesis has used two analytical techniques. The first is 
conversational analysis and the other textual analysis. The first applied in case of interviews 
and the second was applied to the collected documents/ texts, internet archives, and email 
correspondences. In correspondence of the research questions, the study immensely benefited 
from these applications.   
 
1.7  Significance of the Study 
Given the backgrounds, the study expected to acquire following points of significance: 
Ferlie et al (1996, p. 248) suggest ‘further work is needed to assess the extent and significance 
of the hybrid forms empirically occurring.’ I believe that this study adds at least one brick to 
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this direction. This observation adds more empirical flesh to the hybrid representing 
developing countries like Nepal can be understood. 
 
The output of this study is hoped to be an eye-opening for those researchers, academics and 
professionals, who work for institutional reforms, policy analysis, development cooperation, 
and policy advocates. So far, a set tradition is that when it is a ‘call’ for some sort of changes 
in developing countries, local dynamics are most of the times undervalued. Hence, the 
prescribed or imposed reform attempts were failed.  
 
As of now, most of the reforms have faced a tradition that observes any reforms as merely 
taken for granted. This sort of ready-made but sweeping observation tends to neglect some 
other parts, which are generally not exposed due to undermining down-to-earth approach to 
see the phenomenon. Departing from this tradition, the study comes up with some findings 
that render neutral pictures of both sides, i.e., taken-for-granted and owned-with-owner’s 
judgement.     
 
Significant to note, the bunch of NPM practices are like a ‘shopping basket’ of NPM (Hood, 
1991; Pollitt, 1995 cited by Christensen and Lægreid, 2002, p.19). This shopping basket is 
contributed with different sorts of practices from different countries. A collection of ideas 
practiced in the Nepalese reforms can be distilled out and instilled in the open global basket 
so that others also can learn from this. Last but not the least, this study brings into limelight a 
key answer of a question whether there is a new hybrid-NPM in Nepal or not.  
 
1.8  Organization of the Study 
The thesis has altogether six chapters. The chapter one gives an introduction to basics of the 
thesis. The chapter two starts with a short introduction to transformation of NPM, public 
sector reforms, hybrid in NPM and the dependent variable of the thesis. I propose the Cabinet 
decision of the GoN on approval of reform as the dependent variable. Afterwards the chapter 
deepens into three theoretical perspectives and underlying five independent variables and 
concerned hypotheses. The chapter two concludes with an analytical model placed aimed at 
analysing the cause and effect relation of the five independent variables to the dependent 
variable. The chapter three highlights research strategies mainly for data collection, data 
analysis and limitation and challenges faced during the thesis works. Moreover, the chapter 
four contains in its first part details on actors, processes and contents of the first case the 
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SPGNFSRP. In the second part, the chapter describes the actors, processes and contents of the 
second case the GRPRM. Finally, the chapter concludes with a comparative analysis of the 
actors, processes and contents. The chapter five consists of analysis of data described in the 
preceding chapter on the two cases, i.e., the SPGNFSRP and the GRPRM. The vintage point 
of the three perspectives combined with the model of NPM transformation underpins the 
analysis. Also, the same chapter discusses the explanatory powers of each of the theoretical 
perspectives. The concluding chapter six encompasses answers to the set of research 
questions, major findings, and implications for the theoretical perspectives and the model of 
transformation. Likewise, the chapter highlights on additional theoretical implications, 
practical implications to Nepal and other similar countries. The chapter concludes with 
potential implications for further research.  
 
1.9  Conclusion 
We have elucidated some essential introductory parts of my study. They embrace highlights 
on such topics ranging from the background of my study, the central problem of the study, the 
objectives of the study, the major research questions, the significance of the study and the 
short overview of the methodology employed to end this study. Next chapter explains as to 
what methodologies are employed and how they run. 
 15
 
CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
2.0  Introduction 
This chapter primarily focuses on the theory of transformation of NPM. First, it quickly 
reviews the notion of ‘hybrid’ in the transformation of the NPM. Second, it briefly describes 
the dependent variable of the study. Third, it thoroughly overviews theoretical perspectives of 
organization theory that are useful to explanatory part of this study. The linkages between the 
theory and the practice, the implementation of the NPM concepts in this case, are discussed at 
length using some very crucial explanatory variables and hypotheses. The basic purpose of 
this discussion is to develop an analytical framework that explains the issue of transformation 
of the NPM ideas in the context of Nepalese public sector reforms.  
 
2.1  Public Sector Reforms 
Public sector reform starts with a deliberate plan and ends with intended outcomes. It is the 
process of reform rather than change. Common elements of these reform processes include: 
‘deliberate planned change to public bureaucracies; synonymous with innovation; 
improvements in public service efficiency and effectiveness; and the urgency of reform is 
justified by the need to cope with the uncertainties and rapid changes taking place in the 
organizational environment’ (Turner and Hulme, 1997:106 cited by Kjær, 2005, p.24).  
 
The terms public sector reforms and public management are interchangeably used. In defining 
terms, ‘public management reform consists of deliberate changes to the structures and 
processes of public sector organizations with the objectives of getting them (in some sense) to 
run better’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004, p.8). Emphasis of the definition lies with reforming 
to structures and processes. These areas in public management are deemed to be a grey area, 
which demand constant and timely updates. Aiming at the concerns, such a reform takes 
place. 
 
2.2  ‘Hybrid’: A NPM Shape 
The notion ‘hybrid’ with NPM denotes to a shape to be gained by NPM inspired reforms. The 
underpinning of the notion suggests that a country, which has introduced NPM-inspired 
reforms, must have the reforms with its own shape at least to some extent. When ideas come 
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across a country, country-specific ground reality interact with the ideas and transforms the 
original shape into a hybrid. It is, thus, a hybrid NPM is the result of an interaction between 
the national and external variables. This notion embraces the thesis of divergence in diffusion 
of the NPM ideas.  
 
The notion of hybrid is also boosted also by some loosely coupled ideas of NPM. ‘Indeed, 
sometimes the new public management seems like an empty canvass: you can paint on it 
whatever you like. There is no agreed definition of what the new public management actually 
is and not only is there controversy about what is, or what is in the process of becoming, but 
also what ought to be’ (Ferlie et al, 1996, p.10). Given the assumption that NPM is still alive, 
it seems still the ideas are emergent along with discussions and practices. Such notion of 
‘hybrid’ is also supported by the ideas of isomorphism of organization. ‘…organizations 
change essentially to become isomorphic with pressures emerging from their environment’ 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Hannan and Freeman 1988 cited by Ferlie at al, 1996, p.246).  
 
About the hybrid shape, most discussed features can be seen with two models of NPM reform 
- contractualism, i.e., solutions seeking from market; and managerialism, i.e., solutions 
seeking inside the organizations - has won central attention of all. The contractualism has the 
centralising tendencies. They emanate from ‘economic organisation theory, which include 
public choice and principal-agent theory, and focus on primacy of representative government 
over the bureaucracy’ (Boston et al., 1996 cited by Christensen and Lægreid, 2002, p.19). 
Similarly, ‘the managerialism has devolutionary tendencies and set of ideas that comes from 
the managerialist school of thought which focuses on the need to re-establish the primacy of 
managerial principles in the bureaucracy’ (Kettl, 1997 cited by Christensen and Lægreid, 
2002, p.19-20). As a result of the hybrid process, NPM in some countries it can seems to be 
different from that of Anglo-Saxon countries, which are considered to be contractualism or 
market oriented NPM school of thought. And somewhere else it seems more closer to 
Scandinavian practices, which are considered to be managerialism or management oriented 
NPM school of thought. Whatever may be the case in a country specific reform, every new 
hybrid enriches to NPM diversity.   
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2.3  ‘Transformation’: A Process to Hybrid NPM 
As advocated by Christensen and Lægreid (2002, p.1-39), we assume that there is always a 
strong chance of transformation in the NPM ideas itself while actualizing the ideas into 
reform decisions. The shaping process of a NPM hybrid is similar to a process of taking 
human shape by a baby while in embryonic phase. 
 
On NPM, a debate is going on still whether it is the NPM era or the post-NPM era. The study 
stands by the NPM era, however, the forms and natures are always alterable. One can argue 
‘NPM is by no means over’ (Pollitt, 2003a cited by Christensen and Lægreid, 2007, p.1). The 
study agrees to a reassertion ‘NPM has been challenged: new types of reforms have been 
added to those already in place, and there have been some reversals, especially when it comes 
to the disaggregation components of NPM’ (Dunleavy et al. 2006 cited by Christensen and 
Lægreid, 2007, p.1-2). Being theoretically informed, even if there are some reversals of NPM, 
this study considers them as NPM transformation. The transformation in this sense can be 
seen as a departure from familiar forms of erstwhile NPM model. Following the departure, 
while drawing the cases from Nepal, we further assume that there must be a form of 
uniqueness with the actors, processes and contents involved with NPM reforms cropped up in 
the country. 
 
2.4  Dependent Variable 
This study considers the ‘Cabinet’s decision’ on approval of the two reform cases as the 
dependent variable – the phenomenon to be studied. The Cabinet, within the structure of the 
executive branch of the country, is the highest decision making authority. This signifies the 
impact of the phenomenon. The dependent variable consists of three indicators: 1) actors; 2) 
processes; and 3) contents, by which the phenomenon of shaping of the decisions are 
observed completely. For analytic purpose, I further divided the actors into two categories: 
central actors and peripheral actors. Similarly, we employed five processes ‘democratic versus 
non-democratic’, ‘closed versus open’, ‘appropriateness versus consequences’, ‘top-down 
versus bottom-up’ and stable ‘versus unstable’. Finally, we categorized the content as 
‘contractualism versus managerialism’.   
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2.5  Theoretical Perspectives, Independent Variables and Hypotheses 
NPM for some intellectuals is seen as a global reform movement as being a part of global 
modernity project. We, however, argue reforms are not simply a transfer of ideas. Rather it is 
a transformation resulting from the interaction of domestic and external circumstances. To 
answer the ambiguity as to how and why ‘host’ actors and contexts interact with ‘guest’ ideas 
and take a hybrid NPM shape, we make ourselves informed, first, about three theoretical 
perspectives of organization theory. Also, we attempt to assess some supplementary 
theoretical observations. We finally highlight on our independent variables and hypotheses 
that correspond to each of the three perspectives.  
 
The three theoretical perspectives of Christensen and his colleagues facilitate to identify and 
analyse frequently active variants. The perspectives consist of: 1) structural/ instrumental; 2) 
cultural; and 3) environmental – technical and institutional. These perspectives are vantage 
points for describing and explaining as to what shape of NPM transformation happens and 
why so. Same time, one can argue that how the same independent variables can respond 
differently while giving different cases. Also, one more query can be how some variables 
have typical relations with the phenomenon observed. The study, thus, analyzes all the 
relations comparatively divided them into two cases.  
 
2.5.1  Structural/Instrumental Perspectives 
This perspective is made of two underlying elements: 1) structure that is created to achieve a 
certain objectives 2) instrumentality that is to best use of means-end rationality in regard to 
meet the set objectives. This perspective can be used as ‘a means of analytical, hierarchically 
based problem-solving, and as negotiations between actors with partly conflicting interests’ 
(Christensen et al, 2007, p.25). Regarding NPM inspired-reforms, we also consider that the 
perspectives hold 3 assumptions: 1) NPM is ‘a collection of structural reforms’ (Christensen 
and Lægreid, 1999, p.171) 2) main agents of the reforms are ‘the administrative leaders – 
entrepreneurs’ and ‘delegated by political leaders’ (Naschold, 1996; Rouban, 1995, p.52 cited 
by Christensen and Lægreid, 1999, p. 171). They are the ones with means-end rationality and 
special expertise to keep on control; 3) reform successes are measured against organizational 
problem solving and their consequences.  
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This perspective views organizations ‘as tools in the hands of leaders’ (Christensen et al, 
2007, p.22) and emphasizes ‘the ability to exert political control and to engage in clear 
organizational thinking and rational calculation of causal relationships and effects’ (ibid, p.5). 
Highlighting this side, the authors argue ‘leaders have the ability for rational calculation and 
for political control, but also that there may be some limitations to these abilities’ (ibid, p.36). 
Instrumental rationality is centrally placed that involves ‘both the effects of organizational 
structure and the process whereby that structure is determined and formed’ (ibid, p.34). Often 
leaders exert in an organizational structure ‘definable purposes’ and view of ‘things and 
people as ‘resources’’ (Meyer, 1983 cited by Scott, 2001, p.72). By these, this study argues 
that leaders makes use of a structure as ‘pattern variables that sharply urge universalism, 
neutrality, achievement, specificity to the rise of organizations’ (Parsons, 1951 cited by Scott, 
2001, p. 72). Leader’s position in a structure is a chief building block so that ‘…tried-and-
tested tools leaders can use in trying to make organizations more effective’ (Christensen et al, 
2007, p.129). Since this perspective is based on means-end rationality, its ‘underlying logic of 
action is a logic of consequence’ (ibid, p.5). The consequentiality refers to ‘anticipatory 
choice’ (March and Olsen, 1989, p. 23) that is similar to rational choice making.  
 
When it comes to norms and values, this perspective owns formal norms. Such norms are 
‘outlined in organizational charts, rules and job descriptions’ (Christensen et al, 2007, p.27). 
Being empowered with formal rules and terms of references, this perspective generally holds 
controlling approach while dealing with reform issues. In this pursuit, ‘polity’ feature acts on 
behalf of the perspective. The polity activates itself via ‘structure’ placed in any state 
mechanism.  
 
Logic of Consequences: Under such logics one has following questions (March and Olsen, 
1989, p.23): 1) what are my alternatives?; 2) what are my values?; 3) what are the 
consequences of my alternatives for my values?; 4) choose the alternative that has the best 
consequences. Alternatives, values and consequences are the central points. In this, criterion 
for action is consequence as that is the aim of actors with instrumental and structural 
perspectives. 
 
Vertical/Structural Variant: Formal structures of organization constrain how tasks are carried 
out. This perspective argues ‘specialization principle may thus have a strong influence on how 
problems are dealt with and on the content of public policy’ (Christensen et al, 2007, p.47). 
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They continued arguing that this can happen ‘by different forms of coordination, vertically 
through hierarchy, or horizontally through structure such as coordinating committees’ (ibid, 
p.47). The reason why elements of hierarchy matter is ‘a superior can command and instruct 
subordinates’ (ibid, p.49).  
 
Coalitions by Leaders: In instrumental view, organizations may have strategy of coalition and 
interest articulation. From a negotiation-based instrumental perspective, organizations are 
viewed as ‘coalitions, where each actor acts in an instrumentally rational way, is motivated by 
interests and can also enter into coalitions with actors outside the organization, who, 
according to their interests, act in similar ways’ (Christensen et al, 2007, p.50-51). As regard 
to formulating and developing goals, four different ways are suggested (ibid, p.52): 1) 
dominant coalition – proceeding from rational calculations, choose between relevant 
alternatives of action and assert its own goals and interests; 2) compromise – between 
different interests, which in turn provides the basis for an instrumental rational choice based 
on knowledge about alternatives and consequences; 3) quasi resolution of conflict – the 
competing goals can be addressed one at a time, so as not to come into conflict  with one 
another; 4) local rationality – goals in different parts of an organization, or in different 
organization, do not always need to be reviewed vis-à-vis each other.  
 
Leader’s Control: In this perspective, leaders are supposed to have great ability for rational 
calculation and for control over others. However, there are some situations when they also can 
lose their abilities. One can argue that ‘when leaders’ means-ends understanding is incomplete 
where they must negotiate with other actors who have different interests and resources’ 
(Christensen et al, 2007, p.58). This situation can occur when given environment is 
heterogeneous in which actors and interest are critical to each others. Leaders, in such 
backdrops, act in between hierarchically-oriented variant and negotiation-based variant, i.e., 
leaders in former control over situation and leaders in later have no control. They, thus, 
compromise and negotiate with contesting actors and interests. From these insights, we have 
identified the first independent variable ‘deliberate planned and hierarchical decision-making 




2.5.1.1 Deliberate Planned and Hierarchical Decision - making of Superior Organizations – 
Hypothesis 1 
As we learnt that the structural/instrumental perspective has only one feature ‘polity’. Polity is 
meant to be an organized body of nation, state or society. Existence of nation, state or 
organization is embedded with achieving to certain goals. Organizations act on behalf of 
polity in accordance with the means-end rationality of the polity to accomplish certain goals. 
This is how organization is legitimized and rational representative of structure factor that in 
accordance with the referred ‘transformative model’ belongs to polity feature. Because of this 
relational significance, influential players in this study are designated under 
structural/instrumental perspectives as ‘policy preferences of superior organizations’.  
 
Different organization can have different preferences – contesting preferences. Almost all 
organizations in principle are instrumental for goal achievement. This underscores rational 
organizational perspective. In practices, however, superior ones hold greater roles in defining 
problems and solutions. This happens vertically through hierarchy because of the power 
principle. As a result, superior organizations gain greater space in choice makings. Because of 
power principle, superior ones are in a position of providing rewards and sanctions. An 
inherent element of public organizations is hierarchy which is meant ‘that a superior can 
command and instruct subordinates’ (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007, p.49). That can delimit 
capacity of analysis, capacity of decision-making and capacity of action of subordinate 
organizations. By using the hierarchical authority and possessing ability for rational 
calculation, superior organizations maintain control over other actor’s choice making 
behavior. But when superior has incomplete strength - finance, information, knowledge, 
technology - they negotiate with subordinates’ competing choices.  
 
Nepal by polity design has been a unitary country so far. In a unitary setting, authorities are 
centrally located. By employing instruments such as administrative, political and financial 
decentralizations, superior organizations share authorities and resources with subordinate 
organizations. In such arrangements, superior organizations have advantage over the 
subordinate organizations. Compared to horizontal organizations, organizations positioned in 
vertical relation enjoy greater role in exerting influence to decision making. Furthermore, 
superior organization exercise more influences in a country having central planning system.  
 
 22
Given the unitary polity and centrally planned system in Nepal, I hypothesize (H1) ‘reforms 
are a possible consequence of deliberate planned and hierarchical decision making of 
superior organizations’.  
 
2.5.2  Cultural Perspectives 
Cultural perspective is different primarily because it manifests path dependency. The 
prevailing norms and values shape the path through informal channels. In terms of types of 
norms, cultural perspectives follow informal ones. ‘The informal norms and values are found 
in established traditions and organizational cultures that an organization’s members 
internalize or acquire through experience and daily interactions with their colleagues’ 
(Christensen et al, 2007, p.27). Because it is embedded in the informal norms and values, 
generally this perspective has constraining or resistant approach to any guest reform ideas. 
Two main factors of this perspective are: 1) historical institution; and 2) styles of governance. 
They do carry on the established cultural traits. Owing to the factors, the factors are assumed 
to be less reform compatible.  
 
This perspective ‘challenges instrumental assumptions and their underlying means-ends 
rationality and highlights the constraints and possibilities lying within established cultures and 
traditions’ (Christensen et al, 2007, p.22). It is connected to ‘the constraints inherent in 
established traditions and cultures, as they have developed over time’ (ibid, p.25). Cultural 
norms make adaptation to take place ‘slowly and gradually, more through evolutionary than 
revolutionary’ (Christensen and Lægreid, 1999, p.172).  
 
Logic of Appropriateness: This logic refers to ‘obligatory action’ (March and Olsen, 1989, p. 
23) in which actors relates actions with his or her identity. Similarly actors demonstrate rules 
following behaviour to ensure appropriateness before making actions. Hofstede defined 
‘culture’ as ‘the collective mental programming’ of a people whereby a society’s members are 
equipped with a common set of values and beliefs (Thomas, 2003, p.187). It is the mental 
program that governs perception, thought and action of each individual. When one is in a 
choice making process, ‘logic of action’ as criteria is the determinant. The logic of action in 
this perspective is tied to ‘logic of appropriate behaviour or appropriateness’ that includes 
three questions or aspects (Christensen et al, 2007, p.68-69): 1) which type of situation am I 
faced with? – recognition; 2) which identity is most important for my institution and for me? 
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– identity; 3) what are my institution and I expected to do in a situation like this? – rules for 
action. Seen from this perspective, identity and rule of action are imperatives to decision-
makings. These fit to ‘obligatory action’ (March and Olsen, 1989, p.23) in which criterion for 
action is appropriateness. By assessing this, one can get answer if a reform is culturally 
compatible. 
 
Organization culture is visible while reform process is on. The culture shows its presence, in 
turn, reform attempt face opposition from path-dependency of the culture. Organization 
culture ‘becomes apparent when the public administration goes through reform…particularly 
if these processes threaten dominant informal norms and values’ (Christensen et al, 2007, 
p.76)’. In such occasions, culture constrains the endeavour.  
 
Divergence by Path-dependence: This perspective views NPM inspired reform tends to yield 
divergent shapes. This gets supports from the view that ‘Different countries have different 
historical-cultural traditions and their reforms are ‘path dependent’’ (Selznick 1957; Krasner 
1988; March and Olsen 1989 cited by Christensen and Lægreid, 2007, p.5). National reforms 
obtain unique features because in a ‘path-dependency’ countries have ‘a lot of resources are 
already invested…roads taken in the past heavily influence the further reform journey’ 
(Christensen and Lægreid, 1999, p.172). After the emergence of post-NPM reforms, presently 
‘interesting question arises of whether the new reforms have a path-dependency related to the 
old administrative system or to NPM’ (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007, p.5-6). This idea 
seems to be quite fitting to idea of tabula rasa of ‘historical institutionalism’. It argues, ‘the 
initial policy and organization decisions tend to shape the history of a policy, so that once the 
tabula rasa is written on, it becomes very difficult to erase it completely’ (Peters, 1999, 
p.349). Owing to this nature, whenever time for a reform, cultural elements constrain such a 
move. A reform is ‘active and deliberate attempts by political and administrative leaders to 
change structural or cultural features of organizations’ (Christensen et al, 2007, p.210). 
However, this hardly affects a ‘change’ - that happens gradually or abruptly – which is 
induced by incremental changes in surroundings. Culture is bounded to be a rival of reform 
leaders.  
 
Utility Maximizing and Historical Legacies: Both Resistant to Reform 
Generally bureaucratic elites possess negative response to administrative reform. They began 
with a ‘compatibility test’ (Christensen and Lægreid, 1999, p.172) of reforms. Only if they 
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consider reforms are compatible then they implement it and if not they either modify or reject 
it. One can assert two schools for the criteria of compatibility test. The first is ‘utility 
maximizing’, which stems from instrumental perspective, is very powerful in bureaucrats. 
The behaviour is based on an assumption ‘individuals in public office attempt to maximize 
their own personal utility’ (Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971 cited by Peters, 1988, p.119). From 
this point of view, bureaucrats have a top concern about personal betterment or benefits rather 
than betterment of public services. They come down to resist reforms if they conceive reforms 
do not increase their personal betterment. Another school suggests that the bureaucrats have 
‘unique culture, identity’ which is adapted from ‘internal and external pressures’ via 
‘institutionalization process’ (Christensen and Lægried, 1999, p.172). This legacy of history 
maintains resistance to reform. Both of them, i.e., the ‘maximizing behaviour’ from 
instrumental perspective and the ‘legacy of history’ from cultural perspective are uniquely 
combined with bureaucratic elites and generally show similar resistant behaviour. I thus bring 
them together into my study’s constituents. 
 
Punctuated Equilibrium and Path Breaking: When it is a reform issue under historical 
institutionalism, existing institutions themselves are ‘relatively invariant’1 and ‘relatively 
resilient’2 to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing 
external circumstances’. In order to come ‘out of the trap of apparent immobility’ (Peters, 
2001, p.68) institutions require a big changes in the setting in which they operate. In turning 
an inefficient history to efficient3, I also surmise that actors involved in a reform process alter 
rules of appropriateness of the organization, start adaptation to a new path or order of 
solution. For this to happen, we also assume that ‘rapid bursts of institutional change followed 
by long periods of statis’ (Krasner, 1984, p.242 cited by Peters, 2001, p. 68). That situation is 
best known ‘punctuated equilibrium4’ - a driver that breaks path dependency. This 
equilibrium in policy stands in contrasts with gradualism and incrementalism and switch over 
                                                 
1 March and Olsen, 2005, p.4. 
2 Ibid, p.4. 
3 An efficient historical process is one that moves rapidly to a unique solution, conditional on current 
environmental conditions, and is thus independent of the historical path (March and Olsen, 1989, p.8). 
4  Steven Gould’s ‘punctuated equilibrium’ has powerful explanation for evolutionary change. In other words, 
change in any system is a product of external shocks to the system (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992 cited by 
Steinmo, 2001, p.3). According to this concept, biological evolution has actually proceeded in fits and starts, 
and as gradually as Darwin originally thought. Systems seem to settle into an equilibrium for a stable 
equilibrium for a time, then suddenly change, then settle into a new equilibrium. There is no one stable 
equilibrium that these systems seek; rather, there are several possible equilibria, and systems lurch from one to 
another...The historical development of an issue proceeds in jumps and step-level changes, not in gradual and 
incremental fashion (Kingdon, 1995, p.226). 
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to a speedy change. As Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones presented this concept to policy 
studies in 1993, this is marked by a policy shift ‘punctuated by large, but rare, changes due to 
large shifts in society or government’5.  
 
Schooling and NPM: Some studies about cultural traits of elites and choices to NPM exhibit 
typical evidences. ‘New class analysis’, as originally argued by Yeatman (1987, pp. 350-351) 
and Pusey (1991) cited by Hood (1995, p.102), ‘‘the upper echelons of the public service are 
increasingly being occupied by a new class ‘‘econocrats’’…whose education in narrow 
neoclassical economics…is claimed to make them natural sympathizers with New Right 
ideas’’. My point of argument is that such trainings induce rational orientation and lessen the 
strength of cultural resistance. Alternatively, the adaptation to reform grows high.    
 
Finally, the thesis out of this perspective identified two independent variables: ‘elite 
orientation in bureaucrats’ with historical institution factor and ‘political opposition and 
insurgency’ with the style of governance factor. 
 
2.5.2.1 Elite Orientations in Bureaucrats - Hypothesis 2 
The variable comes with ‘historical institution’, the first factor of the cultural perspective. The 
elites exemplify a nature of having path dependency of some cultural traits. Once such traits 
take their shapes, it is hard to alter. Owing to the rigidness and inflexibility, they lack 
adaptation to reforms. As a result, the traits of group in many occasions resist reforms. The 
elites, therefore, are strong carrier of cultural traits and barrier to change.  
 
The elite group is result makers. Mills (1959, p.3-4) points ‘…they are in positions to make 
decisions having major consequences.’ Importantly, whenever creating such consequences 
their cultural traits are activated. At length this group includes ones ‘who control the key 
material, symbolic and political resources within a country… who occupy commanding 
positions within the set of institutions that are most salient to national political influence and 
policy-making within a country’ (Reis and Moore, 2005, p.2). They furthermore view 
‘…elites are the beneficiaries – materially, culturally or psychologically – of poverty and 
inequality, and will therefore resist attempts to overcome them’ (2005, p.195). Plato (427-347 
BC) in one of his dialogues asks: ‘do you know that governments vary as the dispositions of 
                                                 
5  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Punctuated_equilibrium. 25.05.08, 12.45 hours. 
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men vary, and that there must be as many of the one as there are of the other? We cannot 
suppose that States are made of ‘‘oak and rock’’ and not out of the human natures which are 
in them’ (The Republic, Book 8, VIII cited by Helgesen and Thomsen, 2006, p. 17). Although 
people are the force steering public policy, elite group of a society can bend public policy to 
any direction. As a result, people’s choice counts less and elite’s choice counts much in 
reality. ‘Elite theory suggests that the people are apathetic and ill informed about public 
policy, that elites actually shape mass opinion on policy questions more than masses shape 
elite opinion’ (Dye, 2004, p. 23).  
 
When discussing about elite and their roles in bureaucracy, administrative culture appears a 
pertinent issue. Culture is considered to be ‘learnt behaviour’ (Helgesen and Thomsen, 2006, 
p.18). ‘Public organizations reproduce social and political orders, that is, administrative 
behavior is a result of national cultural norms’ (Jamil, 1994, p.292). Bureaucratic elites who 
lead the organization act in accordance with the reflection they acquire from national cultural 
norms.  
 
When it comes to the case of Nepal, political and bureaucratic leaders carry in them the values 
of elite culture. That goes against any changes to prevailing monopoly in social and economic 
power structure. ‘Although Nepal’s planning and governmental apparatuses are superficially 
modern in their external features and seem to be geared to the needs of development and 
modernization, their basic political patterns are fundamentally patrimonial in character’ 
(Shaha, 1982, p.15).  
 
The Nepali system remains hierarchical, with certain elite families having special privileges 
and authorities. Thus, ‘in the central government, most of the high offices are held by 
members of elite Brahman, Chetri, and Newar families’ (Justice, 1986, p.21). Being a 
feudalistic society, except for a few positions, ‘the key positions in the administration have 
become a monopoly of the high born families’ (Bhatta, 1987, p.160). The value of ‘elite 
orientation’ with bureaucratic leaders is in-built as part of culture that generally opposes 
equity and equality. Ironically, other stakeholders in the policy making of the country are not 
as competent as the political and bureaucratic leaders.  
 
In this, the variable is characterised as the culture typed of ‘what organization is’ (Jamil, 
1994, p.278-280) that generally affects others rather than gets affected others. Learnt from 
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these, a hypothesis (H2) to this study is laid down ‘elite orientation in bureaucrats as agents 
of the historical-institutional administrative culture and tradition constrains reform actor, 
process and content’.  
 
2.5.2.2 Domestic Political Opposition and Insurgency - Hypothesis 3 
The second underlying factor of cultural perspective is ‘style of governance’. The style 
illustrates the way or approach that the governance is practiced by major actors. Political 
parties, inter alia others, activated in the country are one of the chief actors. After some times 
of practice, the style per se becomes an established cultural ‘path’. Once it is fixed, it does not 
alter easily. Being an inherent part of national political culture, this is embedded with the 
political parties in the society. Looking at the trend, this study assumes ‘domestic political 
opposition and insurgency’, which correspondence to the factor - style of governance.   
 
While referred to reforms undertaken in the country after the advent of democracy, the most 
noticeable characteristic that the big political parties have shown is hostile nature of response 
to reform agenda of GoN. As this practice has been a tradition, a strong element of path-
dependency they have maintained while responding to the GoN’s reform initiatives. Since 
early 90s and afterwards Nepal has a history of political opposition and insurgency. During 
the period of the Koirala government (1991-94), the opposition parties, especially the leftists 
ones, organized various protest movements like transportation strikes, general strikes, Nepal 
Bandha, Gherao, Dharna causing ‘increasing disruption, destruction and casualties’ (Dahal, 
2001, p.262). On reform issues, the longest serving major opposition party namely CPN-UML 
embraced largely socialist views while the longest serving ruling party namely NC embraced 
rightist views. As there were fundamental differences in their views, they engaged in collision 
on almost all agenda.  
 
In the meantime since February 1996, Communist Party of Nepal- Maoist (CPN-M) launched 
an insurgent movement. It engulfed the country in a sporadic conflict for little more than one 
decade. ‘Since 1996, the Maoist insurgency has claimed an estimated 13,000 lives and 
rendered thousands of people homeless and handicapped and caused enormous social and 
economic damage’ (Karki, 2005, p.45). ‘With the expansion of the arms conflict, the security 
situation in most of the districts worsened and as a result, and as expected the governance 
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system weakened…economic activities in the conflict affected area came to a standstill’ 
(Legal, 2005, p.30).  
 
Due to frequent political turmoil, in between 1991 to April 2006 government changed fifteen6 
times and many times it witnessed coalition government. Whenever the country had a 
coalition government, the agenda of NPM inspired reforms de-accelerated. It was due to 
conflicting policy preferences embedded within the coalition political parties. The bleak 
political situation as a result of political opposition and insurgency bottlenecked reform 
agenda of the governments. With these understanding, this study hypothesizes (H3) ‘turbulent 
transition situation affects reform actor, process and content and it can be seen as a by-
product of concurrent domestic political opposition and insurgency’. 
 
2.5.3  Environmental Perspectives 
This perspective views that influences come from the surrounding environment. Reform 
decision-makers come under its grip when the environment is overwhelming enough to exert 
influences. It is due to that they have myths flavours and the myths are ‘socially created 
norms’ (Christensen et al, 2007, p.98) in which organizations have to act upon and survive in. 
Owing to the myths flavour, environmental perspective is connected to ‘dominant values and 
norms in the current environment, which influence the possibilities for what public 
organizations can do’ (Christensen et al, 2007, p. 25). The environmental perspective in itself 
belongs to two different features: a) technical: the environment which concerns about 
hardcore economic performances and holds ‘logic of consequences’ with means-end 
rationality; b) institutional: the environment which originates with institutional or non-
technical stream and embraces ‘logic of appropriateness’.  
 
The technical environment comes in effect with ‘economy’ factor while the later with 
‘ideology’. Neoinstitutional theory and universalization of the theory are underpinnings of the 
technical environment. For this, a set of international institutions are quite busy in 
transmitting ready-made and prescriptive solutions to any management ills. They apparently 
suggest convergent model of prescriptions and rather undermines a local context. It is because 
‘technicist mentality’ (Ellul, 1954, 1964 cited by Scott, 2001, p.72) of organizational 
managers who ‘attempts to devise governance structures that will economize on transactions 
                                                 
6 Based on the data collected from Secretariat of Parliament, Singhdurbar, Nepal, July 2007. 
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costs’ (Williamson, 1975 cited by Scott, 2001, p.164). In short, economy is the ideal source 
for any reform solution.  
 
The institutional environment is partly regarded as myths-oriented perspective. The reason is 
that this also highlights ‘adjustment to existing beliefs and values in the environment in order 
to understand how organizational changes occur and what effects and implications they have’ 
(Christensen et al, 2007, p.22-23). In regard to application approaches while transmitting 
ideas to a host or recipient country or party, we assume that both features deploy: 1) pressures 
from inside and outside a country and 2) mimetic attraction from other’s practices. These 
approaches are easy carriers by which the two factors, i.e., economy and ideology, easily 
influence concerned actors. They come into effect with two legitimated instruments: 1) 
‘internationally based norms and beliefs…because these have become the prevailing doctrine’ 
2) ‘NPM may really be seen as the optimal solution to widespread technical problems’ 
(Christensen and Lægreid, 2007, p.4-5). In this, socially accepted norms and values are the 
ideal source for any reform solution. Above all, major demarcation between the technical and 
institutional environments is that the former draws reform ideas from economic hard-fact 
whereas the later draws from impressive but socially accepted ideology.  
 
In the both technical and institutional environments, DiMaggio and Powell’s views seem quite 
relevant. They highlight coercive, normative, and mimetic reasons for organizational 
isomorphism. ‘Coercive factors involved political pressures and the regulatory force of the 
state; normative factors stemmed from the influence of professions and the role of education; 
and mimetic factors drew on habitual, taken-for-granted responses to uncertainty’ (Powell, 
2007, p. 2). The role of uncertainty is immensely high for mimetic behaviour and action. 
‘Uncertainty has been shown to drive imitation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983); more 
specifically, when organisations are uncertain about their own experiences, or when their 
earlier development and activities are questioned, they turn to others for experiences and 
models to imitate’ (Sahlin-Anderson, 1996; Sevon 1996 cited by Sahlin-Anderson, 2002, 
p.48). Likewise, ‘habit as well as perceived similarities play a role in the process of imitation’ 
(Sahlin-Anderson, 2002, p.49). 
 
Myths, Recipes and Diffusions: Myths perspectives stress on impact of socially created norms, 
that is, roles of institutional environment. Because of this, ‘organizations must try to 
incorporate and reflect these norms outwardly, even if they do not necessarily make the 
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organization’s activities more effective’ (Christensen et al, 2007, p.98). We see, as an 
outcome, ‘organizations become more similar to one another’ (ibid, p.98). But this contrasts 
cultural perspectives in which organizations are assumed to be different due to cultural 
variant. This also collides with technical environment perspective in which environment is the 
ground rule. Genesis of myths, however, is technical rather than cultural elements.  
 
Myths basically carry on recipes ‘for how to design an organization’ (Christensen et al, 2007, 
p.102). The difference between the recipe in technical environment and the recipe in myths 
can be distinguished by a fact that the latter has socially legitimated recipe while technical 
environment may not necessarily avail the legitimacy. Despite the fact, myths perspective has 
an image of twin of both cultural and technical environment. It is ‘stemming from natural and 
cultural perspectives or as a category of the institutional perspective’ (Christensen et al, 2007, 
p.101). On the issue of myths diffusion, Christensen et al (2007, p.111) acknowledge the role 
of ‘higher education’ particularly in business schools from the West.  
 
Fashion Communities: This perspective argues ‘the world’s management systems will end up 
more or less the same, irrespective of current cultural differences among countries; 
management systems around the world should display increasing homogeneity’ (Thomas, 
2003, p.185). This asserts convergence thesis to any management problem. That’s why they 
buy and sell best practices which are tested successfully in one place. In the transmission or 
replication of such practices in the form of dominant administrative doctrines, fashion-setting 
communities come in with vibrant marketing skills. The communities include (Abrahamson, 
1996, 123-124): 1) fashion leaders or fashion setters – actors who make new fashion and 
legitimate; 2) fashion followers – actors who translate the fashionable techniques into practice 
when the legitimating discourse becomes fashionable. Despite the sound logic, I like to argue 
that the Abrahamson’s concept seems missing one more actor that is what ‘fashion merchant’ 
– who trades fashionable ideas from one part to another. In doing so, they offer to potential 
buyers both pressures as well as imitating impression. Donors or consultant firms or 
international organizations can be the merchants. Abrahamson furthermore notes that two 
sides of parties participate in the fashion market of reform ideas (ibid, p.123-135): 1) demand 
and 2) supply. To this note, I relate a proposition ‘tremendous supply of popular 
organizational ideas and recipes’ (Christensen et al (2007, p.105) is outcome of symbol of 
efficiency, modernism, and legitimated administrative doctrines.   
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Garbage Can Model: We assume that this perspective seemingly fits to garbage can model of 
decision-making. The model in which notion of ‘solutions seek problems rather than the 
opposite’ (Christensen et al, 2007, p.99) is a feature. In this light, being NPM ‘a family of 
business-inspired recipes’ (Christensen et al, 2007, p.105), NPM carries on the elements of 
garbage can model. As the recipes are ‘tried-and-tested tools and ready for use’ (ibid, p.123), 
such recipes supposedly run with efficient, legitimated and modern doctrines. The thesis 
finally draws two independent variables: ‘fiscal crises’, a context of technical environment 
from the ‘economy’ factor; and ‘reform doctrines of donors/ international agencies’, a context 
of institutional/ myths environment from the ‘ideology’ factor. 
 
2.5.3.1 Fiscal Crises - Hypothesis 4 
Economy, the first stream of environment perspective, bestows fiscal stress. This is a 
phenomenon to be seen in management of national fiscal policy and caused by imbalance 
between income and expenditure.  Under such a stress, decision makers of ministry of finance 
and others are challenged for making prudent choices. ‘NPM is often interpreted as a response 
to fiscal stress and resistance to extra taxes’ (Hood, 1995, p.102-103). 
 
In Nepal, such a crisis has deterministic role in many issues. During eighties and nineties, 
maintaining fiscal-balance has been a big problem. During the eighties (FY 81-FY90), 
expenditures rose by an average of 0.73 percent of GDP a year, compared to 0.14 percent for 
revenue; second, expenditures are overextended. Regular expenditures, reflecting mainly (i) 
increased debt service; and (ii) employee compensation, have expanded rapidly (The WB, 
1994, pp ii). This pressure later grew up steadily. On the one hand, later security costs 
exceeded its limits because of internal conflict; on the other, public revenue seen its lowest 
growth rate due to continued slackness in almost all spheres of the economy.  
 
The dismal relation between the income and the expenditure has left deep impact on the 
capability of the government’s policy making, planning and programming. As a result, the 
MoF along with other ministerial officials became keen for alternate ways – the ways that 
help them to manage the budgetary deficits and fiscal imbalances. This means a government 
really trapped in fiscal deficit is likely to imitate reforms ideas from others’ experiences. The 
experiences which are tested ones and are easy to use into practice entice the policy makers in 
such difficult times. ‘A core assumption was that public administration had to adapt to a 
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globalized economy in order to serve the economy better, improve international 
competitiveness, arrest national decline, and reduce fiscal stress, budget deficits and public 
debt’ (OECD report 1991 cited by Olsen, 2003, p.8). By these accounts, the study assumes the 
abovementioned hypothesis to describe and analyse the relation of the fiscal stress with the 
Cabinet’s decision. Being informed by these general observations, this study holds a 
hypothesis (H4) ‘reforms are likely to be seen as a necessary response to pressure from fiscal 
crises’. 
 
2.5.3.2 Reform Doctrines of Donors/ International Agencies - Hypothesis 5 
This is a representative of ideology stream that pertains to institutional or non-technical 
environment. Here the ideology refers to the panacea sort of contents, which are for reforms 
and often comes in from outside. In this process, inter alia, donors and international agencies 
stationed in the country have very efficient roles in disseminating them to local consumers, 
users and recipients. It is because they generally couple with aid and ideas together. Such 
ideologies generally promise efficiency, which the recipient country seems to lack. As the 
ideologies sound attractive and easy to implement, they succeed to get attention of reform 
designers and decision makers.  
 
Aid organizations play key role by carrying both aid and ideas for reforms. ‘Common (1998) 
argues that major aid donors have played an important role with the direct sponsorship of 
NPM-type reforms through their aid programmes, and related conditionalities’ (cited by 
Minogue, 2001, p.34). Major multilateral and bilateral agencies are engaged in such 
businesses. For example, ‘the OECD and the World Bank are important institutions for 
diffusing administrative reform idea’ (John Halligan, 1996, p. 297 cited by Olsen, 2003, p.8). 
In the experience of Nepal, aid conditions significantly act as a carrier of ideas. The country 
encountered with a huge size of loan conditions, for example, ‘from 1995 to 2000, every IMF 
loan had an average of 41 conditions’ (CPWF and Action Aid, 2004, p.37).  
 
‘Foreign aid has become an integral, and a highly visible, part of Nepal’s political, economic 
and social landscape for the last 50 years’ (Sharma et al, 2004, p.1). In a review findings, 
GoN feels ‘donors tend to have their own agendas as well as commercial interests…some of 
them are ‘‘pushy’’ (2002, p.3)7’. Multilateral parties involved in Nepal aid include ADB, EC, 
                                                 
7 Review of Development Partnerships in Nepal, 2002, http://www.ndf2002.gov.np/consult.html 
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FAO, ILO, IMF, UNICEF, UNDP, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNPF, WB, WFP, and 
WHO (MoF and UNDP, 2000). Similarly, bilateral side includes Australia, Canada, China, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, and United States of America (MoF and UNDP, 2000). Compared to the 
bilateral, the multilateral donors hold significant position in terms the aid size and influence 
they exert. Among them, mainly the WB/IMF and ADB has greater roles. When it comes to 
the donors’ roles in influx of ideas into national reform agenda, it is worthy to note ‘…donors 
have responded to a greater extent to the development priorities of the government mainly 
because Nepal is changing its plan and policies as recommended in the mainstream 
development theory or in the policy reform package of IMF and the WB (Khadka, 1991, 
p.426).  
 
Not only is the conditionality supposed to be carrier of the ideas that are popular elsewhere. 
Other carrier might be expatriates, exchanges programs, and publications that transfer the 
doctrine of modernity to countries like Nepal. Assuming that these guest organizations offers 
dominant doctrines to the country’s reform context, this study hypothesizes (H5) ‘reforms are 
seen as legitimate, modern and in line with dominant reform doctrines of donors/ 
international agencies’.  
 
2.6  Analytical Model 
On the issue of how reform ideas or recipe comes into praxis, as Christensen et al (2007, 
p.123-125) argue, I expect three kinds of responses from the identified independent variables 
(IVs): 1) quick coupling – popular idea or recipe – tried and tested tools, ready for use and 
relatively easy to implement - can be implemented relatively quickly; 2) rejection – complex, 
value-based institutions generally able to successfully resist reforms; and 3) decoupling – 
modern organizations experience from the institutional environment to incorporate them 
because they are seen as up-to-date and legitimate ideas and recipes. From the above three 
perspectives, the instrumental owns the quick coupling, the cultural owns the rejection, and 
the institutional/ myths owns the decoupling. By assuming responses of the variables, we have 
proposed below an analytical model for this study which combines the three perspectives of 
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2.7  Conclusion 
We define terms for this study that a new shape of NPM is a ‘hybrid’ and the process of 
gaining a hybrid is ‘transformation’. The three perspectives of organization theory tender 
bedrock to this study. Combining the transformative model of NPM with the three 
perspectives of organization theory along with a few more supplementary theories, we 
distilled five hypotheses. The hypotheses are espoused with the theoretical evaluation plus 
empirical observations. However, the five variables are grounded into the reality of Nepal. 
While the reforms in design and decision-making, as viewed by Christensen et al (2007, 
p.123-125), we also hold that the variables do interact with the NPM recipes generally in three 
modes: 1) quick coupling; 2) rejection; and 3) decoupling. Furthermore, the modes 
presumably affect the actors involved, the processes followed, and the contents acquired. In 
following chapter we discuss about research methodology employed to this study.  
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY  
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter mainly discusses the methodological choices that I have employed for the study. 
The discussion starts with a description of what kind of research strategies I have placed in. 
Also, I shed light on some potential queries on what are my unit of analysis, what 
methodological techniques I have used for evidence collection, and how I organized analyses 
in the study with their respective justifications.  Finally, highlights on what practical challenge 
and experience I got through are also part of subsequent discussions in the chapter.  
 
3.2  Research Strategies 
Four issues arise when you decide that strategy, i.e., making an early decision about which 
methods to use; understanding the link between methods, methodologies and society; 
appreciating how models shape the meaning and use of different methods; choosing 
method(s) appropriate to your research topic (Silverman, 2005, p.109-110). Having learned 
from this, my tacit strategies are as follows:  
 
3.2.1  Qualitative Method 
Qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature of reality, the intimate 
relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and the situational constraints that 
shape inquiry. ‘They seek answers to questions that stress how social experience is created 
and given meaning’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, p.8 cited by Silverman, 2005, p.10). Unlike 
quantitative method, any conclusion in a qualitative inquiry requires immensely rich data 
supports. ‘The reporting of qualitative research relies on rich, descriptive language’ (Schultz, 
2006, p.361). My study rests upon explanatory as well as descriptive inquiries because of 
nature of research questions. They sought answers tremendously dealing with rich descriptive 
and analytical stuffs. I thus opted for qualitative rather than quantitative method. 
 
3.2.2  Case Study  
Within qualitative premise, I have grounded case study for this study. The first advantage the 
qualitative strategy offered was sufficient rooms for meaning construction since it is by nature 
interpretative. ‘In general, interpretative approach is the systematic analysis of socially 
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meaningful action through the direct detailed observation of people in natural settings in order 
to arrive at understandings and interpretations of how people create and maintain their social 
worlds’ (Neuman, 1997, p.68). In the two cases SPGNFSRP and the GRPRM, a challenge 
was there while constructing meaning on what and why decisions in the reforms took place. 
To this end, the required data were possible only from those who had been involved in the 
decision-making processes. Taking a few people and getting long hours in-depth interviews 
was truly fitting more than any others.  
 
Secondly, ‘research questions have both substance (e.g. what is my study about?) and form 
(e.g., am I asking a ‘‘who’’, ‘‘what’’, ‘‘where’’, ‘‘why’’, or ‘‘how’’ questions?)’ (Yin, 2003, 
p.7). On the substance part, my study has sought to understand the transformation of NPM 
ideas in the Nepalese public sector reforms. The core of the sought understanding included 
both descriptive and analytical interests. A basic assumption about possibility of a hybrid 
shape in the implementation of NPM ideas underpinned the appetite for the substance. On the 
part of forms of my questions, the research questions that the thesis came up with included 
‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ concerns. Among them, the first, second and third questions posed 
‘what’ concerns whereas the fourth question posed ‘why’ and ‘how’ concerns. Yin affirms 
that basically five research strategies are applied in social science (COSMOS Corporation 
cited by Yin, 2003, p.5): experiment, survey, archival analysis, history and case study. Among 
them, case study is utterly closer to the form of this study. Because ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions 
are more explanatory that appeal case study. 
 
Thirdly, there are three conditions for the case study: ‘(a) the type of research question posed, 
(b) the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioural events, and (c) the degree 
of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events’ (Yin, 2003, p.5). As we discussed 
above, the first condition was so much prevalent in this case. However, the second and third 
conditions also seemed relevant as I have no manipulative influence at all over the behaviours 
of the events. The unit of analysis, that is, two reform cases took place in the contemporary 
world as implemented by the GoN. Similarly, this study has a feature – possessing recently 
held decisions as unit of analysis. Yin views ‘…the case study’s unique strength is its ability 
to deal with a full variety of evidence-documents, artefacts, interviews, and observations…’ 
(2003, p.7-8). Owing to meeting these conditions, I prefer case strategy for this study.  
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Finally, my study illustrates its five independent variables representing wide array of causal 
factors. Similarly, various tasks of the study, i.e., data collection, data analysis and their 
validity were relied upon different means. Finally, like most of the studies benefit from well-
heeled theoretical framework, this study also had prior theoretical assumptions. In such 
backdrops, Yin suggests case study again when: ‘…there will be many more variables of 
interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data 
needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior 
development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis’ (2003, p.13-14). 
For these very reasons, my thesis has sufficiently benefited from case study.  
 
3.2.3  Selection of Case/ Unit of Analysis 
Stepping into the research design, the two cases chosen namely the SPGNFSRP and the 
GRPRM are the unit of analysis of this study. By placing them in the study the study has 
sought answers about the set research questions. Several reasons drove me to picking up these 
cases. In fact, two-prong criteria were used in the selection, i.e., institution-based criterion and 
case-based criterion. In the institution-based criterion, first, I did a rapid assessment on which 
institutions were the most relevant to look into on the issue. After having consultation with 
some concerned persons, I found three ministries as the most relevant: Prime Minister’s 
Office (PMO), Ministry of Finance (MOF) and Ministry of General General Administration 
(MOGA). Since the PMO is directly led by the PM, the executive chief of the country, it has 
tremendous roles in the reforms. Similarly, MOF is very much pivotal as it deals with revenue 
and expenditure in the country. Moreover, when it is issue of administrative reforms MOGA 
is the focal point as per the ‘The Government of Nepal (Business Allocation) Rules, 2007’. 
On these grounds, the three ministries were taken up. As soon as the institutional criterion 
concluded, I attempted to watch out by using the case-based criterion in order to select one 
case from each of the institutions.  
 
The SPGNFSRP, the second case, I chose from the domain of MOF. The first advantage of 
this case is it represents the most debatable and contested reform of the contemporary Nepal. 
From its start up, the program was mostly welcome despite certain resistances from different 
corners of the society mainly from business community and opposition political parties. These 
plots are enough to regard it as a ‘contested case’. On the other extreme, it was a ‘darling’ 
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reform of some donors especially of the WB/IMF. Besides, by gravity the reform case is 
regarded to have a big impact.  
 
The GRPRM represents the domain of administrative and governance reforms. Inherently, it 
has a say about another big donor of the country ADB as pushing agency. Since theoretically 
a major part of the public sector reform is the changes within government apparatus, this case 
upholds that concern. By taking this case and the other case, I attempted to design a balanced 
strategy having cases from different domains and with different supporting institutions.  
 
In the design process, I was engrossed with concerns of validity. For this, I opted for two-case 
as a part of multiple case approaches. My idea was to gain cross case synthesis which can be 
well-validated due to comparativeness and representativeness in analysis. ‘The evidence from 
multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore 
regarded as being more robust’ (Herriott & Firesone, 1983 cited by Yin, 2003, p.46). There 
are some prejudices against the case study strategy. Social researchers do have high concern 
of generalization. One of the greatest common concerns about case studies is that they provide 
little basis for scientific generalization. ‘‘How can you generalize from a single case?’ is a 
frequently heard question. The answer is not simple’ (Kennedy, 1976 cited by Yin, 2003, 
p.10). To address this shortfall of single case study, I employed ‘multiple-case approach’. 
Inside the two cases, I narrowed down my zoom to decisions made by the Cabinet of GoN. 
However, the decisions concern only to the approval of the reform programs.  
 
3.2.4  Source of Evidence 
As my study is built with strategy of case study, the source of my data consisted of 
documents, interviews, archival records and policy observation. By this, the study is based on 
both secondary and primary forms of data. Out of six sources of evidence to be used in case 
studies, i.e., ‘documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant-
observation, and physical artifacts’ (Yin, 2003, p.83), this study benefits almost from the four 
sources. By these facts, the thesis stands by the ‘principle of multiple source of evidence’ 
(ibid). My idea of absorbing data from multiple sources was to assure of triangulation, e.g. 
multiple sources of evidence. This helped me in constructing validity and reliability to a 
considerable amount in this case study. In the construction phase, my design remains so much 
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impressed with an idea ‘major strength of case study data collection is the opportunity to use 
many different sources of evidence’ (Yin, 2003, p.97).  
 
3.2.4.1  Document Texts/ Written Data 
With regard to the third research question, document texts have been very instrumental. As a 
matter of fact, the question about contents part of the reform remained my point of reference 
for rest of the journey. Two more supplemental sub-questions, i.e., contents of market 
elements and contents of management elements, underpinned this question.  
 
Firstly, I collected copies of relevant decision minutes of the Cabinet of GoN. The decision 
contents of the SPGNFSRP were obtained from NRB whereas the contents of the GRPRM 
were collected from MOGA. Upon the collection, I developed a matrix that exhibits a case-
wise comparison of the contents brought in from NPM ideas (see Figure 4).  
 
The data collected from this source rested upon several forms of texts. Most of them were in 
printed forms like books, reports, papers and so on. I received them mostly from PMO, ADB, 
and the WB. Similarly, another form of source I rested upon was web pages of some 
concerned agencies. This category includes web pages of ADB, the WB and other 
governmental agencies of GoN.  
 
Apparently, there were several reasons why I utilized the document/text method. First, it 
allowed authentic and reliable documents. Second, the method was believed to shorten time 
and to economize other resources involved. Since the study had time-constraint and other 
resource deficiency, a ‘quick solution’ like document method was a great assistance. Third, 
this method could be always helpful for descriptive data. Most importantly, data from the 
documents gave me a sound basis of searching further data. For instance, by the help of the 
documents, I analyzed and came up with a comparative-list of the NPM ideas universally 
practiced and the NPM ideas locally practiced. That paved the way for interviews and other 
sources in pursuit of answer to the second questions.  
 
On the issue of response, I have a bit of a unique experience compared to commonly heard 
experiences. Generally social researchers complain of bureaucrats’ poor response in data 
collection. Contrary to this, I enjoyed pretty warm responses since I myself professionally 
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belong to Nepalese administrative system.  On my request, some provided me with electronic 
documents by email and some did so with even hard copies.  
  
3.2.4.2  Interviews 
As for the fourth question ‘what factors affected the decisions?’ the data I needed was of 
explanatory nature. They were to acquire ‘why’ and ‘how’ aspects of the decision processes 
happened to all the cases. ‘The primary aim is to gather an authentic understanding of 
people’s experiences and it is believed that open-ended questions are the most effective route 
towards this end’ (Silverman, 2004, p.13). For the interview, altogether twenty respondents 
were meticulously taken up. As the interviewee-size in terms of number was not so large, the 
study focused on their professional observation about the process of each of the decision-
making. Of the 15 interviewees, two from NRB, one from PMO, one from ADB, one from the 
WB, one from DFID, one from NPC, five from MOGA, one from Parliamentary Committee 
on administrative reforms, one from MoF, and one from Pro-Public, a leading NGO of 
Nepalese civil society. They were interviewed on the basis of their significant involvement in 
the decision-making processes of their respective organizations. By the case-wise number of 
the interviewees, the SPGNFSRP and the GRPRM held 10 and five interviewees, 
respectively. Most of them are fairly from very senior position of bureaucracy such as 
Secretary, Joint Secretary and so on (see Appendix I, II and III).  
 
Some interviewees were picked up also from non-governmental agencies such as donors and 
civil society. Mainly they are from the background of senior technocrats serving the 
respective agencies. The logic adhered to that the more the senior level the more the direct 
observation in the decision-making. It is because senior-most bureaucrats and technocrats do 
have interface with the Cabinet that is the highest political body of decision making.  
 
On top of all the preparations, each name of the interviewees was well assessed before they 
were approached. It was to minimize unequal competency of the interviewees and also to 
maximize richness of the data. In the assessment process, I benefited from ‘snowball or chain’ 
technique. In this, the person I interviewed last time was requested for pointing out who could 
be the next appropriate person for the next interview.  
 
The action of interview had a support of semi-structured interview-guide (see Appendix IV). 
Although I developed the guide before I marched to field work, I continued to refine it even 
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during the field with practical observations. Despite all, I paid maximum attention to 
consistency in the questioning of interview so as to maintain reliability. During the interview, 
I used the guide merely as an indicative framework to let the flow of in-depth talk. Through 
this approach, I let maximum chance to happen ecological validity in which interviewees 
commonly feel quite comfortable with the environment they live in.  
 
The in-depth interview has tremendous significance to this study. First, this provided with 
opportunity of face-to-face interview along with sufficient control. I could ‘excel’ on my own 
pace and ‘control’ over the questioning-answering processes. Second, it enriched the study 
with variety of sequential pattern of information. It allowed data to emerge in its own way. 
That opened many avenues which were never assumed before. Third is about accessibility. As 
I am still a part of senior level bureaucracy of Nepal, this conferred me a comparative 
advantage of having access to high level bureaucrats and technocrats. Taking this advantage, I 
designed the interview as a key pillar of data collection. To my surprise, many of my 
informants presented themselves very openly. This fairly contrasts a generalization that 
researchers often trouble with bureaucrats. Finally, I saw the area of the study by nature is 
‘process studies’ rather than ‘result studies’. In this regard, observation of those who could 
say ‘how’ and ‘why’ aspects of the process are likely to shed light on the phenomenon. In 
view of making the people replay their observations openly, interview remained undoubtedly 
the best convenient technique.  
 
I tried to record almost all of the interviews on voice tracker. The moment I did request for 
prior permission, a few of the interviewees felt little bit hesitant. However, the good thing was 
the uneasy feeling went off as soon as they stepped into real parts of the discussion. In such a 
time, personally I was so concerned about the feeling, behaviour and response of the 
interviewees towards the setting around. In order to ease the environment, I used a small MP3 
recording instrument. Due to the size it remained user-friendly and also interviewees-friendly. 
By these, I tried to assure of ecological validity. 
 
With regard to the level of response, overall impressions were very encouraging. None said 
‘no’. The best thing I noticed was many of them encouragingly participated and in some cases 
presented themselves in self-confessing way, too. Likewise, many of them expressed at the 
end a feeling of joy with the way we involved in the game of interviewee-interviewer.  
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3.2.4.3  Archival Records 
I found some data useful to all research questions available in archives of some web-pages. 
For this secondary form of data, I mainly used the archive of ‘The Kathmandu Post’, an 
English national daily newspaper. The data were mainly supportive to descriptive as well as 
explanatory parts. I used the archives, however, of only one year on after the decision date.  
 
Literally, this study benefited in various ways from the source. The archival documents do 
have sound stock of reliable data. That carried powerful explanations. For instance, news did 
have coverage on which actors and processes demonstrated what behavior and why. Since the 
news is generally patterned in sequential order each day this is helpful in meaning 
construction going through their history. Second, this specific newspaper is the largest in 
terms of its circulation, and name and fame. These are quite significant while on the issue of 
validity and reliability. Third, comparing with others this particular newspaper stands quite 
ahead with regard to coverage of reform issues. The broad and in-depth coverage remained a 
great help to this study. Fourth, it was a coincidence that I needed a few supplementary 
supports after my field work. Wherever it was data gaps the gap was so nicely filled up with 
the data from archives. Fifth and the most importantly, it was the only source which I found 
fairly possible with computer research without any constraints and additional costs. In brief, 
this has been a true friend of mine while dealing with my empirical chapter but in the form 
supplementary supports.  
 
3.2.4.4   Personal Observation 
My own observation being as a participant observer in some policy-making businesses 
remains an additional help to this study. For almost more than one decade I worked for PMO 
of the Nepal. The agency is one which has been a central actor in the GRPRM. I participated 
in many reform policy task groups. Enriched with the rich observations earned during the 
times, this study garnered tremendous benefits. Chapter five and six obtained ample supports 
from the observation compared to all other chapters. 
 
Data from the personal observation seem to be rich since they have less-distortions. They 
carry the values of first-hand real fact. The long year observation covered a range of time that 
provided comprehensive picture of the reform processes. This minimized a chance of 
misleading ‘peep sight’ in which only one part of picture is understood and rest of the others 
go mislead. However, I used the data from observation basically for supplemental supports to 
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other data. Furthermore, the observation helped me in verification of validity and reliability of 
other data collected from other sources. Due to this, sorting out unnecessary data has been 
easy.  
 
3.3  Analysis of Data  
To be very practical, I analysed the data in seven steps. First, I transcribed all the recorded 
interviews. Altogether 20 interviews taken with concerned high-placed officials were keys to 
open my data treasury. In view of grasping all relevant parts of the interviews, I managed 
transcription of all the recorded interviews in the written forms.  
 
Second, I made a tabulation in which all data are tabulated under three different headings: 
independent variables, hypotheses and obtained data. Data obtained from all four sources 
were stated one by one under the headings. While doing this, only the data are included which 
exhibited relation between the independent variables and hypotheses. In the meantime I used 
my own observation where it was inadequate data in the tabulated form of data for analysis. 
At the end of the day, I obtained a clear picture about the relationship between the IVs and the 
hypotheses linked with the data. This strategy granted me an easy way to analyse how far the 
data supported the hypotheses. 
 
In the third step, I applied the vintage points of the three perspectives (see 2.5) of organization 
theory. They provided us at least four broad theoretical propositions, however, one hypothesis 
I formulated myself taking the empirical context into account. Apart from the three 
perspectives, the thesis took help of some supplemental theories. By using the data, the study 
examined the set five hypotheses whether they are supported or not. In this course, a 
comparative view analyzed the data keeping at centre the five hypotheses (see Figure 1 and 
2).  
 
In the fourth step, the study applied cross-case synthesis. The two cases picked-up rendered 
me a sound basis for this kind of synthesis. Specially in summing up of all the analyses 
conducted, I used the synthesis and attempted to reach a synthesised conclusion.  
 
In the fifth step, in relation to capture causal relation of each of the independent variable with 
the dependent variable, I made a close look into the latter’s three indicators. They include 
actors, processes and contents. However this relation is assumed to be strong only in 
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instrumental. And in cultural and environmental it is believed to be loosely coupled. For this 
reason, I brought into the analysis the relation among and between the actors, processes and 
contents (see Figure 1 and 2) in instrumental more closely and in the rest to possible extent. 
 
The seventh step has been the most significant to the result of this study. In this pursuit, my 
study sought supports that each of the hypotheses received from data analysis in reference to 
the three indicators of the dependent variable: actors, processes and contents. The benchmark 
I placed for ‘support’ to a hypothesis if the relation of a variable is above weak in any of the 
indicators plus provided at least weak in the rest. The other way round if the relation is 
equivalent or lesser than weak the result is regarded as ‘no support’ or ‘rejection’.  
 
Finally, in view of adding quality in the analysis, I applied a wide array of consultations on 
my drafts as well as on the data. For example, I several times sought feedback on my drafts 
from some key interviewees. This helped me significantly in fixing cross verification with the 
drafts and triangulation about the data as such. Similarly, on top of my department seminars I 
presented the drafts in a workshop before senior researchers of ‘public sector reform group’ in 
CMI, Bergen. I in return got rich feedback from the researchers. Also, I obtained feedback 
from several other researchers working in CMI and elsewhere in the world.  
    
3.4  Limitations, Challenges and Opportunities 
3.4.1  Limitations of the Study 
The first limitation was the face-to-face interview itself. The technique in itself has some 
inherent drawbacks despite its all other plus points. By methodological flaws, this kind of 
open-ended interview is likely to be prone to a researcher’s bias in the process and thereby in 
the output. In order to not to let such bias, personally I was so alert. Even in a case when great 
caution is maintained, there still might have a level of risk of “insider’s bias”. Being a human-
being, I am not one hundred percent free from my own ‘values’. Similarly, all data were not 
equally valuable since all interviewees I found not equally competent and perceptive. Second, 
the archives though full of data were difficult to handle. The reason was the pile of data from 
which soaking relevant data was a challenging task. Finally, the issue of time remained all the 
time daunting. The study could have been even more vigorous if the time had permitted. 
 46
 
3.4.2  Delimitations of the Study 
The task of sorting out unit of analysis underwent absorbing of approval decisions taken by 
the GoN on the three reform cases. The study, however, did not go beyond the 
implementation of the NPM ideas into the decisions. Within the boundary of decisions, the 
study confined itself. The premises ultimately visited included actors, processes and contents 
of the three decisions. As all the research questions rotate around the three aspects of the 
decisions, the study remained within that scope. That part is the most visible delimitation. 
 
3.4.3  Challenges and Opportunities during the Study 
My field research in Nepal remained highly exciting and stimulating. However, sometimes it 
also had mixed impressions, too. In the beginning, I started my work with sorting out a long 
list of potential individuals to consult with. Finally, a list of 24 people was sorted out to be 
interviewed. During the period except the last week, I accomplished twenty interviews 
together in given time frame. Suddenly, I fell sick and was hospitalized. As a result, I was 
forced to leave those remaining interviews. Moreover, I got to drop one case from the study 
due to time constraint. Finally the accomplished two cases utilized 15 interviews out of the 20 
interviews.  
 
With respect to the SPGNFSRP, I got to knock the door of NRB. Contrary to my all 
expectation, an odd environment I encountered with. During the time, mass-media was full of 
news about arrest of Governor of NRB of Nepal and also of some high level officials of the 
bank. There was reportedly a charge laid by CIAA of the country in a case of international 
contract bidding with regard to Financial Sector Reform (FSR). Meantime, being a research 
student I dropped by the officials in the same bank. Embarrassingly, whoever I visited I was 
soon taken as an unwanted guest. On the suspect of mine being an investigative journalist, 
none was ready to co-operate with me. As soon as I found one of my former students working 
for the same department, he managed the situation and onwards I enjoyed very supportive 
responses.  
 
There were a few interviewees who claimed themselves as either architect or true ally of the 
reform moves. During their interviewees, I faced some bizarre feelings. For example: two 
interviewees were so defending about what they did. Instead of my areas of interest, they 
seemed so illuminative that it was all in favour of the people at large what they did. Likewise, 
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there was one attempted interviewee, one former Governor of NRB currently in education 
business. His assistant always would ask to leave a message but he never called back. It was 
the only reluctant person I encountered with. I marked others’ cooperation so much 
significant.  
 
When I kicked off writing the thesis, first NIAS a Copenhagen-based institute offered me a 
two-week research scholarship. That provided me with huge library resources on Nepal as 
well as an outstanding research environment. Second, CMI, a high name of reputation in 
social research, provided me with a studentship support that lasted till submission of the 
thesis. Having been awarded with the support, I spent rest of the study period being a part of 
the institute. The fascinating group of researchers especially in public sector reform group 
inspired me significantly to end of my work. My thesis benefited immensely from the 
researchers’ comments, rich library and logistic supports available in the institute. Apart from 
this, I found some scholarly figures working in NPM all the seasons supportive to my works 
with rich inputs.   
 
3.5  Conclusions 
In this chapter, I threw light over a rapid look on the qualitative research and case study. 
Afterwards, I rounded up various parts such as the case study and unit of analysis, the three 
sources of evidence, and the data analysis. Finally the chapter concluded with the challenges, 
limitations and delimitations faced during the study. In the following chapter four, case-wise 
empirical observations are central parts of our discussions. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ACTORS, PROCESSES AND CONTENTS  
4.0  Introduction 
This chapter describes empirical evidences about a) actors b) processes and c) contents that 
are the major indicators of the reform shapes. Firstly, so long as identification of the actors is 
involved, the study sought the roles of broadly two actors, i.e., central and peripheral. 
Secondly, this chapter highlights the processes that are followed in three stages, i.e., agenda 
setting, formulation and decision-making. Finally, this chapter describes the contents of 
NPM-inspired elements in the cases. The contents are divided into two trajectories: 
contractualism, i.e., market elements and managerialism, i.e., management elements (see 
chapter 2.2). Based on the content accounts, this study attempts to conclude as to where the 
three cases stand by about the two contesting forms of NPM.  
 
4.1  The SPGNFSRP, 1999-2000 
4.1.1 Who were the actors involved? 
4.1.1.1 Who were the central actors? 
Senior NRB Officials 
The pre-dominant role of NRB officials sustained mainly during the formulation time. When 
KPMG Barents Report came into public in the dawn of the NDF 2000 in Paris, it gave 
enormity of challenges to policy actors. In the NDF, donors’ urged a strong response from the 
GoN on the issue highlighted by the report. In response, GoN proposed 10-point reform 
which later began to be called ‘financial sector reform’.  
 
Following the NDF, we observe subsequent impetus into the Financial Sector Reform (FSR) 
paper. From agenda setting via formulation process to decision-making, the shadow of the 
NDF 2000 seemed to be the main driving force which could be noticed even in round-table-
discussions. One very senior NRB official who led once the whole FSR process expressed 
‘‘Some times we heard that ministers already signed the things in Paris…no point to discuss 
other than to accept them’’. Then we observe the officials to have taken the time-bound points 
of NDF 2000, which is officially called ‘Priority Reform Actions’, as point of references.   
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Ministers of Finance 
We observe ministers of finance seemed to be quite assertive to the strategy paper. Looked 
into past, 13 government were formed during the period of February 1990 till February 2005. 
During the period, six ministers served the ministry. Among them, two served during the most 
turbulent times of the reform. By academic background, they had schooling of economics and 
also teaching and other engagement in the same field in spite of politics. In Nepalese politics, 
the fundamentals of NC, the longest serving political party introducing many turbulent 
reforms, is known for liberal policy in social and economic constituents. One of them named 
Mahesh Acharya, minister of finance, reaffirmed8 his emphasis to market based solutions for 
reforms. 
The economic liberalization policies and programs of the past decade have been important in greater 
private sector participation and improving the resource allocative efficiency of the economy. The gains 
from liberalization are further strengthened by deregulating and decontrolling several state controlled 
entities (Acharya, Mahesh, Statement to Boards of Governors, 2000, p.2). 
 
 
Later, the same minister expressed his dissatisfaction over the functioning of the banks in the 
country. He is unhappy not only with fully or partially government owned banks but also with 
joint venture and private sector banks (Kathmandu Post, 2000)9.  
 
One remarkable development was that the same minister one day changed governor of NRB and 
appointed one of his close aids to the position. The newly appointed one had been a career 
bureaucrat for several years. Although a huge resentment was observed within the ruling party 
over the change of the governor, the minister remained unabated to his decision.  
 
It is worthy to note legal capacities of minister of finance and the ministry with NRB. Nepal 
Rastra Bank Act, 2002 article (2) reads ‘‘The Bank shall, without any prejudice to the 
objectives referred to in subsection (1), extend co-operation in the implementation of the 
economic policies of Government of Nepal.’’ Similarly, article 5 (g) of the act reads the NRB 
is ‘‘to act as a banker, advisor and financial agent of Government of Nepal.’’ Highlighting the 
relation between the GoN and NRB, article 9 of the same act provisions ‘‘Any contact by 
Government of Nepal with the Bank and by the Bank with Government of Nepal under this Act, 
                                                 
8 Mr Mahesh Acharya addressed a meeting of Boards of Governors IMF/ The WB Group held in Prague, Czech 
Republic, September 26–28, 2000 http://imf.org/external/am/2000/speeches/pr62npe.pdf. 9th March, 2008. 
9 ‘Banking reforms, are they possible?’, Kathmandu Post, May 30, 2000, 
http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2000/may/may30/editorial.htm#4 
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shall be made through the Ministry of Finance.’’ Also, in accordance to article 93 of the same act 
NRB has to submit some important reports to MoF. They include: (a) Auditing Report, (b) Report 
on its activities, (c) Report on economic and financial position. Through these, the minister of 
finance and the MoF exert vertical-hierarchical relations to the bank.  
 
Senior Bureaucrats of MoF 
When the country began the liberalization journey after political change in early 1990s, 
bureaucrats in most of the cases remained an enchanted force with regard to public sector 
reforms. One former chief secretary viewed ‘‘since 1990 onwards, a small number of 
bureaucrats were quite active in reform agenda. Although they were in the number not that 
big, they were committed reformists.’’ 
 
Among the reformist bureaucrats, some have been trained in USA and other universities 
abroad. The study observes that they had good reputation in the circle of development 
partners of the country.  
 
Finally, the same chief secretary made an important note ‘‘Bureaucracy is never a reform 
leader. They only can construct working space to the politicians. In which politicians act and 
some reforms may happen as a result of the conducive space’’. This defends the roles of 
political leaders in the process. That time, the ministry was led by one young central leader, 
who was an economist by academic background, of Nepali Congress. He acted quite assertive 
roles. 
 
Senior Technocrats of NPC 
A team leading NPC demonstrated sporadic commitment onto the reform. Highly trained 
abroad especially in the area of economics and influenced with neo-liberalism, the team 
members played vital roles. This study observes donors like the WB and ADB louded them 
for their roles. Similarly, wavelength of the technocrats of NPC and some reform minded 
senior bureaucrats converged and afterwards developed a synergic effect. They designed and 
presented to Cabinet ministers on what could be appropriate measures against the bleak 
situation in financial sector of the country. This led the decision makers into the reform. 
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4.1.1.2 Who were the peripheral actors? 
Parliamentary Committee – Public Account Committee (PAC) 
Although no decision needed from parliament, the PAC held some discussions on the issue of 
reform. In parliamentarian practices of the country, usually the PAC is under the control of 
opposition party. Long tradition shows that the committee is considered to be a wrestling-
court being used by opposition parties to attack the government. The attack generally 
concentrates in the area of policy and program related to national financial management.  
 
The committee debated on it and applauded the tours-onto-the reforms. The study learns from 
one former chief secretary that the donors’ side, i.e., the WB/IMF, in view of getting all-party 
consensus, was willing to win support from the parliamentary committee. Finally, this also 
happened by getting the agenda discussed in the committee. 
 
International Consultants – KPMG Barents Group 
In retrospective view, the KPMG/Barents10 report 2000 prompted a big explosion in banking 
sector of Nepal.  
At the request of the government, a diagnostic review of the RBB and NBL was carried out by 
KPMG/Barents in 1999/2000. This study's major findings confirm that (a) the banks' management is 
basically dysfunctional; (b) there are no reliable data available on the loan portfolio; (c) financial 
accounting is primitive and not according to international standards (accounts are virtually all manual and 
annual statements have not been produced for over six years); (d) business strategies are not in place; (e) 
human resource policy is weak and counterproductive (f) management information systems and record 
keeping are very basic; and (g) governance and management are highly politically driven and lacking a 
commercial focus(The World Bank, 2002, p.5). 
 
Donors 
The WB and ADB in their country assistance strategies set low case and high case as criteria 
for lending the country. They tied up performances in reforms with borrowing capacity of the 
country. ‘‘The base case envisions an average annual lending of about US$190 million…If 
the reform process stalls (low case), the lending support will be curtailed sharply to a range of 
US$0-50 million (The WB, 2003, p.ii)’’. By doing so, the donors claimed they developed the 
ideas for the reforms and offered the country’s decision-makers joining hands in development 
                                                 
10 KPMG is the global professional advisory firm with more than 100,000 people collaborating worldwide, the 
firm provides consulting, tax and legal, financial advisory and assurance services from more than 820 cities in 
159 countries (Spotlight, June 16-22, 2000, ‘What is KPMG?’, vol 19, No 48, 
http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishweekly/spotlight/2000/jun/jun16/coverstory.htm. 
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efforts. They showed their readiness for joint endeavour, that is, development assistance in 
return for reforms.  
 
Business Community 
On behalf of business community, FNCCI, an umbrella organization of businessmen, played 
its role. But that was blamed to be a double standard. They had a desire to be observed as 
reformists but never been ready to pay price in return. They themselves planted many protests 
against the reform-steps to the extent of holding mass-procession in the street. The protest had 
been ranging from agenda setting to implementation. The study observes in regard to this 
reform, the community was a nagging actor.  One leading figure, by background a technocrat 
served NPC, characterised ‘‘views of business community mainly of FNCCI seemed very 
shaky and confusing. They said ‘yes’ to the reform but tried to save the face of the culprits 
who were target of the reform. This was evident that they have been middle-ranged’’. 
 
Banking Community 
Private sector banks in gross remained supportive from surface. They assumed that they 
would be benefiting from it. If supervisory roles of NRB strengthened and financial 
infrastructure developed well, they would get favor in regard to their banking business. Also, 
they assumed that they could trace out bad-borrower and get rid of them. It is because some of 
the banks worried about multiple-bank problem of some bad-borrowers. A corrupt practice 
has been common that a single borrower borrowed from multiple banks and for the same part 
of a project. In such a way they borrowed 10/10 billions from different banks with the same 
collateral for the same part. And many of such borrowers later became big-defaulters. At the 
end of the day, all those trapped banks would have to share the same collateral being partner-
in-loss. A senior WB financial analyst who also served the reform speculated that as an 
outcome of the supports of the private banks, NBA also seemed supportive. In his words 
‘‘otherwise I wouldn’t see happening it without their involvement’’. It is because they had 
also some skepticism about the consequences of the reform. The risk they smelled was about 
loosing the freedom once a strong regulatory system in placed. 
 
Mass-Media 
Mass-media especially printed national newspapers possessed a significant role. They 
effectively kept people informed about Asian Crisis, the KPMG Report and their possible 
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consequences against Nepalese economy. In the media, among others, ‘The Kantipur’11 and 
‘The Kathmandu Post’ that have largest circulation in the country played a vital role. 
Financial and economic columns of the newspapers brought the issues into the public 
attention. One senior Kathmandu based WB official openly praised their roles and said the 
newspapers had been instrumental, prior to the decision, in creating and strengthening reform 
demand from mass people. By doing this, the reform scored acceptance from the mass people 
and also won legitimacy.  
 
4.1.2  What were the processes followed? 
4.1.2.1 Agenda Activation of the Reform 
Definition of Problem 
First, two huge publicly owned banks namely RBB and NBL had an increasing tendency of 
NPA and capital error. ‘‘Public ownership has distorted and politicised these 
institutions…Loans are not repaid yet deposits continue to be made (The WB, 2002, p.114).’’ 
One former vice-chairman of NPC remarked ‘‘Asian Crisis hit countries upheld a short 
capacity of absorbing external shocks whereas the Nepalese banks lacked even the capacity of 
absorbing internal shocks.’’ Low management efficiency and less professionalization were 
parts of human resource management. One NRB official said the learning with the failures 
concluded with ‘‘too big too failed’’. ‘‘In addition, the financial sector operates in a murky 
milieu of bad accounting, weak regulation, a poor banking culture, lack of transparency, a 
fragile legal environment, and a deficit of readily available information of virtually all issues 
that are required for a banking system to operate effectively (ibid)’’.  
 
Second, NRB itself seemed to be incapable to guarantee that all banks operate within a set 
norms. Its supervisory capacity is far below than required level.  
 
Third, when the reform was in its embryonic stage, the KPMG Barents Report 2000 stripped 7 
ailing spots. It was a big jolt that the country’s financial sector had ever faced. Subsequently, 
the concerns of KPMG overshadowed also upon NDF 2000 Paris. The NDF meeting provided 
ample agenda for the reform. Prior to the NDF meeting, GoN had organized a consultative 
meeting during 13-15 March12, 2000 with various stakeholders on the agenda of NDF. Later 
                                                 
11 http://www.kantipuronline.com/ 
12 See http://www.ndf2004.gov.np/ndf2000/summary.php 
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in the Paris meeting the grey areas pointed out by the KPMG Barents report had been hot-
cake.  
 
Fourth, then the minister of finance was unhappy with banking functioning because of their 
increasing volume of non-performing assets, untimely credit policies and traditional mentality 
persistent with the banks. The minister charged the banks as saying "some groups of people 
with vested interests open these banks and would like to deal with some selected clients 
without serving governments expectation (The Kathmandu Post, 2000)13".  
 
Amid the growing realization that NRB had been unable to cope with banking and financial 
sector, the WB conducted a study on implementation of Basel Principles in Nepal. That 
pointed out that Nepal was in most cases out of the state of Basel Core Principles 1988. As a 
matter of fact, the Basel Principles14 are the universal 25 coercive standards to be followed by 
all signatory countries. One senior respondent from NRB admitted the principles not being 
complied. The non-compliance to the principles worked as a pressing factor. ‘‘Until 2001, 
two third of the Basel Core Principles for effective banking supervision out of 25 were not 
implemented in the financial system. A study by the World Bank (2002) pinpointed 
weaknesses on the part of NRB to carryout the regulatory functions effectively (Adhikary, 
Pant and Dhungana, 2007, p.29).’’ Despite these all, pointing the role of ‘fiscal stress’ one 
former secretary of finance mentioned ‘‘we would hardly go for this reform, if there was no 
sustained fiscal stress’’. 
 
Definition of Solution 
This study observes, first, almost all actors, as described in chapter 4.3.1, had a powerful 
learning from the Asian Crisis 1997. Some of the major reasons of the crisis and subsequent 
measures employed by some successful countries taught some useful recipes to the actors. 
One senior NRB respondent described it was a big demonstration effect of the success stories 
of other countries which had gone through the fatal Asian Crisis of 1997. One very senior 
NPC technocrat extended:  
‘‘Realizing the hard-fact, the WB and also ADB headquarters by themselves initiated this process of 
reform although officially we initiated it. Behind the screen, a WB team did all the homework. It was after 
                                                 
13 ‘Banking reforms: are they possible?’. Tuesday May 30, 2000. 
http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2000/may/may30/editorial.htm#4 
14 See the 25 principles http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs129.pdf. 03.04.08 
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all a part of global financial sector reform. It was a coincidence that our ground reality and their global 
program converged somewhere and marched together.’’  
 
Second, when then minister of finance publicly showed his anger at the functioning of private 
and joint venture banks, this study observes, the minister was of a view of placing some 
regulatory rules and regulations. This particular idea private owned and joint venture banks 
could not digest. And they had a counter logic that instead of going ahead with 
implementation of new rules and regulations, that he may claim will economically revamp of 
the country, he should take them into confidence and make them more competitive in their 
products and services and ask government owned banks to do the same (Kathmandu Post, 
2000)15. This was what their reactions to the minister’s ideas.  
 
In the NDF 2000 Paris meeting and also coming into the stress of the KPMG Barents report, 
the GoN proposed a list of priorities for reforms. This included: a) amendment to NRB Act 
and Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, legislation on merger, and acquisition, bankruptcy and 
business closure to be introduced; b) restructuring RBB and NBL, with improved 
management, branch rationalization, and improved supervision mechanisms; c) improvement 
in prudential regulation, accounting and auditing practices; d) strengthening of regulatory and 
monitoring functions of the central bank; e) improving the operations of non-banking 
financial institutions; f) promoting insurance markets; g) gradually formalizing the rural 
informal credit markets; h) strengthening micro credits to improve production and 
employment opportunities in rural areas; i) privatization of government owned banks and 
non-bank financial institutions; j) creating framework for establishment of branches of 
reputed international banks. In the dawn of the Paris meeting, developers of the strategy had 
no choice except to include them in the strategy.  
 
4.1.2.2 Formulation of the Reform 
Definition of Problem 
The study observes, first, a special team working within NRB day and night. In the backdrop 
of disclosure of the KPMG Barents report, they developed a draft paper for the FSR strategy. 
The team basically consisted of NRB officials. However, donors such as the WB, DFID and 
ADB supported with technical and financial help. A technical team led by Simon Bell, the 
WB/IMF provided the back-up support to the team.  
                                                 




The study observes that the strategy paper was a joint product of NRB, NPC and MoF. It was 
presented later in a seminar in Kathmandu in June 2000. The paper described loan recovery as 
the main problem of RBB and NBL. ‘‘…political intervention, weak management, poor 
financial information system and ever growing bad loans have tremendously impacted on 
RBB to the very worse financial shape. Both RBB and NBL suffer from negative net worth, 
weak internal control and information system and poor financial management, said the paper 
(Spotlight, 2000).’’16 
 
Poor management of financial resources at the RBB and NBL has been one of the most 
important ways by which the powerful elite has been able to abuse the public institutions (The 
WB, 2002, p.3). 
 
However, it was noticed that participation of private sector especially private banks in the 
formulation process remained meagre. There were some resistances made against the process 
from NBL shareholders since very early. However, senior officials of NRB and GoN caught 
on so cautious approach that vested interest groups did not get any chance to spoil the 
formulation. Because the officials and some external reports also viewed that some 
shareholders that had borrowed loan have been in the list of big defaulters.  
 
The study observes poor banking culture as an impeding factor. One Kathmandu-based World 
Bank official revealed ‘‘when borrower got loan approved, they used to celebrate it as if it is a 
wind-fall lottery. Loans should have been like a burden.’’ A corrupt culture inside lending 
was deeply rooted. The same person in some instances used to be ironically both shareholder 
and borrower. ‘‘Fraud, self-dealing, insider dealing, and improper evaluation of collateral 
have been among the reported abuses (The World Bank, 2002, p.iii).’’  
 
On institutional front, old-fashioned set up incapacitated the banking sector. ‘‘Outdated and 
inappropriate laws similarly lead to weakness throughout the Nepalese financial system’’ 
(The World Bank, 2002, p.ii). Serious lacking of corporate governance barred the sector from 
becoming a thriving tool of the economy. A World Bank study notes: 
                                                 
16 See Sick and Battered. June 16-22, vol 19, No 48. 
http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishweekly/spotlight/2000/jun/jun16/coverstory.htm 
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‘‘Many banks cannot provide financial statements, and at times the accounts that banks do 
provide are un-audited – even though banks and finance companies are required to be audited 
annually by external auditors selected at general assemblies (2002, p.ii).’’  
 
The widely quoted report of the KPMG Barents Group on the two giant public banks 
disclosed that they were technically bankrupt: (a) the banks' management is basically 
dysfunctional; (b) there are no reliable data available on the loan portfolio; (c) financial 
accounting is primitive and not according to international standards (accounts are virtually all 
manual and annual statements have not been produced for over six years); (d) business 
strategies are not in place; (e) human resource policy is weak and counterproductive; (f) 
management information systems and record keeping are very basic; and (g) governance and 
management are highly politically driven and lacking a commercial focus (Adhikari, Pant and 
Dhungana, 2007, p.2). 
 
Definition of Solution 
Worthy to note about NBL, owners/shareholders lobbied against the strategy so as not to 
happen any solution against their interest. They claimed that they themselves could manage 
the reforms. However, RBB and MoF ignored outrightly them reaffirming that they had given 
them previously 10 years time to fix the banks. ‘‘As early as in 1988, the Commercial Banks 
Problem Analysis and Strategy Study (CBPASS) recommended that in order to upgrade the 
competitive ability and efficiency of the government-owned banks…(Spotlight, 2000)’’. 
Some serious missing was there with its compliance. This time when the same owners came 
up with the similar claims, the authorities of NRB and MoF did not heed them. And they 
rushed for outer solution. The solution sought from foreigner management team to be taken 
over the management of the two banks and the full privatization in the long run.  
 
Presenting draft of the strategy paper in a seminar in Kathmandu, Ram Babu Pant, deputy 
governor of NRB said, "There is an urgent need to initiate an appropriate plan to improve loan 
recovery and reduce non performing loans of these two banks (Spotlight, 2000)’’17.  
 
The private sector leaders also agreed to the GoN’s promptness to the steps. But this study 
observes they had a reservation about loan recovery measure. "The NRB has to play a pro-
                                                 
17 June 16-22, vol 19, No 48, Sick and Battered. 
http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishweekly/spotlight/2000/jun/jun16/coverstory.htm 
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active and effective role as a guardian of the financial institutions," said Narendra K. Basnyat, 
President of Nepal-USA Chamber of Commerce and Industry. As for loan recovery, he 
continued ‘‘The banks should come up with rehabilitation schemes if a project is due to 
reasonable cause (Spotlight, 2000)’’.  
 
When minister of finance in NDF 2000 Paris presented a priority list for ‘reform actions’, it 
consisted of, inter alia, restructuring of RBB and NBL with improved management, branch 
rationalization, improved supervision mechanisms, and privatization of the government-
owned banks and non-bank financial institutions in the medium term. It also included creating 
‘Asset Reconstruction Company’ with joint venture between NRB and private sector to raise 
bad debt, enacting Debt Recovery Act and amendment in RBB Act, and strengthening the 
monitoring and supervisory capability of the central bank through necessary amendment in 
the NRB Act (Spotlight, 2000)18. We observe that the menu was cooked already in Paris few 
months back and it was rather formalization for ownership and commitments. 
 
4.1.2.3  Decision-making of the Reform 
Definition of Problem 
It was whatever conceived by technocrats and donors, but one group of Nepalese side 
observed it from quite different angle. ‘‘Some experts insist that banking sector reform is 
something that should be the government's agenda, not a bitter pill to be swallowed under 
pressure from the donors (Spotlight, 2000, ibid)’’.  
 
Chairman of board of directors of NBL countered the KPMG’s idea of overhauling the banks 
as suggesting ‘‘The chairman has got no power in the Board. So, the government should think 
of appointing an executive director or executive chairman to head the Board (Spotlight, 2000, 
ibid).’’ This statement shows the problem of authority. 
 
As per the KPMG Barents report, the performance of the banks is far below the 'international 
norms'. However Bhavanath Upadhyaya, acting general manager of NBL, said that the 
parameters cannot be compared with international practice. "We have our own norms, 
according to which the situation is not so alarming (The Rising Nepal, 2000)."19. Views of 
                                                 
18 June 16-22, vol 19, No 48, Sick and Battered. 
http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishweekly/spotlight/2000/jun/jun16/coverstory.htm 
19 ‘RBB, NBL are still doing fine’, July 10, 2000, 
http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/trn/2000/jul/jul10/index.htm#5 
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one former chairman also supported the argument. As he said, it had been conducted 
according to the KPMG standard. If the same standard were applied, almost all the banks in 
Nepal would be termed as technically insolvent (Spotlight, 2000, ibid). 
 
Shankar Kumar Rayamajhi, president of employees association at RBB, pointed out political 
pressure and corruption as main problem of the two banks (The Rising Nepal, 2000, ibid).  
 
While Gopal Chintan Shivakoti of National Concern Society smells a rat in the aberrations in 
those banks. He alleges that there is ‘‘a conspiracy to weaken the RBB and NBL’’ (The 
Rising Nepal, 2000, ibid). 
 
Definition of Solution 
The study observes a heated debate and conflicting ideas surfaced on the issue when it was 
crucial time for decision. The most talked KPMG report imposed the reform designers and 
decision makers ‘‘If no tangible action is taken, key donors are likely to interpret this as a lack 
of Government commitment and resolve to deal with some of the most fundamental problems 
in Nepal - with potential consequences for future assistance and aid commitments. (Spotlight, 
2000, ibid).’’  
 
Chairman of NBL suggested that the government should have honest and professionally 
capable people as members of the Board instead of the government employees. Finally, he 
urged the GoN to take action against rampant corruption and irregularities as they are 
responsible for present state of affairs of the Bank (Spotlight, 2000).  
 
Reacting to the KPMG’s explosive findings and the grave concerns of GoN, CEO of RBB, the 
other bank post-mortem conducted by the KPMG’s report, told that a priority had to be given 
to efficiency of their manpower. Similarly, maintaining transparency and taking the bank 
toward profitability were to be followed. Improving quality of the services and maintaining 
good project appraisal and credit audit were additional tips (Spotlight, 2000, ibid). 
 
One leader of employee organization urged to strengthen the monitoring mechanism of NRB 
(The Rising Nepal, 2000, ibid). Similarly, Prakash Chandra Mukhiya, President of RBB 
Employees leader expressed ‘‘handing over the management of these banks to foreign 
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companies is no solution to existing problems…In any case, we will not support the move to 
fire the employees or restrict the rights of the trade unions (Spotlight, 2000)20.’’ 
 
A chartered accountant Ratna Sansar Shrestha urged for market based solution as saying that 
the government-owned banks like RBB and NBL should take strict measures for 
improvement. Economists are of the view that RBB and NBL (owned 41% by the 
government) are urgently in need of massive changes. They rule out collapse of these banks 
since they cover more than 85 per cent of the total banking transactions in the country (The 
Rising Nepal, 2000, ibid).  
 
On issue of contracting out of the two big banks, this study observes some contesting opinions 
even from NRB side. Satyendra Pyara Shrestha, former Governor of NRB, said that Nepal did 
have the professionals who could manage banks well (Sunday Despatch, 2000)21. 
 
Lok Bhakta Rana, an advocate and former chairman of NBL termed the idea of contracting 
out the two banks illegal as saying ‘‘the NRB's act of inviting foreign management at the 
banks is likely to land in a legal tangle as there is no legal basis for awarding the management 
contract to a foreign company/companies (Spotlight, 2000)22’’ 
 
Notwithstanding, approval decision on the strategy paper taken by Cabinet of GoN remained 
unexpected to many concerned ones. The study observes the designers and decision-makers 
involved from NRB and MoF to be determined to its contents. One senior official of NRB 
argued that as debate could have a spoiling effect, they deliberately avoided direct 
participation of stakeholders in the process.  
 
One senior chartered accountant of NBL supports of prudent use of the Basel Principles as 
saying ‘‘The accounting standard and disclosure rule should be strengthened to meet the 
international standard (The Kathmandu Post, 2000)’’23.  
 
                                                 
20 Spotlight, Vol20, No17, Nov 10-16 2000. 
http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishweekly/spotlight/2000/nov/nov10/national8.htm 
21 Suday Despatch, Vol.XI No.24, Oct 1-7, 2000, 
http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishweekly/sundaydespatch/2000/oct/oct01/index.htm#2 




A former chief secretary recalled one typical process that they got to follow in one case. 
Following the shocking KPMG report, they were in pursuit of bringing multi-prong reforms. 
They were willing to invite a good management with good banking practices from abroad and 
the expectation by doing so was that no petty interest of Nepalese could have messed it. In his 
own words ‘‘if it was Nepalese, political vested interest wouldn’t allow it to work. But 
foreigners work by even squeezing the defaulters’’. In the mean time, the trade unions of the 
bank employees revoked back with mass opposition. He continued. 
‘‘We - steering committee - one day were discussing on the issue of contracting out the 
management. Trade unions came there and pressured not to take any decision to contracting 
out. After the surmountable pressure, we used political influence and paved the way to invite 
a foreigner team. This was by making the decision by Cabinet. Afterwards trade unions 
somehow calmed down due to the political will in the decision. 
 
4.1.3  What were the contents? 
This study observes the trajectory of contractualism implying privatization and hired 
management on contracts, and competition/commercialization. The observed first feature 
includes contracting out of RBB and NBL first. The second is to privatize them after making 
improvement in their performance. The feature includes restructuring of ADB/N and NIDC. 
Similarly, sales/divestiture of rural development banks and development of rural development 
banks via private sector is also one more part of the feature.  
 
The observed feature competition/commercialization includes enactment of some laws such 
as Debt Recovery Act, Bankruptcy Act and Merger and Acquisition Act. On banking front, 
the same feature brings in provisions such as criteria for new banks at par with international 
standards and promoting the operation of international banks in Nepal. Similarly, actions of 
streamlining of ownership structure conventionally run under control of one family or person 
and promoting sectoral financing by industrial, housing and other finances at competitive cost 
are also included. The feature finally embraces promotion of international accounting firms in 
the country, and sales of rural development banks to private sector.  
 
In regard to the managerial trajectory, I observe three out of the six features. They include 
accountability/ transparency/ participation, divisionalized organization and agencification, and 
cost-cutting/ down sizing. The first feature accountability/ transparency/ participation attribute 
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to promoting international accounting firms to come in. Similarly, establishing a Credit 
Information Bureau (CIB) for more transparency is another element observed.  
 
The second feature divisionalized organization and agencification undertakes elements such 
as establishing a Banker’s Training Institute (BTI), initiating Assets Reconstruction Company 
(ARC), and establishing development banks at local level. Likewise, the elements also include 
establishing two new agencies, i.e., Credit Rating Agency (CRA), and CIB for more 
transparency. 
 
The third observed feature cost-cutting/ down sizing undertake strengthening of supervisory 
capabilities of NRB for efficiency, and revamping strength of the NRB. The capacity 
enhancement aimed at monitoring and research of financial sector.  
 
4.2  The GRPRM, 2001-2004 
4.2.1  Who were the actors involved? 
4.2.1.1 Who were the central actors? 
Ministers-in-MoGA and MoF 
A common phenomenon observed after the 1990s political change characterizes almost all 
ministers of finance as champion of reform. As a fact of reason, a few people repeatedly run 
the ministry despite frequent government changes. As the ministry seemed to be main-
entrance for reform issues, their positions on reform agenda have been imperative. This 
happened in both of the cases regardless of degree of differences. 
 
In all the three NDF meetings held as of now, three ministers of finance in their tenure 
showed vigorous reform commitments, inter alia, in the area of governance and public 
administration.  
 
Senior Bureaucrats of MoGA, MoF and PMO 
Bureaucrats working for MoGA, MoF, and PMO were at driving seat across the time. Also, 
NPC secretary held a key role along with them. This study observed that a team serving those 
central agencies had both zeal and driving power onto the reform process. One PMO 
secretary, who had been an architect of GRP, expressed ‘‘likeminded bureaucrats worked as 
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‘critical-mass’. They were not leading rather pushing the reform process’’. His point exhibited 
that bureaucrats acted as a back up support to the politicians enthusiastic to the reform.  
 
Prior to and concurrent the program, some donors organized some study visits in view of 
showing them how similar reform work in elsewhere. Such visits were made especially in 
some Asian, African and even South American countries. The programs mainly targeted high-
placed bureaucrats and technocrats.  
 
Highlighting the background of the bureaucrats, one former bureaucrat and currently serving a 
donor agency pointed out that it was very experienced elite bureaucrats who mattered a lot. 
‘‘The intellectual community includes academically oriented bureaucrats, who show up half 
academic and half bureaucrat. They themselves were either incumbent civil servant or retired 
ones’’.  
 
The thesis observes motivation of bureaucrats in the roadmap was accredited to a growing 
realization about self-existence and role-display during the crisis. That time the country was 
crippled by violent political conflict. In the conflict-ridden environment, civil administration 
had been loosing its validation. As a consequence, civil administration was gradually 
overlapped with police and army administration. One respondent revealed that the then chief 
secretary Dr Bimal Koirala urged ‘‘what role of the bureaucracy in conflict management is 
most likely?’’. Dr Koirala argued that as the bureaucracy was not assertive enough, others, 
e.g., Nepal Army (NA), Nepal Police and so on, were substituting it. He further told that this 
was a living example what would happen if civil administration does not perform well. This 
deep realization in the bureaucratic leadership led them to a solution of the roadmap. 
 
One day secretary of finance sounded so vocal in a Cabinet related meeting. As one MOGA 
official revealed, pointing to sectoral ministries the secretary mentioned that he could not 
provide budget resources to the ministries if the reform was not put in place. He related the 
money with urgency of the reforms.  
 
One senior official from ADB praised the roles of senior team of MoGA, PMO and MoF 
saying ‘‘they are the champion of the program’’. However, he didn’t spare to note ‘old habit 
die hard’. It is because, as he argued, people hate change because of getting into uncertainty 
from certainty. He continued response of many bureaucrats remained very slow owing to 
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absence of incentives in return of the reforms, in-sufficient critical-mass within the 
bureaucrats; and some other contextual factors. 
 
As the leaders of the bureaucracy to have led aggressively the reform, a top layer of MoGA’s 
officials seemed to be a united-force all the times. Ironically, even within MoGA a small 
group of middle-class officials kept themselves out from the process and remained indifferent. 
The proportion of the involved participant and the indifferent was 80 and 20 percent 
respectively. However, line ministries appeared in the rank of most passive actor. In reality, 
they clapped their hands but not made real and meaningful participation. The study observes 
that many officials from line ministries misconceived it as the agenda of only MoGA. This 
made them passive in the reform processes. One former secretary of MoGA acknowledged 
that one section of senior bureaucrats also remained passive. He stated that some politicians 
with vested interest went against of it due to some ideological differences. 
 
4.2.1.2 Who were the peripheral actors? 
Donors: ADB 
We observe that the interest of the both parties, i.e., the GoN and the ADB, merged in a 
roadmap. As the GoN was trapped in fiscal deficit, it was seeking additional resources. The 
bank, however, had its own lending interest. Both interests epitomized at a point, as a result, 
the roadmap cropped up to satiate the appetite of the both sides. One MoGA official’s 
statement supports this fact. 
‘‘ADB was to lend us; the Government was to grasp money. Meantime the GRPRM, 2004 
appeared as a ‘super-glue’ to the interests of either parties.’’ 
 
Many observe the GRPRM as a by-product of Governance Reform Program (GRP).  The 
seven year program (December 2001-June 2007) had been in place with cooperation of ADB. 
The program had mainly four components.  
The objective or scope of the program are to (i) develop an internal capacity within the Government to 
lead and undertake the governance reform agenda, (ii) improve efficiency of the civil service, (iii) 
improve governance and reduce corruption in the Government, (iv) enhance competence and motivation 
of civil servants, and (v) establish processes for improving performance in the key ministries24. 
 
The program equated to US dollar 30 million to be disbursed in three tranche/ installments, 
i.e., first 12 million US dollar, second Nine million and third the final Nine million. Each 
                                                 
24 http://www.adb.org/Documents/PIDs/32238013.asp 
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tranche had a range of conditions or covenants to be fulfilled by the GoN in advance. 
Unfortunately after disbursing the first tranche, the GoN failed to fulfill many of the set 
conditions for second tranche. It was an irony that when GoN was in quagmire of fiscal 
deficit, the money got unreleased. In bid of fulfilling the ADB’s concerns, GoN put some 
serious efforts. They culminated in disbursement of the tranche. Respondent from ADB 
described ‘‘the second tranche (equivalent to $ 10.58 m) was disbursed in December 2006 - 
this is more than the original $ 9 m because the exchange value of SDR has increased’’.  
 
In making possible the second tranche, MoGA paid sober efforts by bringing all concerned 
ministries together. Minister for MoGA himself, who headed a reform committee, organized a 
series of meetings. Senior MoGA officials also met with Prime Minister (PM) on this issue. 
Finally, the GoN came up with a distinct product called GRPMP 2004. As a matter of fact, 
this was elaboration of the 19 conditions of the GRP program loan that remained unattained 
before. Furthermore, the GoN has gone a bit farther than the conditions and extended the 
reform activities to a significant extent. In this whole process, chief secretary of GoN, senior 
bureaucrats from MoGA and some other ministries played vital roles in making the success.  
‘‘This was an example how responsibly bureaucrats in a country can lead a reform design 
process. They could be seen anywhere… from spirit to contents of the roadmap (one MoGA 
official).’’ 
 
But the heart of the reform was engrossed by money concerns. One respondent revealed ‘‘In 
Nepal, it is worthy to note that if there is no reforms no money is coming in from outside’’. 
Money and reforms often arrive together. One official of MoGA visualizes ‘‘Donors are more 
active and government is less. This roadmap is a living example’’. The respondent viewed 
that over-activation on donors’ part obviously implies reflection of the donor’s ideas in reform 
agenda.  
 
Rebel (former) Political Party (CPN-M) 
CPN-M which sponsored insurgency in the country put the state of governance in question. 
So many governance issues hidden till the preceding day came into limelight one-by-one. For 
example, question of inclusiveness and representative public administration sustained less 
talked and then turned into a long-standing debate. Concerns of citizens’ rights on public 
services raised question about relationship between public servants and service-holders. Issues 
of corruption and ethics raised issue of value changes in the society. All these underscored 
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enormous space in the agenda of governance reform that gone beyond conventional scope of 
administrative reform.  
 
One MoGA official highlighted ‘‘the party-in-insurgency namely CPN-M was conceived as a 
‘fear factor’. This forced all kind of policy workers to think twice about casuals of the conflict 
before getting into any policy agenda.  
 
Civil Society 
Following the advent of multi-party democracy in the country in the early 90s, civil society 
witnessed its wider expansion. Governance, among many others, has been one of the areas the 
society actively worked in. Some segments of the society aggressively attacked the distortions 
being popped up in public goods and services. This made a mounting pressure against the 
state to curve the anomalies. By acting so, they began to enjoy space in state affairs. 
The institutions of accountability, such as Public Account Committee of the Parliament, Auditor-
General’s Office, Commission for Investigation of Abuse of Authority and even Special Police 
Department, have often called for the support of civil societies in order to beef up the national security 
system of the state and the financial integrity system of the government, political parties and public 
institutions (Dahal, 2001, p.31). 
 
In that bid, the civil society was not alone. Rather it was boosted by some donors so as to 
assertively fight against the anomalies pertaining to the public administration and governance. 
Pro-Public, a part of the society, for example, was supported for Good Governance Project, 
Civil Society Anti-Corruption Project by SDC25. Also, DFID ESP26 had such ample supports. 
The civil society, as a consequence, strongly began to put leaders of public administration in 
question and imbued that only changes had the answer to the issues. This intensified pressures 
resulted the decision-makers to march for overhauling the system.  
 
Rights Groups 
Organizations working for the issue of rights had been an irrefutable pressure group. In this 
respect, the role of some advocacy groups working for the rights of women, Janjati 
(indigenous), and Dalit (untouchable) are worthy to note. Compared to total number of 
officers in Nepalese civil service 10,648, only 560 (5.26 percent) are from women. Only 3.8 
                                                 
25http://www.sdc.org.np/en/Home/Swiss_Cooperation_Strategy_for_Nepal_2005_2008/Meaningful_Dialogue_a
nd_Conflict_Transformation/Good_Governance_Project_GGP_Phase_3. 2008 March 4.  
26 ESP during 2001 to 2006 mainly focused on anti-corruption, social inclusion, service delivery, access to 
justice, political governance. So many organizations from civil society obtained supports from ESP. 
http://www.esp-nepal.org.np/downloads/ESP_brochure_2007.pdf. 2008 March 4.  
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percent women represent in the highest ‘special’ position (ADB, 1999, p.122)27. Likewise, the 
representation of Dalits and Janjatis are dismal. One finding supports this pity situation 
‘Dalits and other groups (such as the Rai/Kirat, Gurung, Tharu, Magar, Tamang, Muslim, and 
Lama) are extremely underrepresented in the bureaucracy compared to their percentage of the 
population. The situation is worst for Dalits, who comprise only 1% of the civil service even 
though they make up 13% of the total population of Nepal’ (Jamil and Dangal, 2007, 
forthcoming).  
 
Various groups and organizations floated and sustained the agenda of less-representation in 
public debate. By means of lobbying, demonstration and public debate they succeeded to 
attract attention of policy-makers and donors. The voices raised by them reached its certain 
height. The policy demand for changes finally resulted in some positive steps into affirmative 
actions and reservations for deprived ones.  
 
Association of Civil Servants 
Different association of civil servants had also the same role. Nepalese civil servants are 
divided into various associations, e.g., Civil Servant Association, Civil Servant Union, and so 
on. But we observe that this had only peripheral roles.  
 
When a two day workshop was held in Godawari for formulating the roadmap, these 
associations actively participated in the workshop. Some central committee leaders of the two 
civil servants associations represented in the discussion held. The demand of the organizations 
chiefly upheld introduction of level-system instead of present position-system in civil service 
structure. But it was not included.  
 
ADDCN 
The advent of new constitution in 1991 triggered a new episode of decentralization in the 
country. The constitution has recognized the decentralization of authority as a means to 
provide maximum opportunity to people in their governance and hence enjoy the benefits of 
democracy and development (http://www.addcn.org.np/about_addcn.htm. March 10, 2008). 
ADDCN28, in line with its objectives, had been a vocal advocate of decentralization. They 
                                                 
27 http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Country_Briefing_Papers/Women_in_Nepal/women_nepal.pdf. 2008 
March 4.  
28 The ADDCN is an umbrella organisation of district level local governments – District Development 
Committees (DDCs) - of Nepal. It was founded by the DDCs themselves in 1995. Since then it has been working 
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utterly urged further steeping up in the constituents of administrative, political and financial 
decentralization. As a consequence of the pressure, GoN included some measures for 
devolution of administrative and other functions. 
 
4.2.2 What were the processes followed? 
4.2.2.1 Agenda Activation of the Reform 
Definition of Problems 
We observe that one dozen year long Maoist conflict and finally Hapure dialogue29 
underscored the issues of the governance reform in peace agenda. In the peace dialogue, GoN 
presented a reform paper. The paper officially stated that public institutions, i.e., political and 
administrative, were low represented by women, ethnic and other marginalized groups. For 
example only five per cent women are holding officer level posts in the service while only 
four women are holding policy level posts as joint secretaries (The Kathmandu Post, 2003)30.  
The bureaucracy of Nepal is largely represented by three higher castes Brahmins, Khetries and Newars. 
The oppressed, downtrodden, weaker section of the society and Teraians have not been able to gain 
position in the power structure of the country. Reshaping the bureaucracy in line with true representative 
bureaucracy was overlooked in the reform measures (Jha, 2003)31.  
 
Likewise, the paper made a noble acknowledgement of the fact that over-centralization of 
power in Kathmandu and little power in local authorities prevailed in the country. Although 
the country already moved on to the path of self-governance, Kathmandu has been holding on 
the power. Here a popular stanza of one relevant poem carries some feelings: 
‘‘…Now Kathmandu alone can no longer carry Kathmandu 
From now on 
Kathmandu can no longer mean the whole of Nepal…(Bal, Krishna Bhusan, 1999)’’ 
 
Second, people’s dissatisfaction to service delivery system was another source of the agenda. 
Newspapers and popular public hearings programs organized in many parts of the country 
demanded the policy workers for sweeping changes against corrupt mind-set. One respondent 
                                                                                                                                                        
in the area, inter alia, deepening and strengthening decentralization and self-governance in the country 
(http://www.addcn.org.np/about_addcn.htm, March 10, 2008). 
29 The historic 3rd peace dialogue was held in the Maoist stronghold area (Hapure Village of Dang district) in 
17-19 August, 2003 between rebellion party CPN (Maoist) and GoN negotiation team. In the dialogue, GoN 
negotiator team leader Dr Prakash Chandra Lohani had presented a roadmap for forward looking reforms (Upreti 
and Dungana, 2004, p.3-9). 
30 http://www.kantipuronline.com/nwcollection.php?id=3&pubdates=2003-12-11 
 
31 See http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/trn/2003/feb/feb21/features.htm#2. 31.03.08 
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from MoGA unveiled ‘‘In almost all public debate or public hearings civil servants were the 
subject to be criticized’’. This was basically for the reason of rent-seeking behavior of them.  
More than 98% perceived corruption in Nepal (Media Services International Poll Survey on 
Corruption cited by Manandhar, 2005, p.30). 
 
Third, this thesis learns that the then PM Surya B. Thapa had a deep concern about low trust 
amongst people at large about Nepalese bureaucracy. It was the authoritarian regime of 
former King Gyanendra who by himself had appointed the PM. The country was severely 
handicapped due to more than a decade long conflict. One respondent from civil society views 
‘‘the authoritarian regime generally wants to keep people in favor of them’’. One day the PM 
directed to act upon the issue of poor trust that culminated in the process of GRP roadmap.  
 
Fourth, the ADB’s conditions emerged as a force while setting the agenda. It was when ADB 
stopped the release of second tranche to GoN by the fact that GoN did not meet the 19 
covenants of GRP. The country that time was in financial trouble. Regular expenditure was 
steadily increasing due to bloody conflict intensified in the country. Due to the conflict, health 
of the economy was getting down. The problem of the second tranche revoked GoN at a hard 
time when it was underway of credit crunch. As a part of humble solution for the acute 
expenditure stress, high level bureaucrats sought a fast track approach to speed up the meeting 
of the conditionality. The 19 conditions had been pre-dominant across the processes. One 
ADB senior official uttered ‘‘For that reason, the major five components in the roadmap were 
solely picked up from the 19 conditions set for the second tranche.’’  
 
Definition of Solutions 
The 10-point forward looking roadmap, as an outcome of the Hapure dialogue, catered to the 
roadmap 2004 a newer agenda unlike conventional reforms. The roadmap consisted of 
revamping political and administrative institutions by provisioning reservations for less 
represented groups of the society and making true self-governance and so on. First time in the 
country’s history any government proposal accommodated reservation issue into public 
offices. That issue was later extended into the GRP Roadmap 2004. One MoGA official 
recalled ‘‘the Hapure Dialogue and presented Aagragami Sudhar Yojana (the forward-
looking reforms) as precursors for change in the then pre-dominant mind set’’. Despite this 
fact, some segments of the bureaucracy attempted to view the ideas of reform as unnecessary. 
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The potential erosion of meritocracy to be resulted from the inclusionary provision, as they 
argued, was the main reason for their skepticism.   
 
One group of people stressed on self-governance and devolution to local authorities. For this, 
they demanded effective implementation of DIP (Decentralization Implementation Plan), a 
GoN’s roadmap for decentralization, with some timely changes.  
 
4.2.2.2 Formulation of the Reform 
Definition of Problems 
In the final attempt of the roadmap formulation, MoGA organized a participatory workshop in  
Kathmandu. Although various participants associated with different associations and 
backgrounds had participated in the workshop, majority of them represented from Nepalese 
civil service. They ranged from the senior-most secretary level to mid-career level. The 
workshop ended up with an output later famously called as ‘GRP Roadmap’. One former 
secretary of MoGA claimed ‘‘most components of the roadmap were based on home-grown, 
but external knowledge and experiences helped us in identification and definition of 
problem.’’ In his own words ‘‘shopping ideas from elsewhere definitely took place’’. 
 
Almost all seemed to have agreed to the point that the Nepalese public administration is not 
representative to a satisfactory level. Many raised this issue during the formulation period. 
Even the mother program of the roadmap has accepted this hard fact but confined only within 
gender issue. The civil service also suffers from a significant gender imbalance (ADB, 2001, 
p.iii). As the time progressed, the concerns raised also about ethnic/indigenous and Dalit 
(untouchables). It shows that as the time passed the definition of problem also widened on the 
issue of representative public administration. This study observes that this was one of the 
most debated issues during the time.  
 
Issue of corrupt practices in public service related offices got significant space around the 
discussion table. The mother program of the roadmap had third objective that reads ‘improve 
governance and reduce corruption in the Government (ADB, 2001, p.iii)’. In the backdrop 
coupled with voices aroused from media and mass people against rampant corruption, it was a 
pressing environment around for curving corruption.  
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Definition of Solution 
When the WB set forth country assistance strategy in 2003 for FY 04-07, WB appealed for 
some far reaching reforms. Two of them included social inclusion and improvement in social 
services. ‘‘Nepal also needs to address fundamental issues related to social exclusion and 
redress the widespread perception that the state has been failing to deliver basic public 
services (The World Bank, 2003, p.1)’’. We witnessed a cozy relation between some GoN 
technocrats and the major donors. Due to the relation, those technocrats were buying the ideas 
stemmed from some donors. ‘‘An uncommonly strong partnership has developed between 
these leaders and the bank, with a strongly shared vision for the reforms that Nepal needs 
(The World Bank, 2003, p.ii)’’.  
 
‘‘The government officials have said that the roadmap will propose time-bound reservations 
for the said communities. The GoN’s chief secretary Dr. Bimal Koirala hinted that initially it 
would be in place for five years (Spotlight, 2004)’’.32 
 
In response to representative issue, initially perceived solution only included the affirmative 
action, e.g., coaching, tuition and education. Later these measures seemed to be scanty and 
some sections of the society began to urge for reservation. But on the issue of whether or not 
there should be, for whom there should be the reservation, the bureaucracy per se went 
divided. Some section of the bureaucracy argued for affirmative action whereas some elite 
figures in the bureaucracy espoused both positive affirmation and reservation. Broadly, a 
segment of middle-level bureaucrats especially from dominant groups such as Brahmin and 
Chhetri worried about merit system. As a matter of fact, they were so concerned about the 
career they possessed in the civil service.  
 
Contrary to middle-level bureaucrats, this thesis observes a few senior bureaucratic leaders 
from the dominant background espoused the idea of reservation. Unlike their previous track 
records supporting meritocracy, they shifted to this idea amazingly. As a matter of fact, they 
had been so concerned about the question of existence. As one respondent told, surviving also 
was winning sometimes. This was indeed a question of beyond the career opportunity that had 
                                                 
32 Spotlight, vol. 23, No.22, Dec 26-Jan 1, 2004. 
http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishweekly/spotlight/2003/dec/dec26/national3.htm 
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grossly entrapped the mid-career bureaucrats. In short, the changing position to reservation 
was a big twist to rest of the fellows-in-the service. 
 
The paper finally proposed 35 percent reservation. The government has formulated the 
roadmap proposing 20 percent reservation for women, 10 percent for Dalit (untouchables) and 
5 percent for indigenous people beginning April next year (Spotlight, 2004, ibid). We learn 
that the then PM himself also was keen in the idea of proposing reservation to women, dalit 
and indigenous people.  
 
Apart from the proposals for reservations, the roadmap also recommended that all the 
government ministries should have at least one woman joint secretary and an under secretary 
at their respective ministries by mid-July, 2004 (Spotlight, 2004, ibid). 
 
On the issue of positive affirmation, the paper included some activities. It also aims to make 
the curriculum of the Public Service Commission (PSC), the constitutional body authorized to 
recruit bureaucrats, gender friendly, and coaching classes will be conducted at local levels to 
encourage women candidates to apply for the civil service posts (Spotlight, 2004, ibid)33.  
 
In response to the concerns of curving down corruption, some segments urged preventive 
measures. For a couple of years, the country has curative measures. However, it is seriously 
lacking preventive measures. As part and parcel of the preventive measures, some ideas 
floated in the discussions. One side urged launching citizen charters via all service delivery 
agencies. Another idea embraced promoting to transparency in service procedures. One most 
aggressive view came out from one corner that maintained idea of public hearing. According 
to them, conducting public hearing in regular basis is instrumental. This was assumed at local 
level where all commoners and officials participate and listen to each others’ critical views. It 
was for a sort of retrospection to back and learning for future.  
 
4.2.2.3 Decision-making of the Reform 
Definition of Problems 
The Administrative Reform Coordination and Monitoring Committee (ARCMC) headed by 
the Prime Minister approved a Governance Reform Program Road Map in March 2004 (ADB, 
2006, p.3-4). The decision was largely attributed to an output of a workshop held in 
                                                 
33 See http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishweekly/spotlight/2003/dec/dec26/national3.htm 
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Kathmandu. We see no substantial changes in contents of the roadmap. But prior to that 
formulation, a heated debate took place.  
 
Referring to uneven participation of ethnic and marginalized groups compared to that of 
dominant groups such Brahmin, Chhetri and Newar, those involved in advocacy of rights of 
Dalits, women and indigenous groups termed the situation just as discrimination. One 
sociologist Dr. Krishna Bhattachan said “The discrimination against minorities like women, 
Dalits and Janajatis are extreme (Spotlight, 2004)’’34. Some argued ‘‘…there is a tell-tale 
disproportionate domination of limited caste groups particularly Brahmin, Chhetri and Newar 
in politics, administration and education. Occupying around 37 percent of the total population, 
these groups' share in the integrated national governance is 81.7 percent (Spotlight, 2003)35.  
 
The disproportionate participation of different ethnicity in the Nepalese public administration 
and politics, as many people believed, was a reason of the divided society and, thereby, the 
conflict in the country. The thesis observes many key decision-makers having similar views in 
this line. One of them was Dr. Ram Sharan Mahat, former finance minister. He viewed “The 
country's uneven development, poverty and underdevelopment, existing social and economic 
deprivation of socially excluded and ethnic communities provided a congenial environment 
for the organizational expansion of the Maoists (Spotlight, 2003)36. 
 
Shameful spiral wave of corruption made the image of all civil servants corrupt in public 
eyes. The blanket perception was hurting and humiliating to honest ones, too. Two objectives 
set in the mother program of the roadmap had reflections of the problems: (iii) improving 
governance and reducing corruption in the Government, (iv) enhancing the competence and 
motivation of civil servants. These reflections helped to own the problems deeply in the 
formulation process. Many of the participants agreed upon those factors such as low 
transparency, over discretionary power and monopoly in services, inadequate salary and greed 
for affluent life styles as causal to the problem.  
 
Issue of efficiency put civil servants in a question mark. Demand side underpinned with 
people’s aspiration never matched to the supply side service delivery. For this inefficiency of 






service delivery mechanism, some blamed to poor incentive, some blamed to competency and 
some other blamed to corrupt and negative disposition with civil servants.  
 
Definition of Solutions 
Stating about the problem, current chief secretary Bhoj Raj Ghimire expressed  
‘‘There were two alternatives before us – affirmative action and reservation. By affirmative we mean 
providing coaching classes and intensive tuitions to underprivileged sections of society. But we concluded 
that mere affirmative action would not bring in desired impact in short-term. Therefore, we also chose to 
go for providing time-bound reservation to women, Dalit and indigenous community’’ (Spotlight, 2004)37.  
 
The same bureaucratic group of actors all the time in past maintained key roles in defending 
meritocracy while on reform issue. But this time they changed the course of action 
surprisingly. They attempted to redefine the meritocracy with entirely different yardstick that 
did not match with education the traditionally conceived notion. One respondent of MoGA 
described that despite a few opposition the bureaucratic leaders changed the version as saying 
meritocracy is ‘delivery’ but not ‘educational qualification’. They upheld one logic that when 
it was time for distributing ‘allowances for senior citizens’ in rural parts of the country, a 
secretary of Village Development Committee, a village level local government unit, is far 
good who is though SLC or 10th grade failed. Despite the poor education, they speak local 
dialect and at the end of the day appear far better than a secretary with IA or even higher 
degree (intermediate) passed. This is because the former can communicate and perform better 
with local people. In their changed definition, the performance matters not but the educational 
qualification in meritocracy. He not only could deliver but also communicate well with them.  
 
We observe a part of Nepalese bureaucracy as well that went against the idea of reservation. 
‘‘Senior civil servants do not think the new roadmap will work for the country’s benefit. 
“Look at how the reservation policy failed in our neighbouring country India. We should have 
gone for better advocacy and training to make women, Dalit and Janajatis capable of fighting 
civil service exams on their merit’’ (Spotlight, 2003)38. Similarly, one Public Service 
Commission member remarked “Today, they are asking for reservation for women, Dalit and 
indigenous community. Tomorrow many other minority communities may make similar 





demands. Can we afford to open up such a dangerous Pandora’s Box?” asked another senior 
civil servant (Spotlight, 2003).39 
 
One respondent from MoGA who witnessed a Cabinet committee meeting revealed that 
putting full pressure to a decisive moment, one leading ex-minister Dr Prakash Chandra 
Lohani strongly defended the reform. He said to his counterpart ministers and senior-most 
bureaucrats ‘if we don’t trade off this much, the situation will demolish us at once with no 
escape’.  
 
On the issue of containing the corruption, some conceived public hearing as an ideal 
instrument. They saw that rights and control of public people can be established over public 
services with the help of public hearing. The idea was to keep the services under the 
surveillance of people. However, some other had some skeptical approach to this option. They 
had a logic by some experiences conducted in past that such a hearing could have 
embarrassing effects over the morale of civil servants. The civil servants have already been 
target of conflict so that no one easily gets ready to go remote parts. On top of these, if public 
hearing is there, it would be too much.  
 
Citizen charters also seemed to be an effective idea in fixing service delivery system across 
the country. Although a guideline for similar purpose was in effect, the emerged idea aimed at 
deepening and widening its effectiveness all over. This thesis learns a controversy over the 
issue of citizen charters whether compensation provision is needed if front line service 
provider fails to deliver. Some criticized the idea terming it merely a fancy idea – not going to 
work. Some, however, defended it as saying a popularly practiced and tested elsewhere. In the 
latter’s view, it was not wrong to learn from other’s experiences. Rather such learning from 
others’ best practices could reduce chance of failure in host countries. In one MoGA official’s 
words ‘‘hopefully it is fine to go with measures like internationally accepted standard and 
universally recognized ideas they come from outside.’’  
 
As for promoting transparency, almost all seem eager to promote transparency in public 
offices. In reference to procedural transparency, one respondent questioned to what extent the 
Nepalese society needs transparency. His meaning of transparency was acceptable to the 
extent which there is at least underwear in a person’s body.  




With respect to promoting efficiency in civil service, some new ideas appeared. Firstly, it was 
a provision for an incentive fund to best performing offices and individuals. However, it 
invited several critical responses. A skeptical note viewed that the idea fairly fails in Nepalese 
context where indeed no performance evaluation benchmark and evaluation culture do exist. 
However, ADB was the one that pushed it as embracing that carrot approach from the 
incentive fund would change local work culture. Secondly, it was a successive plan for 
ministerial CEO position. One cautious group alerted as arguing that this would not fit to the 
country’s context. The country has a circumstance where all decisions about CEO depend on 
political masters’ will as opposed to any criterion based systematic mechanism. Due to 
absence of a systematic mechanism, the idea would remain a day dream. One respondent from 
MoGA was so critical to these measures that he used an analogy ‘this NPM is new public 
mismanagement’. Finally the decision included the measures although some blamed to the 
role of the donor for the inclusion of the measures. 
 
4.2.3  What were the contents? 
In regard to trajectory of contractualism, the study observes only one feature of privatization 
and hired management on contracts prevails. But the rest two features this study did not 
observe. The observed feature underscores that each ministry has to review the rationale of all 
the underlying project, program, development committees, units, offices, and to conclude 
whether to fix disengagement or privatization or shifting to private sector or liquidating the 
entities and functions. This has adherence to disengagement.  
 
The thesis observes four features of managerialism out of the six. The observed ones include: 
a) administrative decentralization b) accountability/ transparency/ participation c) cost-
cutting/down sizing, d) citizen charters. The feature of the administrative decentralization 
encompasses revising DIP of the GoN and accordingly decentralizing powers to local 
governments. They also underscore revision of existing number of local governments, 
limiting the GoN to big projects and giving other activities to local governments, shifting 
government staffs to local government units, and gradually devolving district level programs 
to local government units.  
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The features of accountability/ transparency/ participation encompass placing performance 
improvement plan, and arranging an incentive fund for efficiency competition by provision of 
reward to the best service providing units. Similarly, it includes gender sensitive provisions in 
recruitment, compensation and facilities. Finally for maintaining transparency the features 
include placing a Personnel Information System, implementing anti-corruption strategy, and 
fixing criteria to all constitutional recruitment.  
 
The feature of cost-cutting/ down sizing includes establishing performance change unit in four 
ministries, arranging voluntary retirement scheme to civil servants for downsizing, rightsizing 
with use of decentralization and service contract, and efficiency improvement by inclusion 
and affirmative action.  
 
Finally, the feature of citizen charters focus on setting a mechanism for complains 
management in all ministries.  
 
4.3  Comparison of the Actors, Processes and Contents 
4.3.1  Actor Comparison 
4.3.1.1 Central Actors 
As for central actors, the first case SPGNFSRP has mainly five actors: ministers of finance, 
senior bureaucrats of MoF, senior technocrats of NPC, senior NRB officials, and donors 
mainly the WB/ IMF, ADB and DFID. From institutional background, they all represent three 
agencies: NRB, MoF and NPC. However, the second case the GRPRM has mainly three 
actors: ministers of MoGA and MoF, senior bureaucrats of MoGA, MoF and PMO. Largely 
the actors represent from three agencies MoGA, MoF and PMO. All belong to apparatus of 
central government of the country.  
 
In both of the cases, there are some plausible similarities across the board. First, bureaucrats 
are very active from the beginning till end. Second, actors from MoF seemed to have 
relatively greater roles. Compared to each other, actors in the SPGNFSRP seem to be more 
technically oriented and less socially oriented. Whilst actors in the GRPRM seem to be more 
socially oriented but less technically oriented.  
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4.3.1.2 Peripheral Actors 
In the case of SPGNFSRP, parliamentary committee (PAC), KPMG Barents group, business 
community, banking community and mass-media possessed the roles. Among the actors, only 
PAC represents government side and the rest all belong to non-government side. Broadly the 
actors representing government, local business community and mass-community were from 
domestic side and only donors from external side.  
 
In the case of the GRPRM, mainly ADB, CPN-M, civil society, rights groups, associations of 
civil servants, ADDCN played the major roles. By the belongingness, they represent 
governmental, non-governmental and donor sides.  
 
We note that the donors upheld in the SPGNFSRP central roles whereas in the GRPRM 
peripheral roles. Compared to the SPGNFSRP, the case of the GRPRM seems to have more 
actors from the non-governmental side. In the former case the actors seem to be highly 
technical and highly apolitical whereas in the later case the actors seem to be less technical 
and high political.  
 
4.3.1.3 Roles of the Actors in the Reforms’ Decision-makings 
In both of the reform decision-makings, all central actors largely seemed to be supportive to 
respective reforms. The SPGNFSRP faced an opposition from business community. In this 
contrary, none opposed the GRPRM. However, peripheral actors seemed to be divided into 
the three categories. International actors remained to be supportive. But domestic actors in 
both cases seemed to be divided, e.g., having opposition or unclear position.   
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Figure 3: The Actors Roles in the Decision-makings 





Minister of finance; Senior Bureaucrats of MoF; Senior Technocrats 




Parliamentary Committee- PAC; International Consultants – KPMG; 
Mass-media 
All central actors are supportive:  
Ministers-in-MoGA & MoF; and Senior 
Bureaucrats of MoGA, MoF & PMO   
 
 
Peripheral Actors:  





None of the central actors opposed. 
 
Peripheral Actors: 
Business Community;  







Peripheral Actors:  
Banking Community (partially supporting) 
Peripheral Actors: 
Rebellion Political Party (CPN-M); Civil Society; 
Rights Groups; Associations of Civil Servants; 
Source: Personal Notes, 2007/08 
 
4.3.2  Process Comparison 
The processes followed in the case of the SPGNFSRP are characterized as being less 
democratic, less participatory, and less transparent. Likewise, the case seems to have more 
consequentiality as part of logic of action. Top-down model and stable nature in the processes 
are additional features.  
 
In contrast, the GRPRM is characterized as being more democratic, more participatory and 
more transparent in the processes. Furthermore, the case used more appropriateness as its 
criteria for logic of action. The case remained more bottom-up process. Also, the processes 
seem being instable, that is, frequently changing the approaches and courses.  
 
Figure 4: Comparison of the Processes between the Two Cases 
Dimension The SPGNFSRP  The GRPRM  
1. Democratic versus non-
democratic 
Less democratic/ less participatory More democratic/ more 
participatory 
2.  Closed versus open More closed/ less transparent Less closed/ more transparent 
3.  Logic of action More consequentiality More appropriateness 
4.  Top-down versus bottom-up More top-down model More bottom-up model 
5.  Stable versus unstable More stable Less stable 
Source: Personal Notes, 2007/08 
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4.3.3  Content Comparison 
The contents of the two cases are understood and divided into six major features of NPM. The 
features include: 1) administrative decentralization; 2) privatization/ performance contract; 3) 
agencification; 4) cost cutting/ down sizing/ efficiency; 5) competition/ commercialization/ 
transparency; and 6) citizen charters. In the SPGNFSRP, all the features are available except 
agencification. In this contrast, all the features can be observed except administrative 
decentralization and citizen charters in the GRPRM. 
 
Figure 5: Comparative Contents of NPM in the Two Reform Cases 
Regime of NPM The SPGNFSRP The GRPRM 
Administrative 
decentralization 
 - Improving efficiency by 
implementing decentralization 
implementation plan (DIP); i.e. 
streamlining the number of 
districts, downsizing the number 
of VDCs, sectoral devolution & 
restructuring of delivery offices 




-    Privatizing RBB and NBL (clause 3) 
-   Restructuring ADB/N and NIDC (clause 
14) 
- Divestiture of Rural Development   
Banks and development of Rural 
Development Banks via private sector 
(clause 16) 
- Employing privatization, 
liquidation etc. of projects, 
development units (clause 2 (v) 
sub-clause 23) 
Agencification - Establishing a Banker’s Training 
Institute (clause 8) 
- Revamping Credit Information Bureau 
- Initiating Assets Reconstruction 
Company (clause 10) 
- Establishing development banks at local 
level (clause 15) 





efficiency   
 
-  Strengthening of supervisory 
capabilities of NRB for efficiency 
(clause 2) 
-   Revamping research and financial      
monitoring strength (clause 11) 
 
 
- Performance change unit in 4 
ministries (clause 1 (i)),  
-  Voluntary Retirement Scheme for 
downsizing by Civil Service Act 
amendment (clause 2 (iii)),  
-  Rightsizing by marketization, 
     decentralization and service 
contract (clause 2 (iv), 
- Efficiency by inclusion & 





- Enactment of Debt Recovery Act, 
Bankruptcy Act, Merger & Acquisition 
Act (clause 1) 
- Criteria for new banks in line with 
international standards & practices 
(clause 4) 
- Promoting international banks to set in 
Nepal (clause 4) 
- Performance improvement plan, 
incentive fund for efficiency & 
reward to the best service 
providing unit at district level 
(clause 5 (xvi) sub-clause 59 and 
60),   
-  Gender sensitivity in recruitment,  
compensation & facilities by 
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-  Phasing out directed & subsidized 
lending and creating broad based 
banking with market interest rate (clause 
6) 
- Streamlining of controlling ownership 
structure by one family or person (clause 
7) 
- Broadening & deepening the financial 
system (clause 12) 
- Promoting sectoral financing by 
industrial, housing & other finances at 
competitive cost (clause 13) 
- Promoting international accounting firms 
to come in (clause 5) 
-   Provision of Credit Information Bureau 
for more transparency (clause 9) 
policy (clause 2 (vi),  
-  Promoting transparency by PIS  
(clause 2 vii, viii),  
- Promoting transparency by 
implementing anti-corruption 
strategy (clause 3 (ix)    
- Promoting transparency in 
recruitment of constitutional 
bodies by fixing the criteria and 
working procedures of 




 - Arranging a mechanism for 
complain management in all 
ministries (clause 4 (xv) 
Source: ‘Governance Reform Program Roadmap 2004’, Government of Nepal and ‘Strategy Paper of GoN on Financial 
Sector Reform 2000’, Nepal Rastra Bank.  
 
4.3.3.1 Contents of Contractualism 
Based on the data mentioned in Figure 6, the study draws a comparison between the two 
cases. That depicts that the SPGNFSRP is stronger as the case has splendid features of 
contractualism. It embraces two of the three features termed in this study as elements of 
market trajectory. They include privatization and hired management on contracts, and 
competition/ commercialization. However, the GRPRM contains only one out of the market 
trajectory. That is only the privatization and hired management on contracts. The most 
observed feature in the both cases is privatization and hired management on contracts. 
 
Figure 6: Comparative Features of Contractualism in the Two Reform Cases 
Criterion Privatization and hired 





The SPGNFSRP + - + 
The GRPRM + - - 
Note: The sign + denotes to ‘observed’, and - denotes to ‘not observed’ with the cases. 
Source: Personal Notes, 2007/08 
 
4.3.3.2  Contents of Managerialism  
Of the seven features deployed to overview managerialism in this study, the GRPRM seems 
stronger compared to the SPGNFSRP. The case has four features which include 
administrative decentralization, accountability/ transparency/ participation, divisionalized 
organization and agencification, cost-cutting/ down sizing, and citizen charters. The other 
case the SPGNFSRP has three features that consist of accountability/ transparency/ 
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participation, divisionalized organization and agencification, and cost-cutting/ down sizing. 
The most observed features in both of the cases include accountability/ transparency/ 
participation, and cost-cutting/down-sizing. None of them possess one feature skills 
improvement of senior managers by training.  
 
Figure 7: Comparative Features of Managerialism in the Two Reform Cases 


































The GRPRM + - + - + + 
Note: The sign + denotes to ‘observed’, and - denotes to ‘not observed’ in the cases. 
Source: Personal Notes, 2007/08 
 
The degree of application of NPM ideas in the two cases can be comparatively observed 
dividing them into two categories. The first category the SPGNFSRP observes high degree of 
market elements and low degree of management elements. To this contrary, the GRPRM a 
non-financial or governance category has high degree of both market and management 
elements.  
 
Figure 8: Application of NPM Ideas in the Two Reforms 
Reforms\Degree Market/ Contractualism Management/ Managerialism 
The SPGNFSRP High High 
The GRPRM  Low High 
Source: Personal Notes, 2007/08 
 
As regard to the processes, the SPGNFSRP seems to have moved during the processes with 
heavy technical debates/arguments coupled with high external elements. The GRPRM  passes 
tremendously along with domestic political and administrative phenomenon but with little 
presence of external forces.  
 
4.4  Conclusion  
Following figure provides briefly the empirical observations that are explained above: 
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Reform 1: The SPGNFSRP Reform 2: The GRPRM 
Actors Central Actors:  
Minister of finance; Senior Bureaucrats of MoF; Senior 
Technocrats of NPC; Senior NRB Officials; and Donors 
(the WB, IMF; ADB and DFID) 
 
Peripheral Actors:  
Parliamentary Committee- PAC; International Consultants 
– KPMG; Business Community; Banking Community; 
Mass-media 
Central Actors:  
Ministers-in-MoGA & MoF; and Senior Bureaucrats of 
MoGA, MoF & PMO   
 
 
Peripheral Actors:  
Donors/ADB; Rebellion Political Party (CPN-M); Civil 
Society; Rights Groups; Associations of Civil Servants; 
ADDCN (a local governments’ umbrella organization) 
Processes Agenda Activation:  
Problem Definition:  
NPA high; Distorted public ownership; Politicised banks; 
No repayment of loans; Weak shock absorbing capacity of 
banks; Management inefficiency; Poor professionalism; 
Poor corporate/accounting culture; Poor banking culture; 
Lack of transparency; NRB weak in supervision; Private 
banks with selected clients; Poor compliance to Basel 
Principles  
Solution Definition:  
Success stories of Asian crisis; Commitment made to NDF 




Problem Definition:  
Illness of 2 public banks; Abuse of the public banks; Poor 
banking culture; Corrupt culture; Outdated laws; Lacking 
of corporate governance; Technically bankrupt 2 public 
banks 
Solution Definition: 
Foreign management on contract; Full privatization; Loan 
recovery; Commitment to NDF 2000 Paris 
 
Decision:  
Problem Definition:  
Misled by donors; Inadequate authority to management of 
the 2 public banks; National vrs international parameters 
KPMG’s report; Political pressures; Corruption; 
International conspiracy against the banks 
Solution Definition: 
Tangible action as assumed by KPMG; Corruption control; 
Strengthening M & E capacity of NRB; Market solution to 
ownership; Reforms by Nepalese professionals; No legal 
basis exists for contracting out to foreigners; Management 
team from abroad 
Agenda Activation:  
Problem Definition:  
Low representation in the public administration; Too 
centralized system; Rent seeking behaviour; Low-trust of 






Solution Definition:  
Inclusionary provisions; Reservation for a few excluded 
groups; Affirmative actions for the excluded groups; 




Less representative public administration; Corruption 
 
 
Solution Definition:  
Reservation for excluded ones; Positive affirmative actions 
for excluded ones; Preventive measures for corruption control 
 
Decision:  
Problem Definition:  
Less representative public administration; Corruption in civil 
service; Inefficiency  
 
 
Solution Definition:  
Reservation to excluded ones; Affirmative actions to 
excluded ones; Public hearings against corruption; Citizen 





Reform 1: The SPGNFSRP 
 
Reform 2: The GRPRM 
 Processes followed:  
Less democratic, less participatory; more close, less 
transparent; more consequentiality; more top-down model; 
more stable 
Processes followed: 
More democratic, more participatory; less close, more 
transparent; more appropriateness; more bottom-up model; 
and less stable. 
Contents Elements of Management: 
Accountability, transparency, participation; divisionalized 
organization and agencification; and cost-cutting and 
down-sizing 
 
Components of Market: 
Privatization and hired management on contracts; 





Elements of Management: 
Administrative decentralization; accountability, transparency 
and participation; cost-cutting and down-sizing; citizen-
charters 
 
Components of Market: 











CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS  
5.0  Introduction 
Decision making subsystem of public policy, as it is an open system, accumulates influences 
from settings and people available in and out of the organization. Taking the advantage of the 
empiric observations made in the preceding chapter, this chapter analyzes how five 
independent variables shaped the actors, processes and contents of the Cabinet decisions 
ranging from agenda setting, formulation to decision making. To this aim, the theoretical 
approach employed consists of mainly three perspectives of organization theory combined 
with transformation model of NPM.  
 
5.1  The Structural/Instrumental Perspectives 
This perspective aims at attainment of stipulated goals. As a state runs with certain deemed 
goals, it translates them into practice with a range of organizations equipped with policies and 
programs. Some sorts of rationality are involved with them. Logic of consequences is inherent 
in order to meet means-end rationality of the state. Causal-effect relationship is assumed to 
work in a routine manner ‘once-pressed-light-on’. ‘‘Instrumental perspectives view 
organizations as tools in the hands of leaders. Rationality is implicit in formal organizational 
structure; it imposes limitations on an individual’s choice of action and creates a capacity to 
realize particular goals and values (Christensen et al, 2007, p.5)’’. Ideally, instrumental 
rationality involves organizational structure and organizational process. Regarding reform, 
instrumental perspective suggests focusing on ‘structural features: 1) hierarchically 
responsible leaders; 2) leaders organize reform process; 3) connection between reform 
process, course, and outcome; and 4) organizational structure determines definition of 
problems and solutions (Christensen et al., 2007, p.212-213)’.  
 
‘Structure’ is regarded as the most viable instrument for a reform. Structure refers to 
hierarchical social arrangement in which superior and subordinate layers co-exist 
interchangeably. In such an interactive mode, generally ‘policy preferences of superior 
organizations’ secure priority because they are empowered by hierarchical relations. This 
variant quite prevails within the executive apparatus of Nepal. Practice of central planning 
system has been in the country for more than 50 years. All development efforts are designed 
in a five year period plan and centrally controlled by a separate apparatus called NPC. On top 
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of that, on the reforms’ approval was done by the Cabinet that decided over the two cases. 
The Cabinet constitutes a group of ministers headed by PM as well as the then King and acts 
with the help of officials/technocrats, who belong to different ministries and agencies. But the 
setting containing all of them are arranged in hierarchies in which the superiors come by 
superior-roles in decision making. In such an uneven exchange pattern, subordinates tend to 
look up to superiors for trickle down of ideas. And the superior apparatus easily impose their 
ideas on subordinates. Subordinates, who have no option until the superior lacks necessary 
strength and bends low for a negotiation. It is, therefore, H1 - ‘the reforms are seen as a result 
of deliberate, planned and hierarchical decision-making from the central government bodies’ 
is very relevant to this study context.  
   
5.1.1 Deliberate Planned and Hierarchical Decision-making of Superior Organizations 
5.1.1.1 The Case of the SPGNFSRP 
How are the actors affected? 
 
The activation of the actors is very much in line with what we could expect from this variable. 
Being superior organizations MoF and NPC enjoyed very hierarchical policy system coupled 
with deliberate plans. The strong relationship of the variable with the actors lasted across the 
agenda setting, formulation, and decision-making. The decision-making can be characterized 
as being: a) instrumental-rational; b) long term plan based; c) articulated with the experiences 
of Asian crisis 97; and d) determined and unaltered with contesting views. The major 
guidelines for policy decisions came from five year plans and annual plans in which MoF 
played a leading role. Given the advantages of a set of hierarchic-vertical relations of MoF 
with NRB entitled by NRB Act 2002, the minister of finance and the ministry played 
dominant role over NRB. As the hierarchic variant could offer both reward and sanction to 
subordinate NRB, the leaders of MoF kept NRB under control. The ministerial actors were 
empowered by top-down model of planning and hierarchical decision making. This 
observation agrees that ‘leaders’ control and analytical-rational calculations are central 
(Christensen et al, 2007, p. 6)’. The strong relation of the variable with the actors scores 
strong with instrumental perspective. 
 
One more instance of the actors in vertical decision-making depicts that once trade union 
leaders of the two public banks opined differently. Also, some civil society members echoed 
in the same rhythm. Similarly, senior officials serving the banks also toned of the same line 
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publicly. Those opinions sharply differed from that of the GoN. Nevertheless, superior 
organizations unheeded those opposing views. Rather, senior officials of NRB, MoF and NPC 
have solely been the decisive in shaping the decision. This observation validates an inference 
that reform process in a strong hierarchical system is shaped by the choices of decision-
makers of superior organization. ‘It is quite rare for seniors to listen to what juniors suggest, 
and juniors hardly argue if they disagree with their superiors; and there is a strong belief that 
knowledge is hierarchical (Jamil and Dangal, forthcoming). The role and capacity of defining 
problems and solutions is determined by deliberate planned and hierarchic system. That 
allows only to superior actors to be central reformers and rest to be peripheral ones. It is 
because the superior actors enjoyed resources along with formal and informal authorizations 
from political masters. This supports a proposition about senior actor as reform ‘entrepreneurs 
formally delegated by political leaders (Naschold, 1996; Rouban, 1995, p.52 cited by 
Christensen and Lægreid, 1999, p. 171)’. To this reference, the strong relation of the variable 
to the actors seems weak with cultural perspective.  
 
How are the processes affected? 
 
The activation of the processes is very much in line with what we could expect from this 
variable. When a high-ranked GoN team returned from NDF 2000 Paris, they had in their 
baggage committed set of problems and solutions. Upon their arrival, they sold out the plan to 
NRB. Accordingly, NRB began developing the strategy paper. The draft via MoF and NPC 
reached the Cabinet of GoN for final approval. In this whole process, the vertical hierarchic 
relation downplayed the preference of subordinate organizations as the reform ideas itself was 
trickled down from the top. I observe it was the hierarchic decision-making that navigated the 
three subsets of decision making. Participation of subordinates in the processes was 
considered to be desirable, but not essential. One reason of this tendency is power distance 
embedded in the system. ‘Power distance is quite high in the Nepalese public administration, 
which means that decisions are seldom made in consultation with subordinates; there is a big 
gap between seniors and juniors since they are not considered equals…(Jamil and Dangal, 




How are the contents affected? 
 
The activation of the contents is only partially in line with what we could expect from this 
variable. When MoF submitted to the cabinet decision-makers a proposal for approval, it was 
the only apparent alternative. The draft was the outcome of the process followed in which 
central actors had a greater monopoly and peripheral actors had little except external actors. 
The decision makers assumed that the issue is of highly technical ones that political leaders 
have no competency to deal with. The same implied also with minister of finance compared to 
other cabinet counterparts. Noteworthy to mention, although the cabinet members are senior 
in hierarchy they came down to negotiate with the solutions persuaded by the subordinate 
technocrats of MoF and NRB. This is the manifestation of recognition of strength in the area 
of specialization of MoF and NRB. I observe that happening this also due to the political 
masters’ conception that devising a solution with means-end rationality and long-term plan is 
the business of technical expertise. In the negotiation based variant, the causal relation of the 
variable remained weak, which led to high elements of market in the contents. 
 
I am informed that the ‘contents’ attained high elements of both, i.e., managerialism and 
contractualism. Compared to the content elements, contractualism has stronger support vis-à-
vis contractualism. I also learn that techno-minded finance minister and strategically 
entrenched bureaucrats induced the market elements. Through out the processes, they kept 
well the flow of contents under control. Before triggering the agenda, they equipped 
themselves with rationally calculated plans based on multi-level studies and long term plan. 
All these favoured market elements. Donor’s conditionality for further support also hugely 
insulated the agenda. To this end, the hierarchic decision system served them as an effective 
instrument for solving problem. Getting aside, some parts of the contents targeted at 
behaviour and banking cultures. They were instances of instrumental attempts made to modify 
existing culture and practices. I thus agree with ‘instrumental actions can largely influence 
informal norms and values (Christensen et al 2007, p. 286-287)’. The thesis considers the 
weak relation of the variable to the contents scores strong with instrumental and again 
moderate with environmental perspectives. 
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5.1.1.2 The Case of the GRPRM 
How are the actors affected? 
 
The activation of the actors is very much in line with what we could expect from this variable. 
It is because evidence observes MoGA as playing the central role. Rest two agencies, i.e., 
PMO and MoF, which were superior to MoGA, remained ‘control-room’. On the part of 
PMO, mainly chief secretary had the navigational roles - getting ‘green signal’ from political 
master and transmitting to MoGA. This illustrates administrative leaders as ‘main agent or 
entrepreneurs’ who were authorised ‘formally by political leaders’ (Naschold, 1996; Rouban, 
1995, p.52 cited by Christensen and Lægreid, 1999, p. 171). In this role, the bureaucratic 
leaders injected their own rational instrumental views to influence others’ preferences. The 
process reflected to some extent the elements of ‘professional knowledge-based steering 
(Christensen et al, 2007, p. 159)’ sustained by the senior administrative leaders. The superiors 
possessed the steering-plus-hierarchy elements, which persuaded the other actors with their 
instrumental reform goals. I also observe the leaders in aid-diplomacy so skilful for their 
deliberate plan. The complimentary horizontal relation with donors’ community also added 
their effectiveness. I, thus, add that superior organizations in vertical relation owning 
knowledge-based steering and having aid diplomacy easily influence the capacity of 
subordinate organizations in a reform decision. Finally, the strong relation of the variable to 
the actors scores moderate instrumental and myths and weak cultural perspectives. 
 
How are the processes affected? 
 
The activation of the processes is very much in line with what we could expect from this 
variable. I learn that because of the professional-based steering, hierarchic advantages and aid 
diplomacy, senior bureaucrats/ technocratic leaders of PMO, MoGA, MoF and NPC held 
upper-hand in defining the problems and solutions. The like-minded bureaucrats came into the 
process with an instrumental team equipped with strategic ideas for future civil service. I 
observe a ‘task force’ approach placed in by forming technical teams. Yet, major defining 
processes of problems and solutions underwent control of the actors. They also consulted with 
concerned officials, experts and other stakeholders by organizing workshops, which ensured 
democratic participation and, thereby, legitimacy to the actors-led product.  
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Another dimension of process includes use of logic of action. Among the central 
governmental actors, MoF applied the criterion of consequences more whereas others applied 
appropriateness more. As consequences concerns about instrumental and appropriateness 
concerns about cultural and institutional perspectives, the employed criteria made different 
the actors’ definition to problems and solutions. In overall, the robust relation of the variable 
to the processes upheld moderate with institutional and instrumental perspectives and weak 
with cultural perspectives.  
 
How are the contents affected? 
 
The activation of the contents is very much in line with what we could expect from this 
variable. Although MoGA was a central actor, some measures picked up were from beyond 
the domain of MoGA. This was by the pulling role of PMO - a superior organization. Many 
other measures resemble with management elements that are mainly resulted from the role of 
MoGA and other peripheral actors. MoGA upheld double advantages: 1) hierarchy; and 2) 
organizational specialization. Due to the advantages, the agency had a greater control over the 
contents and fixed greater support to management elements in the contents. By this, this study 
favours a proposition ‘the choice of specialization principle may thus have a strong influence 
on how problems are dealt with and on the content of public policy (Christensen et al, 2007, 
p. 47)’. Learnt from the observation we add that hierarchy and specialization are twin-triggers 
in regard to the contents.  
 
A little amount of elements are also taken up from market. In that part, MoF has the biggest 
share as being an agency rationally-instrumentally oriented for reforms. Also, the ministry is 
the front-liner with donors and international agencies. In the inclusion of the market and 
management elements into the decision contents, both relations mark determinant roles: 1) 
horizontal structural relation – the relation with MoF and other stakeholders; 2) vertical 
structure relation – the relation of ministries and donors.  
 
Seen from ‘logic of action’, MoF’s action with ‘logic of consequence’ induced market 
elements. However, MoGA’s action with ‘logic of appropriateness’ culminated in 
management elements. The decision-contents, as a consequence, acquired more flavours of 
management vis-à-vis market. It is because of the smaller roles of MoF and the greater role of 
MoGA in the core processes. Heeled with this observation, I posit an organization with logic 
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of appropriateness yields greater management elements whereas an organization with logic of 
consequences yields greater market elements in a reform-content. By these, ‘logic of action’ 
with the variable seems to be a powerful determinant in regard to contents. I finally consider 
that the strong relation of the variable to the contents and possesses received strong value 
from institutional and moderate value from instrumental and weak value from cultural 
perspectives.  
 
5.1.1.3 Summing up 
These analyses support the hypothesis (H1) that reforms are necessary response to deliberate 
and planned decision-making of superior organizations. The hypothesis, however, acquired 
greater support in the SPGNFSRP compared to the GRPRM. In decision-making of the 
SPGNFSRP manifestation of the support can be observed first strongly with actors. The 
manifestations triggered by the variable mainly due to: 1) homogeneity of actors 2) steep 
vertical relation between the organizations involved 3) high concern of technical matters and 
specialized expertise and 4) all action to be stemmed from long term plan, e.g., five year plan 
and annual plan also oriented the actors. However, in the GRPRM the manifestation of the 
variable’s relation to the actors seems moderate. It is due to inefficiency of the variable that 
brought in: 1) more horizontal consultations among the senior bureaucrats 2) less dominance 
of special expertise and 3) senior most administrative leaders switched to societal demands for 
making the public administration more representative. Similarly, the manifestation of the 
greater support can be seen strongly also with processes in the SPGNFSRP. The reason is that 
the variable via the central actors led the processes to: 1) top-down approach employed in the 
problems and solutions 2) limited participation 3) stable processes entertaining less 
interference from other stakeholders and 4) use of consequences more and appropriateness 
less as criteria for logic of action. However, the manifestation of the variable’s relation in the 
GRPRM is observed moderate in terms of the processes. The variable, in this case, via the 
central actors led the processes to: 1) more participation 2) instable due to ever changing 
positions of the contesting actors 3) use of rather appropriateness than consequences and 4) 
top-down in the decisions but via gentle approach. Also, the manifestation of the support in 
the SPGNFSR 2000 can be observed as strong with contents. The contents seen as high 
market and high management elements resulted from the variable via the actors and 
processes. The most apparent reasons include: 1) ‘consequences’ applied as logic of action to 
the processes 2) monopoly of actors in the competency needed and 3) problem solving nature 
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of the reform. However, a moderate support in the GRPRM is evident since the actors and 
processes led the contents to high management and low market elements. 
 
5.2 The Cultural Perspectives 
Organizations are bounded to cope with informal norms and values that is societal reflection. 
To this reference, a thesis is noteworthy that administrative behaviour is ‘a result of national 
cultural norms’ (Jamil, 1994, p.292). It is because administration is a sub-system of a country. 
Once informal rules are shaped, it holds strongly the mindset – controlling body - of people. 
By virtue of this power, behavior of reform designers and decision makers come under its 
influence. This however rewards them with legitimacy from the environment. Talcott Parsons 
views ‘organizations cannot survive ‘merely’ by striving to be efficient. They also need 
legitimacy from the environment (cited by Christensen et al, 2007, p.99)’. Legitimacy comes 
broadly from 2 sources: 1) domestic legitimacy from local culture and institutions; 2) 
international legitimacy from external institutions. In a bid of legitimization, having 
congruence with local culture is a priori. It is because political-administrative culture 
especially in organization theory clinches great deals. Administrative culture emphasizes 
relationships not only within a bureaucracy but outside it as well (Jamil, 1998 cited by Jamil, 
2007).  
 
Administrative culture of Nepal ‘enhances the group values and familial norms crucial for 
maintaining harmony and cohesiveness in a highly hierarchic society (Jamil and Dangal, 
forthcoming)’. Cultural perspective focuses on ‘stability and change in cultural features 
(Christensen et al, 2007, p.212)’. As the Nepali society is very hierarchic, the ‘political and 
bureaucratic elites’, an underlying of ‘historical institution’, seem to be a representative 
independent variable.  The views of Jamil and Dangal (forthcoming) ‘the bureaucracy in 
Nepal is characterized by values that are representative of the existing power structure in 
society…’ depicts that both kind of elites occupy in the country the deciding roles. Likewise, 
‘political opposition and insurgency’ relates to ‘styles of governance’ factor since major 
political parties employed hostile approach to government’s agenda for reforms and NCP-M 
staged insurgency. Looking at the significance of such oppositions, we formulated 
hypotheses: H2 – ‘Political and bureaucratic elites as representatives of the historical-
institutional administrative culture and tradition constrain the reform process and content’; 
and H3 – ‘The turbulent transition situation affects the reform process and content and it can 
be seen as a by-product of the contemporary domestic political situation’.   
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5.2.1 Elite Orientation in Bureaucrats 
5.2.1.1 The Case of the SPGNFSRP 
How are the actors affected? 
 
The activation of the actors is not very much in line with what we could expect from this 
variable. By analyzing the relationship of the variable with the actors, I notice mainly three 
modes of response: 1) steering – staying at driving seat; 2) supporting – staying back but 
giving mass supports; and 3) constraining – sabotaging the reform measures. 
Notwithstanding, schooling or training of the bureaucrats/technocrats seems to have been a 
strong variant in shaping their response. On the whole, the bureaucrats in central actors 
remained in the first category whereas the bureaucrats in peripheral actors remained in the 
second and the third categories. Some evidences revealed that trainings, to some cases, 
attributed to breaking up the elites from their long historical roots – cultural paths. Almost all 
key bureaucratic and technocratic leaders involved in the process from MoF, NPC, and NRB 
seemed to be in the first category. Their areas of expertise were in economics and 
management accomplished from occidental schools. I learn that they remained quite adaptive 
to the reform ideas. In the second category, most of them were from middle and beginner 
levels. As they were out of the key deciding positions, they remain to be applauding the 
reform ideas. However, I observe of the rest bureaucrats regardless of levels and backgrounds 
in the third category. In their mindset, a conventional fear of reform was deeply rooted about 
possible outcomes. From them I learn that the elite orientations do not easily become ready to 
lose the power and resources that were at their disposal for long times. For this reason, they 
seemed to be roadblock to the reform ideas. Learnt from this insight, I relate the elite 
orientation with ‘individuals in public office attempt to maximize their own personal utility 
(Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971 cited by Peter, 1988, p. 119)’. The weak relation of the 
variable to the actors seems strong with instrumental, technical environment and myths 
perspectives and weak with cultural perspective.  
 
How are the processes affected? 
 
The activation of the processes is partly in line with what we could expect from this variable. 
Going into the weak relation, my first observation demonstrates that the elite orientation of 
bureaucrats led the decision-style to non-inclusive, less-participatory and less-transparent 
processes. Broadly, it can be termed as non-democratic. But motive behind was entirely 
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different that the reform could have fatal effect and ruin if the decision style was 
participatory. The perceived threat was from those actors, who were from private owners of 
the bank proposed for privatized and also from some vested interest groups. Only the central 
actors including the experts from the WB/IMF and a few donors interacted with each other. 
Outside of them, no one really knew what was happening behind the screen. This was solely 
developed by limited circles of technocrats and bureaucrats. I witness ‘they are formulated by 
leaders, and policy making largely consists of finding suitable means to achieve the goals 
(Christensen et al, 2007, p. 6).’ Additionally, I find the process part as ramification of 
partnership between the technocratic bureaucrats and politicians of MoF and NPC. The 
partnership kept all other stakeholders out from the processes but for the sake of their 
instrumental and means-ends goals. This ensured stability in the processes, e.g. less swinging. 
 
Conventionally, bureaucratic leaders are blamed for their resistance. To the contrary, we 
notice several times one small bureaucratic group did politics for the sake of the reform. 
Firstly, they themselves asked donors for putting some specific ‘aid-conditionality’ to GoN. 
The dramatic request was to insulate the reform spirit from vested interests potentially coming 
from resistant group. Secondly, one day they were vividly pressurized by trade unions. 
Afterwards they lobbied with senior politicians-in-office and got the decision done by the 
Cabinet of GoN. This was to add legitimacy with the decision and safeguard the reform by 
getting the political leader committed. That ensured safe ride of the decision-making in the 
case. By this analysis, we learn the assumed ‘path dependency’ of bureaucrats to informal 
values and norms that can vary from case to case. The ‘history is not efficient’ meaning poor 
adaptation to changed context turned to ‘history is efficient’ meaning just the opposite. This 
transformation happened mainly due to leadership changes in political, key bureaucratic and 
technocratic positions in the mean time. We finally note that the weak relation of the variable 
combines cultural and instrumental perspectives. We finally note that the strong relation of 
the variable to the processes combines strongly the instrumental, technical environment and 
myths/ institutional perspectives. 
 
How are the contents affected? 
 
The activation of the contents is not very much in line with what we could expect from this 
variable. By examining the weak relation with the contents, I encountered with some 
evidences that support a logic of ‘new class analysis’ as argued originally by Yeatman (1987, 
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pp. 350-351) and later followed it by Hood (1995, p.102). As Hood argues, some senior 
public managers and technocrats, who are some sort of economics-based technocrats 
‘‘econocrats’’ having education in neoclassical economics, generally sympathize to New 
Right ideas. Those technocrats tended to market elements of solutions. The first category of 
actors discussed in our observation of three modes of responses (see 1st paragraph in 5.2.1) 
also supports this observation. My empirical findings reveal that the case acquired high 
elements of both, i.e., market and management. Compared to the management elements, 
market elements seem stronger. The main reason I learn is due to the central actors, who 
strongly tended to market elements. Deepened into the reason, I observe the role of logic of 
consequences held by the central actors. Being very rational, they searched for plausible 
‘alternatives’ one by one, defined their ‘values’ in the reform, and finally calculated and 
identified ‘best alternatives’ to the aspired values. The central actors based on ‘logic of 
consequence’ acted in instrumental-rational manner and ultimately led to the market elements 
in the contents. This supports to infer that actors oriented to logic of consequence become 
instrumental-rational, hence, lead to market elements. Finally, the weak relation of the 
variable to the contents has strong affinity to instrumental and environmental (technical and 
institutional/ myths) perspectives. 
 
5.2.1.2 The Case of the GRPRM 
How are the actors affected? 
 
The activation of the actors is very much in line with what we could expect from this variable. 
Discussed about the reasons, I observe a uniquely happened turning with the strong relation of 
the variable with the actors. Like elsewhere, elites in Nepal are generally painted as a resistant 
force to reform. Just like this, bureaucratic elites are generally blamed for their resistance in 
administrative reform. Despite the theoretical and empirical experiences, I consider the roles 
they played in the decision of the GRPRM being a mile-stone. Amid a long public debate, set 
on whether merit or inclusionary system, run within and out of the bureaucracy, some 
bureaucratic leaders broke the ice. It seems that they were very much concerned about the 
legitimacy of bureaucracy. Brahamin and Chhetri appear to be the dominant group and rest all 
are out of the opportunity. The claim of Jamil and Dangal (forthcoming) looking at the 
recruitment period of 2002-03 ‘‘…Brahmin and Chhetri comprise 74% of the bureaucracy 
whereas they comprise only 29% of the total population’’ depicts a bleak ‘demographic 
representation’. Warner (2001, p.404-405) posits that public administration gains legitimacy 
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mainly from: 1) participation, i.e., representation; and 2) institutional, i.e., competence. 
Referred to the participation school, I observe that the legitimacy of Nepalese public 
administration had come into serious question. In this backdrop, the bureaucratic leaders 
aimed a giant-leap forward and finally made the reservation in line with a trade-off for 
legitimacy.  
 
Having said this, I remark the relation of the elite orientation went with the leading 
bureaucrats weak. Owing to the weakened relation with elite orientation, the bureaucrats 
turned around from their conventional resistant role. Furthermore, my preceding observation 
seems still valid about bureaucrats’ three modes of response: 1) steering – staying at driving 
seat; 2) supporting – staying back but giving mass supports; and 3) constraining – resisting 
the reform measures. The culturally less biased bureaucrats – meaning whose cultural path 
significantly washed out – seemed to be in the role of central actors. The two other actors held 
in peripheral roles. As compared to the central actors, the relation of peripheral actors with 
elite orientation or cultural path looks so contrast. In conclusion, I consider the strong relation 
of the variable to the actors coupled strongly with myths, moderately with instrumental and 
weakly with cultural perspectives. 
 
How are the processes affected? 
 
The activation of the processes is not very much in line with what we could expect from this 
variable. In regard to the processes, I observe a weak relation of the variable. Due to the weak 
relation, the process, to some extent, got rid of ‘power distance’. The distance exists between 
lower and higher classes are caused by social, professional and economic powers. The wide 
participation in the process from different stakeholders was an achievement. Also, the 
participation is materialized in multiple levels and geographical areas. On the mode of ‘active 
participation’, an encouraging picture seems that lower and higher level bureaucrats sat 
together and participated in defining processes of problems and solutions. A distinct feature 
observed in the process was that first time in the country’s history a NGO took part in a 
reform decision. The idea was to materialize partnership of government and non-government 
actors. Looking at the mutual exchanges conducted in participatory and democratic ways, I in 
this case differ with a finding ‘those lower down the hierarchy would have little say in the 
decision-making process (Jamil and Dangal, forthcoming). Also, the logic of action employed 
in the defining processes seemed to have been appropriateness more and consequences less. 
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With respect to relation with perspectives, the weak relation of the variable to the processes is 
grappled strongly with myths and moderately with instrumental and weakly with cultural 
perspectives. 
 
How are the contents affected? 
 
The activation of the contents is not very much in line with what we could expect from this 
variable. Looking into the reasons resulting in the weak relation of the variable with contents, 
first we learn that element of the management is greater than that of the market. The element 
of management resulted from the overarching issue of ‘socialization’ of reform. The 
‘socialization’ of reform stresses in the social justice and equity. In the background of a 
heightened demand for justice and equity, actors set out objective of creating a representative 
and dynamic public administration. To this end, they considered a robust inclusionary 
approach over meritocracy to be the best answer to the issue. I observe during the time the 
cultural path of gradual incrementalism is punctuated. This punctuation suddenly advanced to 
inclusionary system with reservation choice for excluded ones. At this point of time, process 
underscored application of ‘appropriateness’ as logic of action. The appropriateness as action 
led to the greater amount of management elements in the contents. I thus add to logic of 
appropriateness that the appropriateness tends to lead reform contents to management 
elements.  
 
In reference to historical institutionalism, the discussed transformation can be seen as being 
hastened to ‘history is efficient’ from ‘history is inefficient’. Behind this, a rapid but rare shift 
culminated in as a by-product of NCP-M’s agenda and rapid empowerment of marginalized 
sections. In the face of the big jolt, some top-level bureaucratic leaders put off their 
conventional affinity to meritocracy and shifted to inclusionary choice. This shift caused the 
greater elements of management in the contents. By these accounts, I learn that the elite 
orientation departed from conventional role, i.e., constraining administrative reforms. Rather, 
a few top leaders of the bureaucracy became prophet of the reform and acted effectively till 
the contents. Finally, I underscore that the weak relation of the variable to the contents is 
combined strongly with myths and weakly with instrumental and cultural perspectives.  
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5.2.1.3 Summing up 
The analyses largely reject the hypothesis (H2) that elite orientation in bureaucrats as agents 
of historical-institutional administrative culture and tradition constrains reform actor, 
process and content. It is because the elites in both cases, unlike conventional argument, took 
off the constraining role and put on the driving role except a few instances of opposition. 
However, the SPGNFSRP observed higher degree of the rejection compared to the GRPRM. 
This is manifested first with the actors, whereby senior bureaucratic and technocratic leaders 
propelled the reform concept instead of conventional reform resistances. The reasons behind 
this phenomenon largely include: 1) the leaders in SPGNFSRP appeared to be reform like-
minded 2) the leaders in the GRPRM also turned around from their conventional reform 
positions and joined hands with popular demand arising from the Nepalese society for 
representative public administration and 3) high motivation in the bureaucratic leaders in both 
cases for addressing upcoming issues. However, the rejection is manifested also with the 
processes but only partly. It is partly because in the SPGNFSRP the actors led the processes 
to less participatory, less democratic, more close and more top-down processes. In order to get 
through the reform, the actors deliberately skipped the democratic, open and participatory 
processes and employed rather top-down and less participatory process. However, actors in 
the GRPRM led to rather open participation of all concerned. The chief reason was that all 
actors in the country after a long political conflict were willing to resolve any issues through 
negotiation rather than confrontation. Despite the employed opposing processes, one 
commonality existed that the leaders in both cases mindful of reform. Finally, the rejection is 
manifested also with the contents of the both reforms. The actors and processes triggered the 
contents in the GRPRM 2000 to high management and low market elements. The actors and 
processes culminated in the contents of the SPGNFSRP high market and high management 
elements. The major reasons included: 1) in the GRPRM ‘socialization’ of the reform held in 
respond to demand for social justice and equity for all in the public administration; 2) in both 




5.2.2 Domestic Political Opposition and Insurgency 
5.2.2.1 The Case of the SPGNFSRP 
How are the actors affected? 
 
The activation of the actors is moderate in line with what we could expect from this variable. 
Delved into the variable’s moderate relation with the actors, I came across two levels of 
influences that the turbulent domestic politics exerted: 1) To domestic actors – moderate 
influences; and 2) To guest actors – weak influences. With none of them I observe any 
evidences of strong influences. The domestic actors ranging from central to peripheral seemed 
to have moderate influences from the politics. The most apparent reason shows that almost all 
the domestic actors had a consensus about the reform. The central actors among the domestic 
typology seem to have instrumental and rational modes of response to problems emerging in 
the fragile financial sector of the country. Also, the guest actors in the reforms like donors and 
consultants had a set of readymade prescriptive lists for actions drawn from dominant 
international administrative doctrines. Only the section of business and banking community 
had resistances via domestic politics. That was due to some vested petty interests of a section 
of politics. In conclusion, the weak relation of the variable to the actors is coupled strongly 
with instrumental and environmental/institutional (myths) but weakly with cultural 
perspectives.  
 
How are the processes affected? 
 
The activation of the processes is not very much in line with what we could expect from this 
variable. Problem definition and solution definition at all stages remain less affected from the 
domestic turbulent politics. The central actors proceeded rationally and instrumentally at all 
steps with well-defined objectives of the reform. They managed to keep control over the 
processes across the agenda setting, formulation and decision-making. They remain champion 
to gain support from non-government actors such as mass media that is all-time-critical to any 
reform endeavors. Also, external actors like donors and international agencies extended them 
close back-up supports both technical and non-technical.  
 
One typical picture I observe was a coalition of bureaucratic reform leaders and external 
donors. The coalition was so concerned about threats from vested interest groups. To insulate 
the embryo of the reform from the perceived threat especially from the politics of vested 
interest groups, the processes avoided democratic and participatory approaches in this case. 
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From this instance, I consider the process followed was rather skeptical not to get 
contaminated with political resistant elements. In spite of all these, little amount of opposition 
happened mainly from trade unions and opposition parties. But they could not or did not 
mobilize big mass support to deter the reform from happening. I view the processes to be 
moderately affected from the domestic political opposition and insurgency. By these, I 
conclude that the weak relation of the variable to the processes is combined instrumental and 
myths/ institutional perspectives strongly and cultural perspective weakly.   
 
How are the contents affected? 
 
The activation of the contents is not very much in line with what we could expect from this 
variable. Gone back into the causal, I observe minimal presence of domestic politics in the 
contents. Rather than political influences, the contents obtained heavy dose of rational 
instrumental and means-end induced elements. Through these means, it was quite obvious to 
attain high elements of market. However, it also acquired high elements of management 
though it was relatively less than the market element. The management elements are mainly 
targeted at the reform of NRB itself and market elements are for other banking and financial 
institutions.  
 
During the period, the country witnessed frequent changes in the governments. The main 
opposition party in the country mostly tended to oppose reform policy preferences of ruling 
government. This has been a cultural path since a long. The path has become a tabula rasa in 
which once a particular trend is set, it is difficult to get rid of. Owing to this opposition, I 
observe some contents of the reform being sharply attacked. This set of cultural path mainly 
held back market elements of the contents. During the same time, one decade long insurgency 
staged by NCP-M demanded to overthrow the monarchy along with existing structures and 
policies. These denials followed by bloody conflicts crippled almost all spectrums of the 
country including politics, economy and so on. The bleak policy environment coupled with 
hostile political landscapes circumscribed behavior and choice-making of the reform actors. I 
observe the ‘historical path’ followed by the parties in-opposition and the parties-in-
insurgency to some extent attributed to the elements of management in the contents. This 
observation supports one finding of Christensen and Lægreid (1999, p.185) ‘established 
practices do not disappear but are gradually modified by the reforms’. As part of gradual 
modification we observe the market elements which were largely caused by the rational and 
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instrumental coalition of bureaucrats and donors. Finally, the minimal presence of the variable 
in the contents combines strong environmental (institutional myths) and instrumental with 
weak cultural perspectives. 
 
5.2.2.2 The Case of the GRPRM 
How are the actors affected? 
 
The activation of the actors is moderately in line with what we could expect from this 
variable. Pilling out contributories to the moderate relation of the variable to the actors, 
domestic political opposition and insurgency seems to have exerted strong influences. 
However, the degree of influences varies with the types of the actors, for example, they are: 1) 
domestic actors – high influences; and 2) guest actors – moderate influences. Since the 
domestic actors survive in the same society, they remained too much susceptible to the 
turbulent political culture. Similarly, there was a good informal club of reform-minded 
bureaucrats who took the challenges given by turbulent politics as opportunity for action. 
While the guest actors, who are part of external world, accepted little amount of local culture 
due to turbulent local politics. This aspect depicts that international actor involved in local 
reform also learned from local condition especially the local myths. They modified their logic 
of action and, thereby, instrumental reform ideas. The domestic/ local actors and the guest 
actors have been learning partners. Having learnt this, I add (to myths in confrontation) actors 
do modify instrumental reform doctrines when myths – local and international myths - are in 
conflict. Finally, the moderate relation of the variable is combined with strong instrumental 
and environmental (institutional myths) perspectives and they overlapped the cultural 
perspective. The major reason that I observe was three fold: the strength from cultural 
perspective was weakened whereas that was strengthened moderately from instrumental and 
strongly from myths perspectives. 
 
How are the processes affected? 
 
The activation of the processes is rather in line with what we could expect from this variable. 
Analyzing the strong relation of the variable with the processes, I observe across the times 
domestic political opposition and insurgency culminated in a turning point. A long tradition of 
meritocracy emerged since Nepal’s modern era of public administration suddenly took a back 
gear. Amid NCP-M sponsored people’s war, a realization deepened that a large section of 
society was out of the public administration. For happening this, a long path to merit system 
was blamed. Across the agenda setting, formulation and decision-making, on the issue of 
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merit versus inclusive, actors engaged in the discussions. Through a democratic process 
finally the in-fighting actors opted for inclusiveness, i.e., positive affirmative action as well as 
reservation. I notice the leap forward occurred after a big jolt produced by a climax of 
conflictual politics. Politics apparently was an external force to administrative reform, 
nevertheless, that stroke the decision-makers when conflict reached at its peak. It is because 
the domestic actors redefined the logic of action and adapted to logic of appropriateness from 
logic of consequences.  
 
I observe the shocking turbulent politics led the three processes to breaking the long ‘policy 
legacy’ with a punctuated equilibrium. My observation also supports ‘change in any system is 
a product of external shocks to the system (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992 cited by Steinmo, 2001, 
p.3)’. I agree also with ‘…substantial institutional change takes place thereby creating a 
‘branching point’ from which historical development moves into a new path (Gourevitch, 
1986; Collier and Collier; Krasner; 1984 cited by Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.942)’. In the whole 
process, the key is the roles of the environmental changes and the charismatic leadership. 
Through these analyses, it can be concluded that the strong relation of the variable couples 
with myths (environmental/ institutional) and instrumental perspectives. In fact, in this case, 
the cultural perspective is overlapped by the cultural perspective. The major reason was three 
fold: the weakened the cultural perspective, moderately strengthened the instrumental 
perspective and strongly strengthened the environmental/ myths perspective. 
 
How are the contents affected? 
 
The activation of the contents is somewhat in line with what we could expect from this 
variable. Looking into the contents, the contents acquired high degree of management and low 
degree of market elements. Seemingly, the variant brought in tremendous elements from 
management via the breaking of ‘policy legacy’ – an element of cultural path. The variant 
induced such a big amount of management elements because of some factors that 
supplemented them: 1) high sense of responsibility with the central actors to act in that critical 
juncture; 2) survival motive of the central actors; 3) readiness for showing heroism in the 
critical time. Other way round, the contents obtained low elements of market because of 
overwhelming anti-wave of market. One unusual thing we notice that in the whole episode 
culture remained very weak and finally overlapped by the rest two perspectives. By this 
observation I also confirm Christensen and Lægreid’s finding ‘those whose values are more 
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controversial undergo broad modification or are rejected (1999, p.184-185)’. Finally, the 
strong relation of the variable to the contents is coupled with moderate cultural, moderate 
instrumental and strong environmental/ myths perspectives. 
 
5.2.2.3 Summing up 
My analyses only partly support the hypothesis (H3) that turbulent transition affects reform 
actor, process and content and it is a by-product of concurrent domestic political opposition 
and insurgency. The reason is that this hypothesis received equal supports in both cases 
though the degree was very slim. The variable’s support to the actors is observed to be weak 
with the GRPRM and moderate with the SPGNFSRP. The actors posed heavy pressures from 
the variable for the reform, resulting to the central actors: 1) morale pressures of responding 
to the issues catered to the public administration by the turbulent politics; 2) adaptability to 
the demands for the reform; 3) a team with similar reform-minded bureaucrats. Hence, it 
resulted in mounting pressures against the central actors also in the SPGNFSRP and the 
degree was higher compared to the other case. Forms of the pressures made are for: 1) 
managing the fiscal deficit steadily growing along with then prevalent political conflict and 2) 
managing the anomalies surfaced on banking and financial sector. The relative support can be 
seen also with processes in the two cases. In the GRPRM the central actors led the processes 
to more participatory and consensus based process. The major reasons were: 1) the situation 
was ripped enough for breaking the long ‘policy legacy’ from merit to inclusiveness 2) 
demand side increasingly became stronger and 3) willingness for orientation towards 
consensus rather than confrontations. However, in the SPGNFSRP central actors led to less 
open process. Also, logic of consequences was laid down to rationalize the public 
expenditures which exponentially increased during the insurgency. Finally, the moderate 
support in the GRPRM can be observed also with contents. The actors and processes 
contributed to the contents though moderately. The contents acquired high management and 
low market elements from the variable by: 1) raising questions about the country’s less 
representative public administration; 2) raising concerns of issue of socialization due to the 
conflict prevalent in the country. Also, the actors and processes in the pressure of the variable 
resulted in a very few elements in the contents of SPGNFSRP.  
 
Comparative Overview of the Summing up 
Looking at the results of the two hypotheses related to the cultural perspective, this study 
found that the H2 ‘elite orientation in bureaucrats’ is rejected, whereas the H3 ‘domestic 
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political opposition and insurgency’ is partly accepted in the both cases. It is mainly because 
in the meantime the traditional ‘orientation’ of the elites is changed due to changes happened 
in the backdrop of a decade long conflict in the country. As a result, contrary to their 
traditional resistant roles, the elites led the reform processes. This was a paradox in which the 
elite-orientation could not survive although the roles of the bureaucrats remained reform-
maker rather than reform spoiler. In the result of the second hypothesis, this study came 
across that the conflict-ridden situation of the country affected basically the actors and 
contents in both cases, hence, affected the decision-making.   
 
5.3  The Environmental Perspectives 
Having recognized organization as an open system after the Second World War, concurrent 
body of studies view organizations in a given environment from two schools as: 1) a subject 
to influence others; 2) an object to be influenced from others. Among the two features of 
environmental perspective, i.e. ‘technical environment’ and ‘institutional environment’ both 
imply the second school.  Technical environment mainly concerns about efficiency in 
economy and urges preventive and curative remedy to economic ills. Similarly, the second 
institutional environment concerns of ideology that urges recipes for fixing public 
organizational anomalies. As for logic of action, the first typology holds logic of 
consequences whilst the second prefers logic of appropriateness. The second perspective, also 
alternatively termed as ‘myths’, is considered to be different than cultural perspective on the 
ground that cultural and myths view reforms as divergent and technical views convergent. In 
both typologies, solutions often visit from outside an organization. For example, as 
Christensen and Lægreid (2002, p. 24) suggest, ‘international reform entrepreneurs’ carry 
around ‘international administrative doctrines’ which are manifestation of institutional 
environment. In the process, generally national leaders, e.g., politicians and bureaucrats, take 
the initiatives to absorb them. One can suggest ‘adoption of international myths of modernity 
(ibid, p.26)’ from national and international practices can satiate reformers’ appetite for 
legitimacy and scarce resources.  
 
Environment is a variant of both ‘change’ as well as ‘reforms’. Change refers to ‘gradual 
adaptation to external pressure’ and reform refers to ‘active and deliberate attempts by 
political and administrative leaders to change structural or cultural features’ (Christensen et al, 
2007, p. 210-211). Keeping in mind this classification, the two environmental factors, i.e., 
economy; and ideology; this thesis hereinafter attempts to analyze the empirical evidences 
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stated in chapter four. To this end, the first independent variable ‘fiscal stress’ embraces H4 - 
‘the reforms are seen as a necessary response to pressure from fiscal crises’. The second 
variable ‘donors/international agencies’, as international reform entrepreneurs, underscores 
H5 - ‘the reforms are seen as legitimate, modern and in line with dominating administrative 
doctrines in donors/international organizations’. It is because I assume that the variable is fast 
vehicle by which international modernity project travels a national reform project.  
 
5.3.1 Fiscal Crises 
5.3.1.1 The Case of the SPGNFSRP 
How are the actors affected? 
 
The activation of the contents is very much in line with what we could expect from this 
variable. It is because the fiscal stress released tremendous pressures to key managers of the 
national account. The growing pressures rendered them two challenges: 1) how to cut down 
the soaring expenditure and budget-deficit? and 2) how to mobilize additional resources to 
meet the resource gap? In the meantime, a number of catalyst news came into public debate 
that put the ability of the GoN in question. For both of the challenges and also for the issues 
upcoming into public, technocrats of NRB and MoF finally devised a solution – a proposal for 
the SPGNFSRP.  
 
The influences of variant are as follows in accordance with the actor classifications: 1) 
domestic actors – the fiscal stress generated two kinds of pressures for their responses. The 
first pressure provoked the actors to come into action against the stress. However, the actors 
were bounded for the action as parts of their organization’s instrumental objectives. This held 
more formal way of response accompanied with certain structural means-ends rationality. The 
second pressure provoked those actors who can be targeted by the reform’s measures. 
Employees and business community fall in this category. This held more informal rules for 
response accompanied with cultural paths. Seen from this perspective, the variable combines 
high instrumental perspective.  
 
An informal group of reformist actively came into the scene. They consisted though a small 
number, from minister of finance to senior techno-bureaucrats serving MoF, NPC and NRB. 
By ideology of political-economy, they advocated for neo-liberalism. Their criteria for 
problem and solution definition contained means-ends rationality and logic of 
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consequentiality. Also, they had been carriers of local contexts. By virtues of special skills for 
policy lobbying with horizontal and vertical actors such as political masters, mass media and 
donors, they quickly succeeded in pushing up the ideas for getting a reform-shape. The strong 
relation of the variable to the actors is finally fixed with strong instrumental, moderate 
environmental and weak cultural perspectives.  
 
How are the processes affected? 
 
The activation of the contents is very much in line with what we could expect from this 
variable. In the case, I observe that the variable kept the decision-making in its grips. Being 
pressurized by fiscal stress, in plea for big aid supports, GoN held a NDF 2000 meeting in 
Paris. On the eve of the Paris meeting, KPMG/Barents unfolded 2 public banks’ explosive 
audit reports. Moreover, WB study stripped the banking system of the country as revealing 
that the country had been less obedient to Basel’s 25 Principles. At the end of the day, they 
returned from the Paris meeting with assurance of ‘aid’, in return, a long list of commitment 
for reform – the price for the aid. The Nepalese leaders upon arrival pressurized NRB officials 
and the Cabinet decision-makers as well so as to act in tune with the commitments. They had 
a dilemma ‘a beggar has no choice’. The fiscal stress and the subsequent two triggers, i.e., 
NDF 2000 Paris; and Basel’s 25 Principles; had such coercive powers that the GoN could not 
ignore. They left with the decision-makers no choices other than actualizing the made 
commitment made, meaning going for the reform.  
 
In post-KPMG phase, a mass demand for such a reform grew up and the whole environment 
ripped for action. The change took places in fact in two ways: 1) gradual – by irking the actors 
due to the deteriorating fiscal stress for a couple of years; 2) abrupt and explosive – by 
exploding the KPMG/Barents audit report. I view the following reforms as response to the 
changes occurred in the given environment, for example, the fiscal stress to the economy and 
the KPMG/Barents report and others to the banking management. The erupted changes 
created again two kinds of pressures to the national financial managers: 1) internal; i.e., the 
pressures and demand from internal actors; 2) external; i.e., the pressure and demand from 
external actors like donors and international agencies. By this observation, I support 
propositions of Christensen et al (2007, p.210) about reforms as ‘active and deliberate 
attempts by political and administrative leaders’ and change as ‘a gradual process in 
organization…can take the form of abrupt and powerful upheavals’.  
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When the reform agenda set off, during the problem and solution defining times all actors 
seemed to be caretaker of their own rational interests. Consequently, three kinds of relations 
emerged and continued till the decision: 1) adversarial relationship between the actors with 
conflicting interests; 2) coalition relationship between the actors with matching interest; 3) 
ambivalent relationship between the actors with unclear interest. The outputs of agenda 
setting, formulation and decision taking were the consequence of the exchange between the 
relationships. The modes of process remain less participative and democratic. Also, the 
processes can be characterized as less transparent. Across the boards, technocrats-bureaucrats 
and techno-leaders were dominant. On the whole, the strong relation of the variable to the 
processes is coupled with strong instrumental, environmental/ myths and weak cultural 
perspectives.  
 
How are the contents affected? 
 
The activation of the contents is very much in line with what we could expect from this 
variable. In regard to the contents, the fiscal stress remains very efficient in the sense that the 
variable exerted tremendous effect. The major sources of the contents: 1) Fiscal stress - The 
nature of the variant ‘fiscal stress’ itself is very much susceptible to instrumental rational 
solutions. For this reason largely the contents attained high elements of market. 2) Demand of 
the changed environment: in the post-KPMG phase, the changed environment demanded for 
deliberate reform to banking structure and culture. This caused attainment of high elements of 
market and management as both streams. 3) The commitment of GoN with NDF 2000: This 
has been the reference point to the reform. All major guidelines were derived from the 
commitment-list and later extended into the formulation. As a result, I observe the contents 
acquired high elements in both streams: market and management. Worthy to note, the 
contents combines high instrumental and low cultural perspectives.  
 
Being shattered by the fiscal stress and subsequent irks, I observe the contents tended to have 
a safer reform-path. They seemed to be contained with a three fold concern: 1) What contents 
could refrain negative implications of the reforms? 2) What contents could win aid-supports? 
3) What contents could get legitimacy? These concerns led them to ‘dominant administrative 
doctrines’. They were tested elsewhere and user-friendly. Additionally, this remained helpful 
in making financial aid, which was the prime agenda of the reformers. The observation 
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supports my initial argument that ‘the adoption of international myths of modernity 
(Christensen and Lægreid, 2002, p.26)’ from national and international practices can satiate 
the reformers’ appetite for legitimacy and scarce resources. The same observation also 
supports the uncertainty conceived as a source of imitation DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 150). 
Extending the supports, I affirm an argument that imitation happens when ‘organisations are 
uncertain about their own experiences, or when their earlier development and activities are 
questioned (Sahlin-Anderson, 1996; Sevon 1996 cited by Sahlin-Anderson, 2002, p.48). In 
such times, reformers ‘turn to others for experiences and models to imitate (ibid, p.48).’ 
Having said this, I note that the reform contents, to a greater extent, are resulted from the 
fiscal stress via imitation. The observations about imitation are reflection of how myths and 
technical environment go and act together. Finally, the strong relation of the variable to 
contents is woven with strong instrumental and environmental/ myths) and weak cultural 
perspectives.  
 
5.3.1.2 The Case of the GRPRM 
How are the actors affected? 
 
The activation of the actors is very much in line with what we could expect from this variable. 
In quest for triggering factors, we are confronted with evidences that fiscal stress had 
tremendous relation with various kinds of actors: 1) Aid seeking actors –ministers and senior 
bureaucrats of MoF fall in this category. It is because they were the front-liners in the 
business related to national revenue and expenditure. Instrumental perspective remained their 
guidelines to act. 2) Reform seeking actors – Although they had nothing to deal with national 
revenue and expenditure, they urged reform in the system they served in. This included the 
actors from governmental and non-governmental sides. MoGA and civil society, for example, 
came under this group. Instrumental, cultural and environmental perspectives remained their 
guidelines for action. 3) Aid and reform donor actors – those who provided the first and 
second actors with both aid and reform came under this category. They are external actors 
having money and ideas or popular doctrines for reform. Structural/instrumental and 
environmental perspective happened to be the criteria for their action. 4) Threat actors – CPN-
M as a big threat to the establishments fell under this category. They, to some extent, created 
threat to all other actors. The criteria for action of this group made of structural perspective. 
Among them, the actors from first and second categories scored central roles and rest 
peripheral roles. Finally, the variable’s strong relation to the actors combines strong 
instrumental and institutional/ myths with weak cultural perspectives.   
 109
 
How are the processes affected? 
 
The activation of the processes is very much in line with what we could expect from this 
variable. The ‘fiscal crises’ happened to be a strong variant to the processes. The agenda 
speeded, for example, when aid money stopped due to the country’s failure to fulfill some aid 
conditionality. Defining processes of problems and solutions rested upon two logics of action: 
1) logic of consequences; 2) logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1989, p.23-26). The 
ones, who had the logic of consequences, were keen about ‘fixing the problems and the aid’. 
That is in line with the consequences. The users of this logic include bureaucrats/technocrats 
and minister of MoF as they had strong relations with the variant. In contrary, the opposite 
ones were keen about ‘maintaining local identity, local values and locally suited actions’. That 
is in line with the appropriateness or process. The users of this logic include bureaucrats of 
MoGA and other domestic actors.  
 
Nevertheless, the major processes underwent more democratic and participatory styles. It is 
because the central actors, who in controlling position of the processes, held the logic of 
‘appropriateness’ and cultural perspectives. Those bureaucrats represented MoGA and PMO 
which had structurally and instrumentally little to do with fiscal issues. Those actors, thus, 
held looser relation with the fiscal stress. The learning implies two relationships: 1) the actors 
responsible for fiscal issues are concerned about fixing resource crisis by aid and; 2) the 
actors not responsible for fiscal issues were concerned about local values, norms and culture. 
Finally, the strong relation of the variable to the processes is combined with strong 
instrumental, strong environmental/ myths and weak cultural perspectives.  
 
How are the contents affected? 
 
The activation of the contents is not very much in line with what we could expect from this 
variable. The weak relation of the variable to the contents after all led to low degree of market 
and high degree of management elements. The central actors of MoF as being firmly 
associated with the variant argued for the reform with their counterparts. Citing the resource 
crisis, they applied both suggestive and threatening modes. Their efforts to some extent 
impacted the contents especially on the part of elements of market. I view rest other central 
and domestic actors maintained stronger relation with the variant. The robust relation 
culminated in high elements of management into the contents. Also, I observe that their logic 
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of action – ‘appropriateness’ undermined the relation with the variant ‘fiscal stress’. Above 
all, ADB factor also have strong relationship with the combined form of contents that 
illustrate market and management elements together. It is because of the bank’s concern about 
the conditionality that was continuation of the first version of ADB assisted GRP. The 
version, an output of wide and multi-level consultations with Nepalese bureaucrats and 
experts, implied the larger part from management and the smaller part from market. The 
thesis considers the ADB’s conditionality to be a strong coercive force. The observation 
supports an argument of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) that illustrates coercive isomorphism as 
a result of ‘formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations 
upon which they are dependent’.  
 
In a bid of fulfilling the conditionality of ADB, I notice that the situation led the contents to 
the bank’s reform ideas but with some editing after heated local debates. The 
decontextualization brought in ‘editing’ into the previously conceived ideas, that is, the 
ADB’s conditionality for the tranche 2. The ‘editing’ attempted to fulfill the gap that took 
place in the local contexts over the time. The editing also resulted in some elements from 
‘meantime ecology’ of the country. This insight supports ‘the distance between the supposed 
source of the model and the imitating actors (Sahlin-Andersson, 2002, p.54)’. The editing 
happened due to two reasons: 1) the former elements did not cope with emerging overarching 
issues of local environment; 2) the former elements did not match with new myths about 
inclusionary public administration. In the backdrop, the editing was inevitable in order to have 
the fine-tuning accordingly. This also supports the conception of Christensen et al. about 
myths perspective ‘public organization are becoming increasingly expressive 
organizations…concerned about their image and reputation in the environment (2007, p. 98)’. 
Finally the weak relation of the variable to the contents combines strong instrumental, strong 
institutional (myths) with weak cultural perspectives.  
 
5.3.1.3 Summing up 
These analyses support the hypothesis (H4) that reforms are necessary response to pressure 
from fiscal crises. However, the degree of support varies in the two cases. This has stronger 
support to the SPGNFSRP compared to the GRPRM. The varied support can be seen with 
actors. The stronger support in the SPGNFSRP is outcome of less contesting relationship 
between the actors – more or less they were unanimous about the reform. The principal 
reasons of this include the growing deficit in national accounts, the financial sector remained 
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affected with series of crises, and relative monopoly of reform minded bureaucrats and 
technocrats. Similarly, other reasons include homogeneity of actors involved and tendency of 
taken for granted, the reform ideas imposed by superior authorities like MoF and NPC. 
However, in the GRPRM the actors remained overly contestants; hence, the relation of the 
variable seems rather weaker. It is because the social issue and political conflict became rather 
powerful than the fiscal issue. The manifestation of the greater support in the SPGNFSRP can 
also be seen with processes. The main reason for the greater support in the case includes, 
undergoing back-up support of international agencies and experts and use of technical 
analysis, rather than open consultation with stakeholders. However, in the GRPRM, those 
elements seemed less preferred. Rather, open consultation and dominance of social issues 
remained more preferred modes. Also, the manifestation of greater support in the SPGNFSRP 
is observed also with the reform contents. The greater support in the contents was resulted 
from overwhelming success stories from Asian crisis countries to the central actors. Similarly, 
the reform leaders agreed rather with internationally dominant doctrines of reform. However, 
the variable’s relation remained lesser supportive in the GRPRM as the actors and processes 
accommodated rather locally perceived problems and solutions than internationally perceived-
ones. 
 
5.3.2 Reform Doctrines of Donors/International Agencies 
5.3.2.1 The Case of the SPGNFSRP 
How are the actors affected? 
 
The activation of the actors is very much in line with what we could expect from this variable. 
From the cause and effect relationship, the variable developed three kinds of actors: 1) 
Problem/ solving oriented – this category is hugely concerned about solution of the problem 
they encountered with. These were mostly bureaucrats, technocrats and minister of finance. 
Most of them belonged to MoF, NPC and NRB. Apart from the domestic, some external 
actors also fell in this category. The role features confirm their central position. They 
maintained a good relationship with donors and international agencies. These actors held high 
structural/ instrumental and environmental (institutional myths) perspectives and low cultural 
perspective. 2) Resistant to donors/ international agencies – ones who were skeptical to the 
variant referring some potential negative implications thereof. The variant faced opposition 
from them and the relation of them with the donors and international agencies remained 
hostile. This category included all domestic actors. Their roles always limited in peripheral 
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rather than central. On the whole, the variable’s relation to the actors combines strong 
instrumental, moderate institutional and weak cultural perspectives.  
 
How are the processes affected? 
 
The activation of the processes is not very much in line with what we could expect from this 
variable. The variable exerted big influence to the contents all across. When the 
KPMG/Barents audit report galvanized the agenda, all the actors divided into two groups 
began a wrangling. However, the dominant actors of MoF, RBB and NPC maintained their 
upper-hand across the phases of defining problems and solutions. To this regard, a less 
participatory approach barred other actors from participation. Only external actors like 
consultants as legitimate representative of donors remained in back up supports. The other 
actors expressed themselves only via mass-media rather than round-table discussion. From 
this insight I learn that the processes expected ‘legitimacy’ only from the reform doctrines 
rather than the participation of domestic stakeholders. 
 
As part of criteria for logic of action, actors of the ‘problem/ solving’ category seemed to have 
both consequentiality and appropriateness. This largely depended upon the issue of discussion 
and the actor’s identity. This is a puzzle to be answered why such actors time and again do 
swing and what are the incentives and motivation for them making such frequent wings. 
However, actors of the ‘resistant’ category employed appropriateness to the criteria for logic 
of action. They related their own identity to action and concluded with resistant option. We 
finally note that the observed strong relation of the variable to the processes combines 
moderate instrumental and strong environmental/ myths with weak cultural perspectives. 
 
How are the contents affected? 
 
The activation of the contents is very much in line with what we could expect from this 
variable. The variant’s close ties with the contents have three aspects. The first aspect 
exemplifies affinities to donors and international agencies. This happened after two triggers: 
1) the KPMG/Barents audit report; and 2) the WB report on Basel Principles. That welcomed 
a WB/IMF technical team coupled with ADB and DFID in view of fixing the ill-system. I 
learn that the solutions the team and other international agencies offered were picked up from 
the experiences of South-East Asian countries. For those agencies, the success stories of 
Asian Crisis countries were not less than a victor’s story. Literally, those practically tested 
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and successful-rated ideas were sponsored by those agencies. ‘The IMF created a series of 
bailouts ("rescue") packages… the IMF's support was conditional on a series of drastic 
economic reforms influenced by neoliberal economic principles called a "structural 
adjustment package"’40. Over the time, the agencies marketed the tested ideas in the form of 
dominant doctrines for reforms and started them injecting to other countries. One high-placed 
NPC technocrats said ‘‘it was likely that Nepal was on the verge of similar crisis like Asian-
crisis. Realizing the threat, the WB headquarter by themselves initiated this process of reform 
although we owned it officially’’. These accounts exhibit reform dominant doctrines of the 
WB were copied in the contents. And also the accounts support ‘‘models that are ‘packaged’ 
so that they can be transported’ are more easily imitated’’ (Røvik, 1998, forthcoming Strang 
and Meyer, 1993 cited by Sahlin-Andersson, 2002, p.50). 
 
The second aspect reflects glamorous part of the reform ideas. The dominant reform doctrines 
from the donors and international agencies remained impressive just as an international 
fashion. The ideas were out there knocking the door of the decision-makers. Just as March 
and Olsen’s ‘garbage can model’ in which ‘solutions seek problems rather than the opposite 
(Christensen et al, 2007, p.99)’, Nepalese reform leaders/actors found the solutions ‘out’ there 
seeking a deal. This happened, as I learn, owing to the ‘international myths of modernity’, 
which was there along with a set of solutions. The solutions seemed to be sex appealing 
because of: 1) Stamps of legitimacy as having back-up of giant donors and international 
agencies. Also they were from time and again getting updated with technical analysis. 2) The 
ideas were tested and hand-picked from someone’s success stories. 3) The value they carried 
on was parts of international modernity project. 4) They had been popular elsewhere. Having 
so attracted with the doctrines that resemble the NPM ‘generated through the prism of rational 
choice theory (Gregory, 2007, p.236)’, a big part the contents swayed with market elements. 
In all this, we witness the contents grappled with internationally popular reform doctrines. 
This is in fact a part of ‘the sweeping reform processes have made central banks more alike 
(Marcussen, 2007, p. 152).’ Learnt that popular recipes underpinned to a greater extent the 
concepts for contents, we approve ‘the concepts are often inspired by the international 
organizations and by those who certify them (Christensen et al, 2007, p.110)’. 
Finally, the strong relation of the variable to the contents is combined the strong instrumental 
and moderate myths with the weak cultural perspectives.  
                                                 
40 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asian_financial_crisis#IMF_role. 20.05.08, 8.30 pm. 
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The third aspect of the ties depicts the doctrines coming out from donors and international 
agencies as fashion. Organizations as an open system get affected not only from surrounding 
institutions but also from upcoming technical fashion of management. As Abrahamson (1996, 
p.117) argues, the fashionable techniques are considered to be both ‘rational’ and 
‘progressive’. In the aftermath of the KPMG/Barents audit explosion, the WB, DFID and 
ADB came up with offers of standard prescriptions. This is the point where this study 
considers, a management fashion-setting community exits as supplier of the reform ideas as 
suggested by Abrahamson (ibid, p.123). He points out two kinds of actors in the community: 
1) fashion leaders or fashion setters; 2) fashion followers. It is obvious that the actors – the 
WB, DFID, and ADB - involved in such businesses were professional, legitimate and modern. 
As the actors regarded the ideas offered from dominant reform doctrines ‘smart look’, the 
contents incorporated major parts of the ideas. By this, I add that popular doctrines from 
international agencies possess guarantee of smartness, hence, a strong relation to the contents. 
This relational aspect upheld strong environmental/ myths perspective. 
 
While these are the imported ideas, the actors were aware that that might spring off public cry 
in the country. Resulted from the delicacy, we observe the reformers being divided into two 
groups: a) loyal reformists - a few key decision-makers seemed to be fan of the ideas coming 
in from outside; b) skeptical reformists - some others kept on with some reservations hand-in-
hand pushing up the reforms. The former tended to have quick coupling with the recipes from 
the reform doctrines and the later tended to have decoupling. This observation quite matches 
with two out of four classifications of reformers in OECD countries ‘the hesitant reformer’ 
and ‘the comprehensive reformer’ (Halligan, 2002, p. 75). The interaction held between the 
reformers and the variant remained significant, hence, the contents obtained some parts of 
market and rest management elements. Finally, the strong relation of the variable to the 
contents combines strong instrumental, strong myths with weak cultural perspectives.  
 
5.3.2.2 The Case of the GRPRM 
How are the actors affected? 
 
The activation of the actors is very much in line with what we could expect from this variable. 
By analyzing the strong relation of the variable to the actors, I observe that the degree of 
relation varied according to actors’ classification. The central actors had closer relation 
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whereas the domestic peripheral actors had lesser. As part of the effect, I observe reform 
doctrines of donors and international agencies increased the appetite of the central reform 
leaders. This was for looking ‘modern’ with the aid of the doctrines. To this reference, I 
notice three roles of the reform leaders: 1) reform leaders were in constant touch of donors 
and international organizations; 2) donors and international organizations made space for 
reforms; 3) administrative and political leader acted upon the offered spaces. They kept on a 
dual role - respecting the local informal values and upcoming environmental elements in the 
surroundings and adjusting themselves with the concepts of the doctrines. On the one hand, 
they have to be ‘sensitive to cultural traditions and guarding historical paths’ and on the other 
hand they have to make adaptation ‘to a new and changed environment and context’ 
(Christensen and Lægreid, 2007, p. 5).  
 
Due to the variant, the peripheral actors underwent broadly three types of roles: 1) Actor 
adhering with traditional measures of reforms. This category included mainly high and middle 
level bureaucrats. They seemed to be less flexible to the environment and high demanding of 
the traditional ideas of administrative reform. 2) Actors taking up with new measures of 
reforms consisted of some high-ranked bureaucrats, rights/pressure groups, and donors. 3) 
Invisible but exerting threat to all. A rebellion political force NCP-M and concerned 
associations played this role. They were by that time distant actors – never participated but 
remained very powerful. Based on these, I learn the strong relation of the variable embraces 
strong environmental/ myths, moderate instrumental and weak cultural perspectives.   
 
How are the processes affected? 
 
The activation of the processes is very much in line with what we could expect from this 
variable. The strong relation of the variable with the processes has ample manifestations. The 
processes, for example, underwent participatory style. ‘Participation’ has been a popular 
notion in the dominant doctrines for administrative reforms. While designing the way 
forward, the actors grappled with the participatory approach, namely round-table discussion 
and public debate. In the face of turbulent political era, the leading actors considered the 
participation to be the best means for assuring the legitimacy of the reforms.  
 
From the point of top or down, the processes, especially agenda-setting benefited from high 
top-down. The top leaders were conceived as ‘easy deal’, ‘quick responsive’ and ‘effective 
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instrument’ for the dominant reform doctrines. Reforms may be based on initiatives from the 
top (Christensen et al, 2007, p. 211). Once the doctrines had affairs with the agenda, it trickled 
down to subordinate levels of actors for formulation where I witnessed a wider participation. 
Again when the formulated draft reached the top leaders for approval, they managed the 
chance to fine-tune with the internationally standardized doctrines. Here the top leaders 
seemed to have an additional ‘gatekeeper’ role – screening for what to let or what to deny. 
Learnt from the insights, I suggest in reference to ‘the individual agencies have their own 
‘gatekeepers’ (Christensen and Lægreid, 1999, p. 185)’ accepting a dual role of the top 
leaders – cultural gatekeeper and instrumental gatekeeper.  
 
I discern that employed logic of action by actors varied from time to time and case to case. In 
that process, the variant had certain roles. Social issues like gender, excluded groups or 
marginalized sections of the society, for example, got significant priority in the doctrine. Just 
as the ‘priority’, the doctrines altered over the time, logic of action of some actors also 
changed accordingly. In this transformation I notice some actors modified their logic of action 
and some shifted to opposite logic. Bureaucratic leaders who used to define meritocracy till 
yesterday as panacea of all problems began to blame it and put on a mantra of 
representativeness. This happened largely due to the modification and shift in logic. In 
shifting the logic of action, donors also did so. They also got infected by the reform doctrines 
that they came along. On the whole, the strong relation of the variable to the processes holds 
strong environmental/ myths), moderate instrumental and weak cultural perspectives.  
 
How are the contents affected? 
 
The activation of the contents is very much in line with what we could expect from this 
variable. Evidences show that the reform concepts of the contents largely rested upon the 
dominant administrative doctrines. This happened mainly for two reasons. First, I observe that 
a few donors and international agencies organized study tours to some reform leaders. That 
aimed at making a demonstration effect over them as to how the doctrines have successfully 
worked elsewhere. The indoctrination tempted them in implanting the ideas in the reforms. 
Secondly, the guest ideas observed with the ADB conditionality for tranche 2. The aid 
conditionality served as a carrier of the reform doctrines. Having squeezed with the 
conditionality, concerned decision-makers seemed to enjoy the leverage available. The 
implied motive depicts guarantee of ‘certification or accreditation (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; 
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Ruef and Scott 1998 cited by Scott, 2001, p.60)’ for legitimacy. By doing so, the GoN had 
‘two birds with one stone’ meaning legitimacy and aid both. On the contents part, both of the 
reasons led to a mixed composition, that is, high management and low market elements. In 
spite of the presence of the dominant doctrines, the decision acquired some edited elements 
additionally incorporated in later days. That happened because of de-contextualization 
processes with the country’s social, economic and political spectrums.  
 
As I discussed above, since the donors- ADB - also infected with own reform doctrines, they 
also tended to ‘inclusionary’ from ‘merit’ school. From that point, some elements of post-
NPM surfaced in the contents. It is intriguing to observe that the donors, a transmitter of 
modern and internationally ‘instrumental super standard (Christensen and Lægreid, 1999 
p.171)’ of NPM ideas, also grappled with changing fashion. This was mainly due to multiple 
but contesting popular ideas coming together out of the doctrines. This situation of ‘myths in 
confrontation (Christensen et al, 2007, p. 292) resulted in the very contrasting elements to the 
contents. On the whole, the strong relation of the variable to the contents upholds strong 
environmental/ myths, weak instrumental and weak cultural perspectives.  
 
5.3.2.3 Summing up 
The analyses support the hypothesis (H5) that reforms are legitimate, modern and in line with 
dominant administrative doctrines of donors/international agencies. Going into case-wise 
support, the degree of support seems stronger in the SPGNFSRP compared to the GRPRM. 
The later observed manifestations of the weaker support with actors by the fact that the 
relation between the actors and this variable was hurdled with unique nature of local 
externalities compounded with poor governance, poor service delivery and conflict in the 
society. Also, in the meantime political situation turned to the King’s authoritarian regime 
from elected government. Since international community went against the King’s move, the 
changes as its fallout effect weakened the commitment, authorization and legitimacy of the 
administrative reform leaders. However, the former observed the manifestation of stronger 
support with the actors since there was a strong coalition formed between the reform leaders 
and the donors. That coalition was firmly determined to bring the reform into effect. 
Similarly, the manifestation of weaker support in the GRPRM can be observed with 
processes. In this case, political chaos prevalent then in the country and uncertainty about the 
future of the reform, forced the variable to be rather out of the processes. However, the 
manifestation of stronger support seems in the SPGNFSR 2000 with the processes. In that 
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regard, the variable seemed pretty vigorous. It is because of the fiscal stress and the anomalies 
exposed in the financial sector of the country. As a result, the coalition was formed between 
the reform leaders from MoF, NPC and NRB and the donors. The last manifestation of the 
support was with contents. The stronger support in the SPGNFSRP and the weaker support in 
the GRPRM resulted mainly from three variants: 1) ‘the area of reform’, financial and 
banking sector as compared to administrative sector, is more susceptible to market elements; 
2) donors’ intensity is high in the SPGNFSR 2000 as it was part of global financial reform 
project and that supports market elements; and 3) ‘issue of socialization’ is high in the 
GRPRM and that rather led to management elements.  
 
Comparative Overview of the Summing up 
While examining the results of the two hypotheses drawn from the environmental 
perspectives, this study came to a conclusion that both hypotheses received strong supports. 
Comparatively, the H4 of the ‘fiscal crises’, has greater supports than the H5 of the ‘reform 
doctrines of donors/ international agencies’. The backdrop of fiscal stress and anomalies 
prevalent in the country’s financial and banking sector remained triggering factors. As the 
bureaucrats and technocrats were front-liners dealing the issues, they possessed pivotal roles 
across the decision-makings. On top of them, the close proximity of donors and international 
agencies with the bureaucrats and technocrats also rendered additional points. In fact, the two 
environmental variables forged a coalition, which efficiently controlled the cultural variables.  
 
5.4  Significance and Interplay of the Perspectives 
Environmental/ institutional perspective has the strongest explanatory power. The study has 
coupled them together with an assumption that myths and institutional environment have 
some common features. The environmental/ myths perspective is overwhelming over the rest 
two instrumental and cultural perspectives. The myths being ‘socially created norms in 
institutional environments (Christensen et al, 2007, p. 98)’ entices attention of reformers 
easily. Owing to these reasons in both cases, the myths remains the most powerful in keeping 
the decision-makings under control (see Figure 10).  
 
Instrumental perspective seems to have moderate degree of explanatory power but still quite 
powerful. The instrumental carries largely means-ends rationality and the structural carries 
vertical relationship. In a developing country like Nepal, power and resources are centrally 
located. Polity is designed and functioned as per the possession of power and resources. 
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Having combined polity with transformative approach, the perspective embraces significant 
explanatory power in both of the cases (see Figure 10).  
 
Cultural perspective is limited with the weakest power. Furthermore, the perspective is 
displaced from two cultural related independent variables. As environmental/ myths and 
instrumental perspectives absorbed the most powers, cultural perspective seemed to be 
helpless. The attraction of new myths – dominant international reform doctrines - and 
distraction of traditional reform doctrines have weakened (see Figure 10) the cultural 
perspectives in the cases.  
 
From case-specific comparison, in the SPGNFSRP, instrumental owns the strongest power, 
while cultural and environmental/ myths perspectives have the weakest and moderate 
explanatory powers, respectively. Furthermore, in the GRPRM, environmental/ myths has the 
strongest explanatory power, with instrumental and cultural perspectives having moderate and 
weakest power, respectively.  
 
My observation suggests recognizing ‘coalition of instrumental and myths can largely 
influence informal norms and values’. However, in this process I affirm that this happens 
when ‘organization’s culture is minimally influenced by its members’ social background 
(Christensen et al, p. 287)’. 
 
5.5  Conclusion 
We observe several evidence of coupling in the cases. In the SPGNFSRP, instrumental and 
environmental/ myths perspectives have a coalition made in various independent variables. I 
discern the partnership of the two perspectives to be the most successful as they successfully 
neutralized the strength of ‘cultural traditions and path dependency’ (Christensen et al, 2007, 
p. 286). Also, in the GRPRM, the same two perspectives maintained the long-standing 
coalitions.  
 
Cultural perspective in both of the cases decoupled with instrumental and environmental/ 
institutional perspectives. Being decoupled with the rest of the perspectives, cultural 
perspective in the transformative process remained less-efficient, reflected failures to perform 
certain roles, for example, ‘compatibility test’ (Brunsson and Olsen, 1993) and cultural ‘gate-
keepers’ (Christensen and Lægreid, 1999, p. 185). Because of the erosion in the cultural 
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strength, the reform leaders could ‘deliberately attempt to design their organizational culture’ 
(ibid, p. 287).  
 
As for overlapping, two shining evidences emerge in which cultural perspective is displaced 
due to overwhelming powers of the two perspectives. In both of the cases, such phenomena 
are evident. In the SPGNFSRP, cultural perspectives from three independent variables were 
overlapped and displaced, and was substituted by the coalition of the other two perspectives. 
The displacement is even more severe in the GRPRM. In this case, cultural perspective was 
displaced from its two independent variables namely elite orientation in bureaucrats and 
domestic political opposition and insurgency. The substitution was made with the same 
coalition of the rest three variables from other two perspectives. In short, the cultural 
perspective is a loser and the rest are winner in the interplay happened in the decision-making.  
 
Figure 10: Explanatory Powers of the Three Perspectives by Cases 
 
Note: 1) S = Strong; M = Moderate; and W = Weak; and Blank space = No support at all.  
2) The case 1 is the SPGNFSRP; the case 2 is the GRPRM;  
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CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Following the preceding analysis chapter, the current chapter includes answers to my research 
questions and a description of major findings. Implications for the theoretical perspectives 
employed and other relevant theories are also parts of the discussion. We also highlight some 
possible practical implications for concerned policies in Nepal and also for other countries 
with similar features. Finally, we outline a few potential areas for further research. 
 
6.2 Answers to the Research Questions 
1. What actors played the major roles in the approval decision-making of the NPM-inspired 
reforms? 
The study found that two major actors played the major roles. In the role of central actors, 
ministers of finance; senior bureaucrats of MoF; ministers of MoGA and MoF; and senior 
technocrats of NPC; senior NRB officials; and donors (the WB, IMF; ADB and DFID) played 
the roles in the SPGNFSRP. Similarly, ministers of MoGA and MoF; and bureaucrats of 
MoGA, MoF and PMO played the roles in the GRPRM.  
 
Similarly, in the role of peripheral actors, parliamentary committee - PAC; international 
consultant – KPMG; mass-media; and banking community played the roles in the 
SPGNFSRP. However, donors/ADB; ADDCN; former rebel CPN-M; civil society; rights 
groups; associations of civil servants played the roles of in the GRPRM.  
 
As for supporting and opposing roles (see Figure 3), all the central actors remained supportive 
to the reforms in both the cases. Peripheral actors, however, seemed to some extent divided. 
Specifically, parliamentary committee- PAC; international consultants – KPMG; mass-media 
played supportive roles whereas banking community played partially opposing and partially 
supporting roles in the SPGNFSRP. Likewise, peripheral actors like ADB; and ADDCN 
seemed to have supportive roles. None of the peripheral actors explicitly opposed to the 
reform in the GRPRM. However, the roles of rebellion political party (CPN-M); civil society; 
rights groups; and associations of civil servants seemed to have tremendous pressures on the 




2. What were the processes followed in the decision-making of the NPM inspired reforms? 
The study unveiled that the processes followed in the two cases quite varying from case to 
case and also stage to stage. In the SPGNFSRP across the sub-stages of decision-making, the 
processes were rather less participative, less democratic, less transparent, more top-down and 
more stable (see Figure 4). Having examined the various decision-making stages, I found that 
the agenda setting seemed more top-down, less democratic and less participative. Similarly, 
the formulation seemed to have less open, more logic of consequences, and more bottom-up. 
And the decision-making processes turned to be more top-down, less-democratic, more close. 
On the whole, I found that the overall processes were very much fixed with three independent 
variables ‘deliberate planned and hierarchical decision-making of superior organizations’, 
‘fiscal crises’ and ‘reform doctrines of donors/ international agencies’. Also, partly ‘domestic 
political opposition and insurgency’ influenced the held processes. However, ‘elite orientation 
in bureaucrats’ had rather little roles in the processes. Analyzed from the theoretical 
perspectives, the processes underwent instrumental perspectives rather than any others. It is 
because of the high presence of hierarchical variant.  
 
In the GRPRM the study unfolded that the processes allowed relatively high degree of 
participation, openness and transparency. Similarly, that followed high degree of bottom-up, 
application of appropriateness, unstable processes (see Figure 4). After looking into the sub-
stages of decision-making, the study revealed that the agenda setting underwent relatively 
high degree of the top-down and application of logic of consequences. In the formulation, the 
degree of participation, openness, application of appropriateness, and   bottom-up remained 
high. Again, the degree in the decision-making slightly dwindled to lesser amount of bottom-
up and open participation except the application of appropriateness that remained unabated.  
 
3. What were the contents of the decisions made on the NPM inspired reforms? 
The SPGNFSRP acquired high degree of market elements and also high degree of 
management elements in the decision-contents (see Figure 6, 7 and 8). This study revealed 
that this case in regard to the market element is stronger compared to the other case. This case 
obtained two of the three deployed features. They include privatization and hired management 
on contracts, and competition/ commercialization. To this contrary, this case in regard to the 
management elements possessed three features out of seven but very rich. They consist of 
accountability/ transparency/ participation, divisionalized organization and agencification, and 
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cost-cutting/ down sizing. Owing to the mixed elements, this study terms the case as a ‘mix 
case’. 
 
The GRPRM appeared with high degree of the management elements and low degree of the 
market elements. Of the seven features of management, the case acquired four features. They 
include administrative decentralization, accountability/ transparency/ participation, 
divisionalized organization and agencification, cost-cutting/ down sizing, and citizen charters. 
In the management, this case seems stronger compared to the SPGNFSRP. Contrary to this, 
out of three features of market elements this case holds only one. That is privatization and 
hired management on contracts. I term this as a ‘management driven case’.  
 
This study also unfolded that the most observed, in both cases, features drawn from 
management elements are accountability/ transparency/ participation; and cost-cutting/down-
sizing. While privatization and hired management on contracts is the most observed feature 
drawn from the market element including the both cases. Finally, the contents of the cases are 
a ramification of hybrid shape which in itself is a unique form – not necessarily similar to any 
others’ contents despite a heavy presence of the convergence-minded variables.   
 
4. Why some factors affected the approval decisions of the NPM-inspired reforms?  
In this examination, this study first delved into polity related factor and underlying variable 
‘deliberate planned and hierarchical decision-making of superior organizations’. The result of 
the H1 shows that ‘reforms are result of deliberate planned and hierarchical decision-making 
of superior organizations’ is supported in both of the cases. Comparatively, the SPGNFSRP 
has greater supports whereas the GRPRM has lesser supports to the hypothesis. It is because 
the hypothesis is supported in the former case strongly by actors, strongly by processes and 
moderately by contents. On the other hand, the same hypothesis gained supports in the latter 
case moderately from actors, also moderately from processes and strongly from contents (see 
Figure 10).  
 
Furthermore, this study examined political-administrative culture factor placing two 
independent variables: ‘elite orientation in bureaucrats’ and ‘domestic political opposition & 
insurgency’. The hypothesis of the former variable ‘elite orientation in bureaucrats as agent of 
historical-institutional administrative culture and tradition constrains reform actor, process 
and content’ is largely rejected in both of the cases. Comparatively, the degree of rejection is 
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greater in the SPGNFSRP as compared to the GRPRM. This study found that the hypothesis 
obtained in the former case weak supports from actors, no supports from processes and no 
supports from contents. Likewise, the same hypothesis in the latter case managed to receive 
weak supports from actors, weak supports from processes and also weak supports from 
contents (see Figure 10).  
 
As for another independent variable of the same factor ‘domestic political opposition & 
insurgency’, the employed hypothesis ‘turbulent transition affects reform actor, process and 
content and it can be seen as a by-product of concurrent domestic political opposition and 
insurgency’ is only partly supported. In the SPGNFSRP, the hypothesis is supported though 
weakly. It is because the hypothesis received the supports moderate from actors, weak from 
processes and also weak from contents. Similarly, the hypothesis in the GRPRM is accepted 
but weakly. The hypothesis in this case received the supports weak from actors, weak from 
processes and moderate from contents (see Figure 10).  
  
With regard to the technical environment this study found that the laid down hypothesis 
‘reforms are seen as a necessary response to pressure from fiscal crises’ is supported in both 
of the cases. However, as compared to the SPGNFSRP the hypothesis received higher 
supports in the GRPRM. It is because the supports the case obtained are strong from actors, 
strong from processes and also strong from contents. While the supports the SPGNFSRP 
received include moderate from actors, also moderate from processes and strong from 
contents (see Figure 10).   
 
With respect to the institutional environment the employed hypothesis ‘reforms are seen as 
legitimate, modern and in line with dominating reform doctrines of donors/ international 
organizations’ is accepted in both the cases. Comparatively, higher supports seemed in the 
GRPRM as the hypothesis received strong supports from all actors, processes and contents. 
However, the SPGNFSRP witnessed the supports moderate from actors, moderate from 
processes and strong from contents.  
 
Based on the results of the hypotheses, this study found that the contents of the SPGNFSRP 
are strongly the result of two independent variables, i.e., ‘fiscal crises’ and ‘reform doctrines 
of donors/ international agencies’. Another independent variable ‘deliberate planned and 
hierarchical decision-making of superior organizations’ has moderate effect to the contents. 
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However, ‘domestic political opposition and insurgency’ has very weak causal relation to the 
contents. But the last variable ‘elite orientation in bureaucrat’ did not have any clear relation 
to the contents. Seen from the theoretical perspectives, the contents are largely response to 
environmental/ institutional and instrumental perspectives than cultural perspective. When it 
comes to the GRPRM, I found that the same two independent variables ‘fiscal crises’ and 
‘reform doctrines of donors/ international agencies’ are the most vibrant. Another variable 
‘deliberate planned and hierarchical decision-making of superior organizations’ also seemed 
moderately vigorous.  Contrary to this, rest two variables ‘elite orientation in bureaucrats’ and 
‘domestic political opposition & insurgency’ remained having little roles in the contents. This 
thesis with a theoretical observation to this case concludes that the contents have resulted 
strongly from environmental/ institutional perspective and moderately from instrumental 
perspective. While cultural perspective remained weak in making the contents. 
 
6.3 Major Findings  
In reference to the transformative model of NPM, my study found that the decision-making is 
after all the result of not only one particular factor. Rather it has been a hybrid product of a 
complex transformation in which a combination of three factors: structure with instrumental 
perspective and the economy and ideology with environmental perspective played the most 
crucial roles. They functioned via their agent variables ‘deliberate planned and hierarchical 
decision-making of superior organization’ of the structure, and ‘fiscal crises’ and ‘reform 
doctrines of donors/ international agencies’ of the economy and ideology, respectively. Also, 
partly one more factor namely style of governance via ‘domestic political opposition & 
insurgency’ variable contributed to shaping of NPM ideas into the two cases. By this, my 
finding is that rather a hybrid NPM than a prescriptive NPM is possible through an interactive 
model. Owing to the complex interaction of aforesaid factors in the model, the country 
acquired a new hybrid NPM. That is unique in many ways, to be precise, by actors, by 
processes, and by contents.  
 
Having said that the whole approval decisions are the outcome of the NPM transformation, 
the study unfolded in the interactive model a coalition emerged over the time. The coalition 
was made mainly by the three variables, i.e., ‘fiscal crises’, ‘reform doctrines of donors/ 
international agencies’ and ‘deliberate planned and hierarchical decision-making of superior 
organizations’. The coalitions in effect to a greater extent circumscribed historical institution 
related variable ‘elite orientation in bureaucrats’ and also downplayed another cultural 
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variable ‘domestic political opposition & insurgency’. The study, therefore, found that the 
cultural related variables lost path-dependency because of the roles of instrumental and 
environmental perspectives related variables.   
 
6.4 Implications for the Theoretical Perspectives Employed 
I have contributed to an understanding of the underpinning sub-factors which carry casual-
effect relation with explanatory factors of ‘model of transformation of NPM’ (Christensen and 
Lægreid, 2002, p. 35). This suggests that in a context of developing country like Nepal, 
deliberate planned and hierarchical decision-making of superior organizations can be a 
indicator variant with regard to the structure factor. Similarly, elite orientation in bureaucrats 
can be a variant as for the historical institution factor. Likewise, domestic political opposition 
and insurgency can cope with the style of governance factor. Moreover, fiscal stress can be 
representative of the economy factor. Lastly, reform doctrines of donors’ and international 
agencies have contributory relationship with the ideology factor.  
 
I have contributed also to an understanding of the actors that have roles in NPM 
transformation being a part of decision-making. The study points out a number of actors of 
both categories, i.e., central and peripheral actors. They ranged from domestic to external 
actors. The actor identification, as I believe, is a supplementary effort to the fact that the 
‘model of NPM transformation’ (Christensen and Lægreid, 2002, p. 33-36) per se has been 
rather silent about actors.   
 
I have depicted that reforms are outcome of decision-making. My study unfolds that a 
financial sector related reform implies less-democratic, less-participatory and more top-down 
approach. The sole monopoly in the processes belongs to the technocrats; hence, the styles 
stand close to ‘technocratic strategy’ (Halligan, 2002, p.78). Governance related reform, 
however, implies more democratic, more participatory and less top-down approach. By this 
fact the styles stand by closer to ‘political or consensus model’ (ibid, p.78). I add the 
penetration to the ‘model of transformation’. 
 
I have contributed to an understanding of the relationship between the perspectives applied 
and the reform-contents. A reform in which high degree of structural/ instrumental 
perspectives, moderate degree of technical environment plus institutional/ myths perspectives 
and low degree of cultural perspective led to high degree of market and high degree of 
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management contents. Similarly, a reform in which strong degree of technical environmental/ 
institutional/ myths perspectives, moderate degree of structural/ instrumental perspectives and 
weak degree of cultural perspective led to high degree of management and low degree of 
market contents. This suggests the relationship between the perspectives and the decision-
contents to the ‘model of transformation’ (Christensen and Lægreid, 2002, p. 35).  
 
I have shown that an organization with logic of appropriateness yields greater management 
elements whereas an organization with logic of consequences yields greater market elements 
in a reform-content. This suggests that further extension to logic of appropriateness and logic 
of consequences which as a decision criterion seems quite relevant to the three perspectives.  
 
I have contributed to an understanding that international actor involved in local reform also 
learned from local environment especially from local myths. They modified their instrumental 
reform ideas. This suggests an extension to a notion of ‘myths in confrontation’ (Christensen 
et al, 2007, p. 292) that actors do modify instrumental reform doctrines when local myths and 
international myths confront. This also confirms one finding of Christensen and Lægreid that 
‘those whose values are more controversial undergo broad modification or are rejected’ 
(1999, p.184-185). Empirically, I witnessed the weakened and adamant culture was 
substituted with the two rest perspectives.  
 
I have shown a close link between the NPM idea as international reform doctrines and 
‘garbage can model’, a seminal work of Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) about public policy 
making. The model in which ‘solutions seek problems rather than the opposite’ (Christensen 
et al, 2007, p.99) matches to the NPM idea. I have illustrated also that Nepalese reform 
leaders/actors found the solutions ‘out’ there seeking a deal.  
 
With regard to popular recipes, I have confirmed a proposition ‘the concepts are often 
inspired by the international organizations and by those who certify them’ (Christensen et al, 
2007, p.110). My observation, however, suggests for an addition to the proposition that ideas, 
legitimacy and resources all come from international organizations in a developing country. 
 
I have demonstrated three roles of a reform leader. Heeled with the aid of the identified roles, 
we affirm that leaders have ‘double roles in reforms’ (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007, p. 5): 
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‘being sensitive to cultural traditions and guarding historical paths’ and making adaptation ‘to 
a new and changed environment and context’.  
 
My study also has illustrated that reform process began from top to down as the top leaders 
were conceived as ‘easy deal’, ‘quick responsive’ and ‘effective instrument’ with regard to 
international reform doctrines. This result confirms ‘reforms may be based on initiatives from 
the top’ (Christensen et al, 2007, p. 211). 
 
From my results, I have demonstrated that top leaders have had one more role: being an 
‘instrumental gatekeepers’. I thus suggest accepting the identified role apart from the role of 
‘cultural gatekeepers’ (Christensen and Lægreid, 1999, p. 185).  
 
6.5 Additional Theoretical Implications 
I have shown that fiscal crisis led the decision-makers to the financial sector reform. The 
finding confirms one previous finding about a developed and trail-blazer of NPM - New 
Zealand. The confirmation implies ‘the political elite perceived the country to be in severe 
financial trouble’ (Easton, 1997, p. 244; Evans et al., 1996 cited by Zuna, 2002, p. 126) as 
financial trouble was seen to be a major reason for NPM inspired reform of 1984 in New 
Zealand.  
 
I have contributed to a penetration that reveals ‘reform process in a strong hierarchical system 
is shaped by the choices of decision-makers of superior organization’ support the quoted 
finding. This is a part of extension of one previous finding about decision-making styles in 
Nepal that ‘It is quite rare for seniors to listen to what juniors suggest, and juniors hardly 
argue if they disagree with their superiors; and there is a strong belief that knowledge is 
hierarchical’ (Jamil and Dangal, forthcoming).  
 
My observation empirically supports seminal works of Downs and Niskanen where they 
argue that ‘individuals in public office attempt to maximize their own personal utility’ 
(Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971 cited by Peter, 1988, p. 119). I have extended the proposition 




I have shown that big political shock interrupted ‘policy legacy’ by making a punctuated 
equilibrium. This confirms ‘change in any system is a product of external shocks to the 
system’ (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992 cited by Steinmo, 2001, p.3). Besides, I suggest an 
extension to the proposition that political upheaval suddenly changes a long administrative 
policy path to a new path.  
 
I have shown that international factors became as a pressing force in fiscal sector reform and 
the country had no option as it was rested upon their supports, i.e., financial and legitimacy. 
From this reference, we confirm institutional change as a consequence of coercive 
isomorphism since it ‘results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on 
organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983, p. 150).  
 
I have linked uncertainty as a source of imitation, a seminal work of DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983). This confirms that imitation happens when ‘organisations are uncertain about their 
own experiences, or when their earlier development and activities are questioned’ (Sahlin-
Anderson, 1996; Sevon 1996 cited by Sahlin-Anderson, 2002, p.48). In such times, reformers 
‘turn to others for experiences and models to imitate’ (ibid, p.48). 
 
I have contributed to an affirmation that editing in a reform is resulted from ‘the distance 
between the supposed source of the model and the imitating actors’ (Sahlin-Andersson, 2002, 
p.54). From my observation I have shown that the country’s decision-makers in a bid of 
accepting donors’ conditionality did some editing. This suggests recognizing a ‘pressurizing 
condition’ as the actors did the editing in response to local pressures. 
 
I have illustrated that international reform doctrines received welcome responses. This 
confirms ‘models that are ‘packaged’ so that they can be transported’ are more easily imitated 
(Røvik, 1998, forthcoming Strang and Meyer, 1993 cited by Sahlin-Andersson, 2002, p.50). 
As a part of further extension in the same, I suggest that ‘the adoption of international myths 
of modernity’ (Christensen and Lægreid, 2002, p.26) from national and international practices 
satiate the reformers’ appetite for legitimacy and scarce resources. 
 
I have contributed to affirm an empirical finding from OECD about classification of 
reformers. Our results affirm two out of the four classifications: ‘the hesitant reformer’ and 
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‘the comprehensive reformer’ (Halligan, 2002, p. 75) as I have shown: a) loyal reformists - a 
few key decision-makers seemed to be fan of the ideas coming in from outside; b) skeptical 
reformists - some others kept on with some reservations hand-in-hand pushing up the reforms.  
 
I have found with regard to a concept of ‘fashion-setting community’ three visibly active 
actors. However, Abrahamson (1996, pp.123) argues only two kinds of actors in the 
community: 1) fashion leaders or fashion setters; 2) fashion followers. As I have shown the 
WB, DFID, and ADB seemed to have a role of ‘fashion merchants’, I suggest one more actor 
to be included in the community: the ‘fashion merchant’.  
 
I have contributed to strengthen understanding about ‘international myths of modernity’ 
(Christensen and Lægreid, 2002, p. 26). My results have illustrated that the myths are popular 
in developing country as they provide or are: 1) stamps of legitimacy from giant donors and 
international agencies; 2) being updated time and again with technical analysis; 3) the ideas 
tested and hand-picked from someone’s success stories; 4) the value of international 
modernity project; 5) popular elsewhere. I suggest accepting the reasons as a part of extension 
to the idea of ‘international myths of modernity’. 
 
6.6 Practical Implications 
6.6.1 Generalizations for Nepalese Policy Makers 
Reform has to be understood as a transformative approach rather than merely an adjustment 
with international reform doctrines. The transformative approach is a mantra for reform 
design. Spreading universal doctrines by skipping the complex mix of the three perspectives 
and the transformative approach can be a risky orthodox. Diversity of the reform-dynamics is 
subject to be welcome. It is because NPM has to be seen as ‘a loose collection of means and 
measures that allow for flexible adaptation’ (Christensen and Lægreid, 2002, p. 303). 
 
Legitimacy in reform is an imperative issue. But it does not imply only dominant international 
reform doctrines. Instead of the external source, it is also potential with internal source – 
‘participation’ of stakeholders in reform process. Stepping up towards participation is a key to 
this direction. However, it is wiser to determine the degree depending upon the requirement of 




Looking at the ‘dual roles’ (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007, p. 5) of the top leaders in 
reforms, a sufficient number of leaders must be groomed up aiming at sound knowledge and 
skills about two leadership roles: 1) instrumental gate-keeping; and 2) cultural gate-keeping. 
These roles are expected to meet filtering down useful ideas for reform in a balanced 
approach of all the three perspectives.  
 
In designing a reform, two basic approaches such as knowledge-based and consensus based 
can be useful rather than hierarchical approach. For this, we suggest a sound critical mass of 
reform leaders, who follow the two basic approaches of reforms, to be maintained at top layer 
of Nepalese bureaucracy.  
 
As culture is an identity of a society, action must respect the criteria for ‘cultural 
compatibility test’ (Brunsson and Olsen, 1993). However, it should not be so rigid that it 
denies adaptation to changes in environment. In order to avoid such unpleasant moments, 
reform leaders have to be so watchful that collision between cultural myths and institutional 
myths may not get any chance. 
 
6.6.2 Lesson for Other Similar Countries 
From Nepalese experiences, the best lesson that other countries can learn is the role of 
reform-leaders. The leaders with bureaucratic and technocratic backgrounds have shown 
exemplary practices even in a time of most conflict-ridden political crisis. The high sense of 
responsibility that felt on the part of bureaucratic leaders is a shining example to be 
disseminated to any developing countries with similar features.  
 
At some points donors and international agencies, which are generally regarded as carriers of 
international reform doctrines, also have shown keen enthusiasm to accept and adapt to local 
emergences. In the given the circumstances, they also have done some editing and 
modification in their instruments. This can be interesting for other countries.  
 
  
6.7 Implication for Further Research   
Having encountered with our finding that factors like structure, economy and ideology 
boosted up the financial and banking sector related reform, it is now relevant to deepen into 
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different aspects of the factors. Moreover, my deep concerns lie with a sort of comparative 
study so that further insights can be added to how far the findings from a developing country 
Nepal affirm with reform decision of a developed country.  
 
With reference to my finding, next research I urge is that factors like historical institution and 
style of governance espoused the governance related reform. As the finding differed from a 
conventional assumption that factors of cultural-path obstruct reform, my further interest is to 
investigate into what are the underpinnings that turn a long time ‘cultural gate-keepers’ into 
‘gate-openers’. To this study-interest I urge to include a comparative investigation. 
 
A general impression in organization theory is that most public sector reforms are less 
successful. Against such a backdrop, one more potential area for further study is to investigate 
into any of the reforms but in implementation. From this point, examining implementation 
status, delving into factors responsible for making discrepancy in the implementation and 
analyzing the reasons why the factors are causing discrepancy can be the central questions for 
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Appendix I: List of Interviewes 
SN Name Organization Position Name of the  
Case 
Associated 




2 Dr Bimal Prasad Koirala Presently, Executive 
Director, Management 
Development Centre 




3 Rajansingh Bhandary Presently CEO of Citizen 
Bank of Nepal 
Former Executive Director 
of NRB and Project 
Coordinator- FSTAP/FSRP  
The 
SPGNFSRP 
4 Dr Surya Prasad Shrestha Asian Development Bank, 
Kathmandu 
Governance Advisor The GRPRM 
5 Dr Hiramani Ghimire DFID, Kathmandu Governance Advisor The GRPRM  
6 Dipendra Bikram Thapa Office of the Prime 
Minister & Council of 
Ministers, Kathmandu 
Secretary and former 
Project Director of GRP 
The GRPRM 
7 Mukunda Aryal Ministry of General 
Administration 
Ex-Secretary The GRPRM 
8 Sabinraj Shrestha World Bank, Kathmandu Financial Sector Specialist The 
SPGNFSRP 







10 Bishnu Prasad Lamsal Now Ministry of Labor Former Section Chief of 
Administrative Reform 
Section, Ministry of 
General Administration 
The GRPRM 
11 Dr Shanker Sharma Presently Development 
Economist 




12 Madhav Prasad Ghimire Secretary, Ministry of 
Tourism, Civil Aviation 
and Culture 
Former Secretary of 
Ministry of General 
Administration 
The GRPRM 
13 Dr Shrikrishna Shrestha ‘Pro-Public’ a famous 
NGO 
President of Pro-Public and 
Head of Central 




14 Ishor Raj Paudel Ministry of Forest & Soil 
Conservation 
Former Section Office of 
Administrative Reform 
Section of MOGA 
The GRPRM 
15 Bharat Raj Gautam Joint Secretary Member Secretary of 
Parliamentary Committee 
on Administrative Reforms 
The GRPRM 
 
Appendix II: Interviewees by Associations with the Reform Programs 
SN Category of Associations Number of Interviewee Taken 
1 Strategy Paper of Government of Nepal on Financial Sector 
Reform Program, 2000 
5 
2 Governance Reform Program Road Map, 2004 10 
 Total Number of Interviewee 15 
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Appendix III: Interviewees by Organizational Association 
SN Name of the Organization Associated with Number of Interviewee Taken 
1 Nepal Rastra Bank (Central Bank of Nepal), Kathmandu 2 
2 Office of the Prime Minister & Council of Ministers, Kathmandu 1 
3 Asian Development Bank, Kathmandu 1 
4 World Bank, Kathmandu 1 
5 DFID, Kathmandu 1 
6 National Planning Commission, Kathmandu 1 
7 Ministry of General Administration, Kathmandu 5 
8 Ministry of Finance 1 
8 Parliamentary Committee on Administrative Reform, House of 
Representative (Lower House) 
1 
9 Pro-Public (a representative of civil society) 1 





Appendix IV: Interview Guide 
 
Interview Guide: Spring 2007 
 
I am an MPhil student of University of Bergen and as part of my final year project; I am 
undertaking a thesis research. The topic of my thesis is ‘Transformation of New Public 
Management: Shaping A New Hybrid in Nepal?’ The two principal aims of the study include 
mapping the actors, processes and contents involved in two reform cases and analyzing the 
causal of the reform decisions. I would be delighted if you could manage to answer the 
following questions. The exercise is purely academic and confidentiality of your answers 
would be maintained. The success of this research is fully dependant on your responses. 
 





2. Gender:  Male  Female 
3. Educational Background:……………………. 
4. Capacity to the Case:…………………………. 
5. Organization’s Name:…………………………….. 
 
 
1) In what background the reform process began? 
2) What was the role of the senior bureaucrats in the decisions over the time? 
3) How did work elite mindset of the bureaucrats involved? 
4) What was the role of budgetary troubles of the country? 
5) What were the roles of various donors? Multilateral and bilateral donors? 
6) How far the donors’ conditionality played the roles? 
7) How did political parties respond the reform issue over the time? How did major 
oppositional parties respond? 
8) What roles of the insurgent Communist Party of Nepal- Maoist were observed? 
9) What roles were played by domestic and international consultants? 
10) What roles were played by different employees’ organizations? 
11) Was there any roles played by any actors from civil society? How did they affect? 
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12) Any roles were there played by NGOs? If yes, what roles did they play? 
13) How did mass-media respond to the reform processes and affect the decision-makings? 
14) Who were other major actors seen in the decision-makings? 
15) How the processes affected the contents of the decisions? 
16) How superior officials and organizations did impose their ideas in the decision-
makings? 
17) How did superior officials and organizations negotiate with their subordinate officials 
and agencies? 
18) Did the reform get any inspiration from any special local practices or actors? If yes, how 
did they influence? 
19) Did the reform receive any inspiration from practices or ideas coming in from abroad? If 
yes, how did they affect? 
20) What kind of decisions styles employed? Was there any role of the decision-making 
style employed?  
21) How was organized the agenda setting process? And who affected the process? 
22) How was drafted the paper? And who affected the draft and how? 
23) How was made the final decisions by the Cabinet? And who affected the decisions and 
how? 
24) Who were relatively strong actors in the different processes? Why were they strong? 
25) Who were relatively weak and passive actors in the different processes? What were the 
reasons? 
26) What reasons did motivate the actors involved in the decision-makings? And how affect 
that the decision-making? 
27) What reasons did de-motivate the passive actors? And how affect that the decision-
making? 
 
 
 
 
